

b2

[REDACTED]

HUNTER PROJECT

NO INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS FILE SECTION SHOULD BE
DISSEMINATED IN ANY FORM WITHIN OR OUTSIDE THE BUREAU. THIS
FILE SECTION MAY ONLY BE REVIEWED BY PERSONNEL OF THE RECORDS
MANAGEMENT DIVISION OR LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION IN CONNECTION
WITH FOIA REQUESTS OR CIVIL LITIGATION. ADDITIONALLY, THE
DIRECTOR, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT DIRECTORS AND THE ASSISTANT
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, OR SOMEONE ACTING IN THEIR
BEHALF, MAY REVIEW THIS FILE SECTION. SEE 105-93089-98 FOR
AUTHORITY.

MAINTAIN AS TOP SERIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3/4/79
CLASS. & EXT. BY 2842-PWD/98
REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW 11-7-98 *per marked c*
declassification

(U) (B) HANDLING OF SENSITIVE MATERIAL UNDER CODE WORD "JUNE" --
"JUNE" policy, as set forth in SAC Letter 70-29, dated 5/26/70, states that
"only correspondence which identifies an individual, organization, or diplomatic
establishment as having been or is under consideration to be the subject matter
of an electronic surveillance in the internal security or racial field should be
included in the 'JUNE' procedure." A review of the current practice reflects
that the definition of "JUNE" is both outdated in its terminology, and in conflict
with Executive Order 12065, which replaces Executive Order 11652 and becomes
effective December 1, 1978. This new Executive Order prohibits the use of terms
or markings such as "JUNE" in order to identify information requiring protection.
So as not to conflict with the special marking prohibitions outlined in the new
Executive Order on classification, the "JUNE" designation should be discontinued.

Despite the restrictions set forth in the new Executive Order regarding
special markings, FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ) considers it imperative that certain
intelligence information both at FBIHQ and in the field offices be afforded special
storage. Henceforth, the following material should receive special storage,
preferably in the same space designated for "Top Secret" national security
material:

- (a) FBI national security electronic surveillance (ELSUR) material
which identifies the target, reveals extraordinary technical devices
being used, or where the subject is particularly sensitive.
- (U) (b) FBI communications identifying subjects of recruitment cases in
which recruitment appears probable or other sensitive communications
dealing with penetration or double agent matters.

Field offices should insure that material meeting the criteria defined
above receives special storage apart from the office's general files, keeping
in mind that special markings are prohibited when administratively designating
this material for special storage. All field offices should immediately initiate
a review of current "JUNE" material to determine if it still warrants special
storage under the new definitions. To insure that all information is available
on a timely basis to those entitled to it, great care should be taken to insure
that any files or serials designated for special storage are properly charged
out from the office's general files in accordance with current charge-out
procedures.

(U)
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

William H. Webster
Director

66 FEB 2 1979
MEMORANDUM 52-78


NOT RECORDED
191 JAN 24 1979

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-1572

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-08-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB/MJS

SOME MAIL IN 66-1372 WAS CHANGED TO 66-2



6-1372-

JUNE MAIL

JUNE MAIL

SPECIAL FILE ROOM MATERIAL

RETURN PERSONALLY TO

ROOM 5991

DO NOT PLACE IN TELELIFT SYSTEM

**AUTHORIZATION FOR MAINTENANCE IN THE
SPECIAL FILE ROOM SEE: The June General
File - 66-1372**

4-257 (Rev. 9-12-79)

JUNE MAIL

FBI/DOJ



United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

PERSONAL ATTENTION
~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

SAC LETTER NO. 69
Series 1949

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. _____

June 29, 1949 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SAC	ALBANY	DENVER	MILWAUKEE	RICHMOND
	ANCHORAGE	DETROIT	MOBILE	ST. LOUIS
	ATLANTA	EL PASO	NEWARK	ST. PAUL
	BALTIMORE	HONOLULU	NEW HAVEN	SALT LAKE CITY
	BIRMINGHAM	HOUSTON	NEW ORLEANS	SAN ANTONIO
	BOSTON	INDIANAPOLIS	NEW YORK	SAN DIEGO
	BUFFALO	KANSAS CITY	NORFOLK	SAN FRANCISCO
	BUTTE	KNOXVILLE	OKLAHOMA CITY	SAN JUAN
	CHARLOTTE	LITTLE ROCK	OMAHA	SAVANNAH
	CHICAGO	LOS ANGELES	PHILADELPHIA	SEATTLE
	CINCINNATI	LOUISVILLE	PHOENIX	SPRINGFIELD
	CLEVELAND	MEMPHIS	PITTSBURGH	WASHINGTON, D. C.
	DALLAS	MIAMI	PORTLAND	QUANTICO

(A) MONTHLY INSPECTION EXAMINATION - COMMUNIST MATTERS -- It is desired that you submit to the Bureau by August 1, 1949, an inspection report covering an examination of certain phases of the Bureau's work relating to Communist investigations. In connection with the file reviews requested, the provision of Section 87, Volume III of the Manual of Instructions should be reviewed to determine whether the instructions therein have been followed in the investigations and reports. (c)u

I. COMMUNIST PARTY, U.S.A., AND SPLINTER GROUPS

Each office shall review the files regarding the Communist Party as an organization, the Socialist Workers Party, the Workers Party and similar groups, covering the period from January 1, 1949 to the present time. Reference should be made to SAC Letter No. 24, Series 1948, dated February 13, 1948, in addition to Section 87 of the Manual of Instructions in connection with these reviews. The following information should be obtained and included in your inspection report: (c)u

a. The number of Special Agents and Special Employees assigned to coverage of the Communist Party as an organization and splinter groups. The percentage of time spent by these employees on such matters should be set forth. (c)u

b. Describe the efforts to follow Communist Party membership trends and set forth the number of Communist Party members in your division. (c)u

c. Advise whether the states covered by your division have legislation pending or under consideration, directly aimed at curtailing the Communist Party or similar groups. (c)u

CLASS. & EXT. BY
REASON - FCIM 11, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW

RECORDED

66-1392-
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
AUG 9 1949
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

DECLASSIFIED BY 6383 KRT/LJR
ON 3-24-81

CONFIDENTIAL

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-04-962

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

d. State whether the Communist Party is attempting to create slowdowns in industry, create disturbances and cause strikes. If evidence of such activity exists, describe the methods employed in this connection by the Communist Party. (C) u

e. Report information concerning any factional group of expelled Communist Party members operating in your division, including details relating to the activities on which such group is concentrating. (C) u

f. Describe the program of education pursued by the Communist Party and the special classes or schools utilized to transmit their theories. (C) u

During the review of these files, you should determine if all instructions have been followed in the submission of the most recent quarterly report regarding the Communist Party, U.S.A. In addition, the adequacy of the general investigative procedures employed should be considered, and the following specific items checked during the file reviews: (C)

(a) Adequacy of information obtained under each phase of Communist Party activities, as outlined in SAC Letter No. 24, Series 1948. (C) u

(b) Whether the deadlines set for investigative reports have been met. (C) u

(c) Whether legally admissible evidence is being gathered in addition to the development of general intelligence information. (C) u

(d) The prompt notification of the Bureau regarding scheduled conventions and other important meetings of the Communist Party and similar groups, and the coverage of such conventions and meetings is required. Determine if such action is being taken by your division. (C) u

(e) The possibility of technical and microphone surveillances and increased coverage of the Communist Party and splinter groups through trash coverage. (C) u (C)

(f) Coverage of Communist Party headquarters and coverage of the Communist Party District Chairman and other top functionaries. (C) u

(g) You should determine whether information is being collected concerning the sources and extent of Communist Party income and expenditures. In this connection, bank accounts of the organization should be monitored at regular intervals, and efforts should be made to determine if safe-deposit boxes are being utilized by the Communist Party, either in the name of the Party or in an individual's name. (C) u

(h) Determine what efforts have been made to learn of the Communist Party's plan of operation and who its leaders will be in the event the organization goes underground. During the file review, careful consideration should be given to logical leads looking toward the development of such information. Also, the file reviews should determine the extent of efforts to learn of any hidden Communist Party caches of arms, ammunition, stationery supplies, mimeograph machines, radio transmitters, the existence of gun or hunting clubs, etc. (C) u (C)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(i) Whether deadlines on letters to the Bureau regarding addresses of Communist Party units are being met. (EXU) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(j) Whether the Bureau is advised promptly of planned foreign travel of Communist Party members, and if adequate coverage of such departures and returns is being arranged. (EXU)

(k) The identification of Communist Party members who obtain employment in strategic industry. (EXU)

(l) Whether the Bureau has been notified of the identities of Communist Party members and sympathizers who have run for Federal offices, together with the results of such elections. Such information should also have been set forth in the quarterly report. (EXU)

(m) Significant revolutionary remarks made by Communist Party members should be submitted to the Bureau under the caption "Communist Party Brief". You should determine if such action has been taken. (EXU)

II. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF LABOR

Each office shall review a total of 50% or up to 10 pending cases, whichever number is larger, relating to Communist infiltration of labor. One-half of the number of pending cases reviewed shall be reviewed from the closed cases relating to this matter. (EXU)

It is desired that you include in the inspection report the number of pending cases in this category, and the number in which your division is office of origin. You should set forth also the percentage of coverage relating to these cases obtained from each of the following sources: Newspapers, technical and microphone surveillances and live informants. (EXU)

During the review of these files, consideration should be given to the following items, in addition to the regular investigative operations used in the cases: (EXU)

a. Whether reports are being submitted each six months. (EXU)

b. Whether these cases in which your division is origin are being adequately followed to insure that auxiliary offices complete requested investigations promptly and thoroughly. (EXU)

c. Whether individuals mentioned in reports are being identified and described as to Communist affiliations. (EXU)

d. The files should reflect the identities of Communists holding office on both the national and local levels. (EXU)

e. Determine whether all information in reports is being attributed to its original source. (EXU)

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(f) Determine whether the proper number of copies of reports are being furnished the Bureau, and if copies are being disseminated to local intelligence agencies having interest in their contents. (S) u

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(g) Prior to closing Communist infiltration of labor cases, adequate informant coverage should be established to insure that the Bureau will be advised of pertinent changes within the union's organizational setup which might justify the reopening of the case. During the inspection, the number of informants utilized for this purpose, and frequency of contact with such informants should be analyzed to determine if such coverage is adequate. (S) u

III. COMMUNIST FRONTS

You should review a total of 50% or up to 10 pending files, whichever number is larger, relating to Communist front organizations in which your office is origin. One-half of the number of pending files reviewed should be inspected among the closed cases regarding Communist front organizations. (S) u

There should be included in your inspection report the number of pending Communist front investigations and the number of cases pending in this category in which you are office of origin. (S) u

During the review of these files, in addition to reviewing the general investigative procedures utilized, the following items should be considered: (S) u

- a. Whether reports are being submitted each six months. (S) u
- b. Whether auxiliary offices are being adequately followed, and if copies of reports are being furnished to local intelligence branches of the Government. (S) u
- c. Determine if statements in reports are attributed to the original sources and appropriate headings and sub-headings are being employed. (S) u
- d. Whether individuals mentioned in reports are identified and described as to Communist affiliations. (S) u
- e. Ascertain if informants in Communist matters are being fully utilized in these investigations. (S) u
- f. Six copies of reports should be furnished the Bureau relating to investigations dealing with organizations designated by the Attorney General as within the purview of Executive Order No. 9835. Determine whether such instructions are being followed. (S) u
- g. Ascertain if the Bureau has been advised promptly of the formation of all local organizations subject to Communist infiltration or control. (S) u

IV. INFORMANTS

During this monthly inspection, it is desired that an analysis and inspection of various live, paid informants utilized in the cases reviewed be made. (S) u

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The following specific information should be included in the inspection report submitted by your office: (S)U

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

a. The total number of live, paid informants on the Communist Party and splinter groups, with a breakdown of the number who are members of particular organizations and the positions held in the organizations. (S)U

b. The efforts made and procedures followed to develop new informants. You should include the efforts of the personnel of your division to raise the level and value of the present informants. (S)U

c. Describe the methods used to pay live informants, and the security measures taken in contacts with them. (S)U

d. Advise what action is taken to prevent infiltration of the Bureau by the Communist Party through a double agent. (S)U

In addition, the following items should be considered in reviewing files relating to the confidential informants used in cases comprehended in this inspection: (S)U

(a) Whether all paid confidential informants have been assigned a symbol number and the Bureau appropriately advised. (S)U

(b) Whether background information has been sent to the Bureau on each informant, and clearance requested to utilize the informant on Communist matters. (S)U

(c) The adequacy of the ticklers on paid informants. (S)U

(d) Whether the requirement that the request to pay an informant be submitted two weeks before the expiration of the previously authorized period has been followed. (S)U

(e) Whether informants of no value are being eliminated. (S)U

(f) Whether reports submitted by informants are appropriately identified. (S)U

(g) Ascertain if the instructions in SAC Letter No. 71, Series 1947, dated June 6, 1947, regarding reports mailed by informants are being followed. (S)U

(h) Determine the frequency of contact with informants, and the check that is made of the expenses of informants in those instances in which the Bureau is paying the informants' expenses. (S)U

(i) Determine the adequacy of the information furnished by informants and the compensation paid for such information. It should be determined whether the Bureau is receiving information commensurate with the amount the informant is paid. (S)U

The report of this monthly inspection should consist of a summary memorandum, case write-ups and administrative memoranda. Case write-ups and

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serious administrative delinquencies which are the subject of memoranda must include explanations for the delinquencies from the employees responsible. A copy of the case write-up or administrative memorandum should be placed in the personnel file of the employee responsible for the delinquency. The Bureau should be furnished with your recommendations for any disciplinary action you consider appropriate regarding such delinquencies. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

An original and three copies of case write-ups should be forwarded to the Bureau, and an original and two copies of administrative memoranda should be submitted. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

It is desired that you attach to the inspection report a separate memorandum reflecting any interesting, unique and new investigative techniques utilized by your office in the cases reviewed. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(B) CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS - LISTING IN REPORTS - SPECIAL COMMUNICATION -- When information is received from some highly confidential source and such source of information or informant is of such a confidential character that the information should not appear in the file of a case, it is desired that the identification of such a highly confidential source be communicated to the Bureau by letter, which will be forwarded to the Director under personal and confidential cover. The communication should be sealed in an envelope bearing the code word "June" and then placed in the envelope addressed to the Director "Personal and Confidential." ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

These letters received at the Bureau will be filed in a separate confidential file maintained under lock and key. The copies of such letters in the field offices are to be maintained in a confidential file by the Special Agent in Charge and this file, too, shall be retained under lock and key. The administrative informant page will merely state that "Other informants are being identified in a separate letter being forwarded to the Bureau." ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

There would be no necessity for being unusually secretive about the average confidential informant who does not want his identity disclosed due to temerity or due to the fact that such a disclosure might interfere with the informant's business or embroil him in difficulties with his friends and neighbors. Information from such a source should be included in the usual manner on the informant page of the report.

The above-described letter is to be used only for the most secretive sources, such as Governors, secretaries to high officials who may be discussing such officials and their attitude, or when referring to highly confidential or unusual investigative techniques.

This information should be made known, orally, to the Special Agents of your office promptly.

(C) CURRENT PHOTOGRAPHS FOR AGENT PERSONNEL -- At this time the Bureau is desirous of receiving up-to-date photographs of all Special Agent personnel who have completed at least three years of service and who have not furnished up-to-date

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photographs during the period of time. These photographs can be of the passport type.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In the future, on each July 1st, you should instruct those Special Agents assigned to your Division who have not furnished up-to-date photographs to the Bureau within a three-year period to furnish such photographs on that date.

(D) CENTRAL RESEARCH MATTERS - "THE CURRENT LINE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, USA" - SECURITY MATTER - C -- Attention is directed to SAC Letter No. 134, dated October 14, 1947, page 5, which furnished suggestions concerning the "Preparation of Reports on Communist Party Front Organizations," for the purpose of establishing uniformity. Among various breakdowns, these suggestions call for a subdivision entitled "Implementation of the Communist Party Line," and directed that the program and activities of the organization be compared with similar programs of the Communist Party. The letter pointed out that the statements used for the Communist Party Line should be taken from official publications of the Communist Party. *TCU*

There is transmitted herewith, a memorandum dated June 6, 1949, bearing the title, "The Current Line of the Communist Party, USA," which was prepared at the Bureau. It was developed from a review of the Communist publications, "Political Affairs," "The Worker," and the "Daily Worker" which were quoted extensively. *TCU*

The contents of this memorandum may be quoted or paraphrased when preparing above reports. However, care should be taken to cite the original sources and not this memorandum. It is believed that by utilizing this material, a considerable amount of duplicate review work can be avoided. The field will be advised of major changes as they occur. *TCU*

You are instructed to call the attention of all Agents handling Communist, Russian and related cases, to the existence of this memorandum. You are also directed to prepare a dead file entitled "Communist Party - USA - Line" as a central depository for this type of information so that it can be readily available at all times. *(X) ALCU*

(E) STENOGRAPHIC AND TYPING DELINQUENCIES -- Reference is made to SAC Letters #46 and #52, Series 1949, dated April 15, 1949 and May 3, 1949 respectively. A recent survey of the status of the stenographic work pending in the divisional offices as of May 31, 1949, has brought to the attention of the Bureau several instances which reflect the improper preparation of Form FD 162, which is supported by stenographers' and typists' daily reports Form FD 76.

The instances wherein errors were noted could be traced to the fact that work pending as reported on the stenographers' and typists' daily reports could not be reconciled to the number of pages reported on Form FD 162. It was also noted that in some instances an improper classification of pending work was made inasmuch as the work was not broken down by months received as is required in the preparation of Form FD 162. Some offices reported only current work pending on

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the stenographers' books and others reported work performed during the month, neither of which is desired by the Bureau inasmuch as the only information required is that work which is pending on the stenographers' and typists' books at the close of business on the last working day of the month.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

It should be borne in mind that if you have employees in a leave status at the close of the month, they must be accounted for and if they have pending work on their books you should forward the last daily report which was submitted by them prior to their entering a leave status. You should be certain that the total number of pages reported as work to be done by the stenographers, equals the total number of pages appearing on Form FD 162.

For your assistance in the preparation of this report, there is attached hereto an executed sample copy of Form FD 162, and you should bear in mind that these reports should be mailed to the Bureau no later than the close of business on the second working day of the new month. They should be forwarded by routing slip for the attention of the Administrative Division.

(F) CITATIONS BY OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES OF ORGANIZATIONS AND PUBLICATIONS FOUND TO BE COMMUNIST OR COMMUNIST FRONTS -- There are being forwarded herewith copies of a pamphlet captioned as above dated December 18, 1948, which was prepared and released by the Committee on Un-American Activities, U. S. House Representatives, Washington, D. C.

It is believed that the citations contained in this pamphlet may be of assistance to your office as a ready reference in identifying the more common Communist organizations and publications particularly in the preparation of reports which are to be disseminated to other government agencies such as Loyalty of Government Employee and various applicant type cases.

You are requested to acquaint the agents assigned to your office with the availability of the pamphlet in order that lengthy file reviews made for the purpose of briefly describing Communist groups and periodicals may be kept to a minimum.

You are cautioned, however, that it has been learned that this pamphlet may be in error where organizations and publications are listed and are credited with having been originally cited by the California Committee on Un-American Activities (Tenney Committee). Therefore, wherever the original citation as listed in the HCUA pamphlet is credited to the Tenney Committee, before the citation may be used, the 1948 Tenney Committee reports must first be checked to see if the Tenney Committee actually cited the organizations or publication in question. One copy of the 1948 Tenney Committee reports is transmitted herewith for this purpose.

(G) LIAISON WITH BUREAU OF CUSTOMS - REGISTRATION ACT -- The Criminal Division of the Department of Justice recently conferred with representatives of the U. S. Bureau of Customs relative to the problem of the handling of potentially subversive material which comes to the attention of the Bureau of Customs. It was pointed out by the Customs representatives that considerable material comes through various Customs offices which may indicate subversive activities. It was the opinion

of the Criminal Division that not only would the Department be interested in some of the material from a standpoint of knowledge of subversive activities, but would also indicate liability for registration under the Foreign Agents Registration Act.

CONFIDENTIAL

These facts were pointed out to Customs, and it was requested by the Criminal Division representatives that Customs Headquarters make arrangements whereby the collectors in the various Customs districts advise the nearest field offices of the FBI when the material which the collectors regard as questionable comes to their attention. It was agreed that no formal notice would be given to the local field office of the FBI but an informal notice such as a telephone call would be made each time a questionable shipment arrives. When this notice is given, the shipment will be held for a few days for FBI inspection if desired.

It is understood that all of the collectors of Customs offices may contact the nearest Bureau office to discuss this matter. In the event contacts are made with the collectors of Customs with reference to this material, we should effect such liaison as to insure the receipt of the information indicated herein.

With regard to the material in question, if Customs suspects a shipment to contain material indicating subversive activities, copies of the material should be obtained if legally possible. Where that is not possible, Customs should advise you of the names of the consignee and the consignor and the date on which the shipment goes through the collector's office. If the material suspected by Customs is available for inspection, a check should be made as soon as possible in order that it may not be held more than a few days. If there is any question concerning material detained by Customs and inspected by you, a communication should be directed to the Bureau for transmittal to the Criminal Division and an opinion will be obtained as to whether or not there is a violation of the Registration Act.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Attachments for (D), (E), and (F)

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Series 1949

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CONFIDENTIAL

JUNE
TOPICAL INDEX OF GENERAL FILE 66-1372

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Clarification of procedure for JUNE mail	6	10/27/50
	8X	12/21/51
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5/4/79
CLASS. & EXT. BY 2842 PLO/Dr
REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW 4/13/86

CONFIDENTIAL

SERIALDATE

Procedure for continuance of technical surveillances on a case to be brought before U.S. Attorney -- discontinuance upon arrest of subject
Procedure for preparation of reports concerning a surveillance

(SAC Let. No #)

4/24/52

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Documentation of summary reports in security investigation -- suggestion

9

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11/23/55

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(SAC Let. No #)

2/3/56

Copies of FD-142 and FD-143 not to be made

2/27/57

Clarification of restrictive words and phrases to be used on Bureau correspondence

(SAC Let. 457-52)

9/16/57

Stamp JUNE in red on all JUNE mail -- suggestion

20

9/4/58

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

	<u>SERIAL</u>	<u>DATE</u>
(U) Transmittal notations (C)		3/6/59
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice**

Los Angeles, California
October 10, 1949

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

JUNE

Re: JUNE

Director, FBI

Dear Sir:

(U) Reference is made to SAC Letter No. 85, Series 1949, dated September 7, 1949, Section B, wherein it is stated that when highly confidential sources will be used as the basis for information being set forth in numerous reports, the informant should be assigned a permanent symbol number by letter under the caption "June." (S) (C)

(U) This office has a number of such sources which have been assigned a permanent symbol number. It is expected that these sources will be frequently utilized in future reports. In order that the symbol number will be readily available, a confidential informant card on each of these sources will be maintained in the active informant index unless the Bureau instructs otherwise. (C)

Very truly yours,

CLASS. & EXT. BY SP-5 RJB/142
REASON - FCIM 11, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW 4-5-90

R. B. Hood
R. B. HOOD
Special Agent in Charge

ELO:rih
67-7200-B

RECORDED - 2

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1-66-1372-26-55
FBI
34 NOV 23 1949

JAN 4 1966mm

54 NOV 28 1949

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

672

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: September 2, 1949

FROM : GUY HOTTEL, SAC, Washington Field

SUBJECT: JUNE

JUNE - GeneralPERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Re report of Special Agent Milton Singman dated September 2, 1949 at Washington, D.C. in the above captioned matter.

The identity of the following informant was not fully reflected and is being set out below:

(U) Washington T-1

A highly confidential informant referred to on page 19 of the report of Special Agent Edward W. Dooley at New York City dated March 22, 1946, in the case of "NATHAN GREGORY SILVERMASTER, et al, Espionage -R". Informant made available address book of JULES KORCHIEN.

CONFIDENTIALMS: bh
66-21685/4/99
CLASS. & EXT. BY 2842 PWD/KR

REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2 2

DATE OF REVIEW 8/4/89

RECORDED - 2

66-1372-1X1

66-1372-53-11

34 SEP 21 1949

917

CONFIDENTIAL9-6-49
54 OCT 1 1949
JAN 25 1966

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. NICHOLS *BN*
 FROM : F. W. WALKART *F*
 SUBJECT: "JUNE" (PROCESSING OF MAIL)

DATE: January 20, 1950

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

Reference is made to the attached blind memorandum prepared by Mr. Fletcher referring to the handling of JUNE mail. Instructions set-out therein provide for the confidential and secure handling of both incoming and outgoing mail in the JUNE category. Mr. Fletcher requested that the Records Section submit an outline of a method for processing this mail which will maintain its confidential nature and at the same time restrict the handling to a minimum number of employees.

JUNE mail will be forwarded to the Records Section by special messenger in a ~~confidential~~ envelope from Mr. Lamphere in Room 4708. We will arrange to have this mail handled only by a select number of employees in each unit. (4)

JUNE mail will be indexed and recorded into whatever case file or files are pertinent. Although thoroughly indexed and recorded the mail will not be actually filed in the subject matter files but will be returned to Mr. Lamphere in Room 4708. (4)

Special serial charge-outs will be made out for each item of JUNE mail and filed in the subject matter files. These charge-outs will serve the purpose of notifying anyone reviewing the particular file that correspondence is missing and may be located by contacting Mr. Lamphere, Room 4708. There will be no indication on the charge-out concerning the confidential nature of the subject matter. (4)

It is believed that the above method is the only practical way of handling JUNE mail. I am very definitely opposed to any use of sub-files or a special file room wherein material is recorded and indexed with no record reflected in the master indices and files of the Bureau.

FWW:eo
 Attachment

CLASS. & EXT. BY *SP-5 RWH/uf*
 REASON FCIM II, 1-2.4.2
 DATE OF REVIEW *8-5-90*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE *8-6-80* BY *SP-5 RWH/uf*

66-1272-3
 FEB 8 1950
 34

*The above applies to
 mail re Tech Surveillance
 only. 398*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

54 FEB 10 1950

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Re: JUNE

Current instructions require that confidential material be handled under the code name "June". Under recent instructions all field technical surveillance material is to be carried under a confidential cover marked "June". It is retained in files separate and apart from the main file room in a confidential office. All "June" confidential correspondence is handled and filed in this one office presently under the supervision of R. J. Lamphere. The word "June" serves as a tag to the Records Section so that mail coming into the Records Section is not opened there or, if received through inadvertence or accident, it is immediately stopped and forwarded to R. J. Lamphere.

Any incoming correspondence coming to your attention bearing the code word "June" should be forwarded to R. J. Lamphere without opening. In other words, no "June" mail should reach any supervisor until it has been routed from R. J. Lamphere.

With reference to outgoing correspondence, it should be appropriately marked "Personal Attention" and immediately beneath the designation, "Personal Attention," shall appear the word "June". Without exception, the name of Lamphere shall be written immediately under the block appearing in the lower left-hand corner of the yellow. In addition, there shall be affixed to the yellow a routing slip directing the yellow and the attached correspondence to Lamphere. All outgoing correspondence bearing the code word "June" shall be placed in a messenger envelope. It shall carry the following routing from the supervisor preparing these communications: Name of Section Chief, Fletcher, Ladd, Reading Room, Mail Room, Lamphere. When the correspondence relates to technical surveillances, in addition to the routing indicated immediately after the name "Ladd" should appear the routing, Mr. Tolson, followed by Reading Room, Mail Room and Lamphere. It is to be noted that Lamphere's present room number is 4708 and when his name is listed on the messenger envelope, the room number should be indicated to insure direct routing. (4)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-5-80 BY SP-5 BJT/12

8-5
CLASSIFIED BY SP-5 BJT
REASON FOR DECLASSIFICATION 8-5-90
DATE OF REVIEW 8-5-90

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 28, 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. D. M. Ladd
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Fletcher
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-1-80 BY SP-7

(Mr. Rosen and Ladd.)

Your attention is directed to the "no number" SAC Letter issued to the field December 22, 1949, regarding technical surveillances. In order to supplement these instructions as they will be applicable to the Seat of Government, the following procedures are to be followed:

All written material concerning field technical surveillances shall be retained and filed separate and apart from the main file room in a confidential office where similar confidential correspondence is now being handled and filed. Communications from the field to the Bureau and replies from the Bureau to the field concerning the technical surveillances will be sent in a confidential cover marked "June."

The word June is the code word for mail related to technical surveillances and other highly confidential matters for a flag to the Records Section that this mail is not to be opened in the file room.

With respect to incoming correspondence bearing this code word, it should be sent to Mr. Ladd's Office for handling. With respect to outgoing correspondence bearing this code word, the Records Section should mail the correspondence to the Special Agent in Charge of the field office to which it is indicated. This procedure is designed to prevent the processing at the Seat of Government or the field file rooms of this correspondence and to prevent its handling by clerical or messenger employees.

I desire that these instructions be placed into effect promptly

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

RECEIVED

HCB:BWM

RECORDED - 2

JAN 18 1950

RECEIVED RLB

JAN 19 1950

61-1009



United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NO NUMBER
SAC LETTER

December 22, 1949

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMO FOR MR. HOOVER
TOLSON
CLEGG
CONNELLEY
GLAVIN
HAREO
LADD
NICHOLS
ROSEN
TRACY
BAUMGARDNER
BOSWELL

CALLAHAN
CALLAN
CARLSON
CARTWRIGHT
CONRAD
DOWNING
EDWARDS H. L.
EGAN
FEENEY
FLETCHER
GURTEA
JONES, M. A.

KEAY
LAUGHLIN
LEONARD
LONG
McCABE, E. J.
McCABE, N. H.
McGUIRE
McINTIRE
MOBLEY
MOHR
NANNA
NAUGHTEN

NEASE
PARSONS
PENNINGTON
RENNEBERGER
ROGERS
SCOTT
SIZOO
TAMM, Q.
WAIKART
WALL
WHITSON

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-6-80 BY SP-9 [signature]

CLASS & EXT BY SP-5 [signature]
REASON - FCIM 11, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW 8-5-90

(A) SURVEILLANCES - TECHNICAL -- As a matter of general policy, the Bureau will not make use of technical surveillances in any criminal case. The Bureau will continue, however, to consider technical installations in kidnaping and extortion cases where human lives are in jeopardy.

In the security field, technical surveillances will be authorized to obtain general intelligence information. In this connection, cases involving possible prosecution, such as espionage or sabotage, technical surveillances will be authorized only when the intelligence need for the particular surveillance is equal to or greater than the prosecutive needs. These individual instances will be considered separately as they may arise and a decision made concerning the advisability of such technical surveillances in keeping with the circumstances of the individual case. It should be borne in mind, however, that the Bureau desires to avoid use of technical surveillances when the case will be prosecuted. (4)

Any technical surveillance installed should be regarded as a confidential investigative technique. Knowledge of the use of this technique in any individual case should be restricted so far as possible. The Bureau is of the opinion that it is not necessary for all employees to know of the existence of any one or all technical surveillances in use in a field division. The following procedures are designed to restrict the availability of information concerning the use of technical surveillances to those employees necessary to make their use effective. These procedures are to be instituted immediately in your office.

all copies destroyed 7-6-67
per Mr. Tavel's instructions with
the exception of copy he gave
Mr. Rex Shroden, Div. 6, [unclear]

DUPLICATE YELLOW
CONFIDENTIAL

NOT RECORDED

119

APR 4 1950

ORIGINAL

In the future when a technical surveillance has been installed, only one permanent record will be retained. This will be a chronological log maintained on each technical surveillance. In the event there are several surveillances covering different lines at the same establishment, which relate to the same case, the results from all of these lines may be recorded on the same log if found desirable. Any handwritten notes made by the employees monitoring these surveillances and the information on the recording should be consolidated into these logs. The logs are to be made up on a day-by-day basis. It is imperative that care be exercised in the selection of the Special Agent or Agents who are to prepare the logs from the monitoring employees' notes and from the disk recordings. The identity of the Agent preparing the log should be shown. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

When these logs have been prepared they should be transmitted in a sealed envelope to the field supervisor in charge of the case to which the log relates by an appropriate employee. The supervisor will in turn personally deliver such logs to the Special Agent to whom the case is assigned. This Special Agent will review the logs and take any required action based on the information therein contained. Upon the completion of the examination of these logs, the handwritten notes made by the monitoring employees and the recordings of the technical surveillance should be promptly destroyed. The reviewing agent should personally return the logs to the supervisor from whom they were obtained who will in turn personally deliver them to the employees maintaining the special files as later described in order that the logs may be appropriately serialized, indexed and filed.

In the event the Agent reviewing the logs desires to dictate necessary excerpts from the logs for inclusion in future reports, such dictation should be in paraphrased form and so worded as to protect the source of the information. This paraphrased material may then be placed in the regular case file.

In every office where there are technical surveillances, there shall be maintained a special series of files in which the information obtained from these surveillances will be retained. These files are to be maintained apart from the regular files of the office, preferably in a locked room.

Logs from technical surveillances shall be maintained in these special files. Logs pertaining to each specific case will be kept together and the file covers will bear the same file number as the case file to which the material relates, but will be given a "sub-one" classification. The logs will be filed chronologically in the appropriate files. In the event there is no activity or no log for a specific date, a sheet of paper should be inserted as a serial for that particular day, on which will be noted "no activity on this date." These should be serialized along with the other information retained in such files. Any indexing of information in the logs will be indexed by employees maintaining these special files who will place on the index card the name, file number, date, and serial number. The index card will show the "sub-one" reference and when prepared will be sent to the Chief Clerk's Office for regular filing in the general office index. No reference shall be made on these index cards to technical surveillances.

Correspondence of an administrative nature pertaining to technical surveillances shall be maintained in "sub-two" files. All administrative correspondence, including letters requesting authority for technical surveillances and communications justifying the continuance of such surveillances, shall be placed in the "sub-two" file of the case to which the surveillance relates. This file, like the "sub-one" file, shall bear the same file number as the case to which the correspondence relates and will be given a "sub-two" classification. This file shall be retained adjacent to the "sub-one" file pertaining to the same case. (S) u

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


Only carefully selected personnel shall be assigned to the maintenance of these files. The minimum number of employees required to handle these files should be used. However, in addition to the employees assigned to filing, indexing and the general maintenance of these files, and an adequate number of stenographers should be designated to take all dictation pertaining to the log material and all correspondence between the field office and the Bureau concerning technical surveillances. The Special Agent preparing the logs should be located in the space by this special group. (S) u

It is desired that you bring to the attention of all employees selected to maintain the special files provided for herein and to the stenographers designated to handle dictation in these matters the fact that this material is confidential and should not be discussed with other employees.

The Bureau recognizes that the number of employees necessary to place this procedure in effect in some offices may necessitate the approval of a supervisory agent to handle the administration. If this appears necessary and desirable, you should communicate with the Bureau for authority to designate a supervisory employee for such purposes.

b2

After a technical surveillance has been authorized in any case, the



Communications to the Bureau regarding technical surveillances shall be sent to the Bureau in an envelope with the code word "June" indicated thereon. (S) u

These instructions relate to technical surveillances as distinguished from microphone surveillances. (S) u

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

- 3 - Director

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE DIRECTOR

December 7, 194

MR. TOLSON

TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE PROBLEMS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7-1-80 BY SP-5 R

Today, a special committee consisting of Messrs. Tolson, Ladd, Carlson, Nease, Fletcher and Clegg, considered the matter of technical surveillances and the possibilities of placing confidential restrictions on information obtained therefrom. The following recommendations were made unanimously:

- 1) That the Bureau not make use of technical surveillances in any criminal cases or any case involving possible prosecution; that technical surveillances, when approved in individual instances, be used only for the purpose of obtaining general intelligence information. It was understood there was a likelihood that a technical surveillance of a general intelligence type might disclose information indicating contacts being made which would in turn develop into individual espionage or sabotage cases involving individuals who have called the number under surveillance. However, when it is determined that an espionage, sabotage or other criminal case is to be opened on this basis there will be no technical surveillances on the phones of these individuals or in connection with these individual cases. For example, if a technical surveillance is maintained on some establishment and Mr. "X" should call that establishment and from the conversation it could be inferred that Mr. "X" was attempting to furnish information of an espionage type when it is determined that a case would be opened on Mr. "X" which may involve eventual prosecution for espionage, as a matter of policy there would be no technical surveillance on Mr. "X's" telephone. This will mean that, effective immediately, the only technical surveillances installed or continued will be those of a general intelligence character as distinguished from the cases involving possible prosecution. If, for general intelligence purposes, the Bureau should decide to seek approval for a technical surveillance in the case that might involve some criminal aspects, these individual instances will be considered as they arise and recommendations made in keeping with the situation.

66-1372-
NOT RECORDED

163 SEP 29 1955

HHC:mjd

Room

- 2) As a matter of uniformity and policy, in the future when a technical surveillance has been installed the only record retained on that surveillance will be the chronological log on that particular installation. Any handwritten notes made by the Agents monitoring the call and the information on the recordings will be consolidated in these logs. The notes of the Agent and the recordings will also be promptly destroyed after this log is prepared. Thus, separate logs will be made up on each installation on a day-by-day basis
- 3) In the field offices, the logs will be transmitted in an envelope to the field supervisor who will personally deliver it to the Special Agent to whom the case is assigned. This Special Agent in turn will review the log, dictate in a paraphrased form the necessary excerpts for inclusion in subsequent reports and he will then personally return this log to the field supervisor.

In each field office there will be a special series of files, preferably in a locked room, in which highly confidential information of this type will be filed. Only carefully selected personnel to the minimum number required to handle this mail will be assigned to handle these files. The field supervisor will deliver the log to the select employees of this room. (In larger offices with numerous technical surveillances pending, it may be necessary for the field supervisor to have a specifically designated assistant to handle this material. This may become necessary only in New York, Washington Field and San Francisco).

The select employees of this file room will maintain locked file cabinets in which these logs will be filed. The logs pertaining to each specific case will be kept together and the file cover will bear the same file number as the case file to which the material relates but will be given a "sub-one" classification. Any indexing of information in the logs will be indexed by these select confidential employees and they will place on the index card the name, file number, the date and the serial number and, of course, the file number will show a "sub-one" reference. The index card will then be sent to the Chief Clerk's Office for regular filing in the general office indices. It is noted that there is no reference to technical surveillance indicated on these index cards.

These logs will be maintained in this file chronologically. In the event there was no activity or no log for a specific date, a sheet of paper will be inserted as a serial for that date on which will be noted "no activity on this date." These will also be serialized.

The Special Agent to whom the case is assigned as a general rule dictates the communication requesting authority for the technical surveillance and periodically he dictates a communication justifying the continuation of the surveillance. This dictation will be given by the Agent only to the select stenographer assigned to handle these confidential files. The correspondence of an administrative type making the request justifying the continuation and correspondence from the Bureau approving the installation and continuation, as well as any other administrative correspondence dealing with that particular installation will be placed in a "sub-two file" and retained adjacent to the "sub-one file." The separation of the administrative material from the logs is necessary because of the difficulty of finding administrative data due to the volume of log material commingled in a large file.

The above procedure, if approved, will prevent correspondence and log material concerning technical surveillances becoming available to a large number of stenographers, file clerks, messengers, and typists in the field office and will also restrict its availability to the Agent and Supervisory personnel.

- 4) After a technical surveillance has been authorized in any case it was unanimously recommended that
-

b2

- 5) At the Seat of Government, the following recommendations were made:

- A) That the written material concerning field technical surveillances be handled and filed separately and apart from the main file room and in a confidential office where similar confidential correspondence is now being handled and filed.
- B) Communications from the field to the Bureau and replies from the Bureau to the field concerning technical surveillances will be sent in the confidential cover marked "June" which is the code word for this mail not to be opened in the file room but would be sent to Mr. Ladd at the Bureau or to the SAC of the field office in order that this correspondence will not be processed in SOG or field file rooms or handled by clerical or messenger employees.

SIC Letter #85
Series 1719
dated Sept 7, 1949

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 8-8-80 BY SP5-RJB/KR

(B) CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS - LISTING IN REPORTS - SPECIAL COMMUNICATION -- Certain questions have been raised in connection with Section B, SAC Letter No. 69, dated June 29, 1949. The following instructions are intended to clarify and correctly implement the previous instructions.

It is not necessary to advise the Bureau of the informant's identity when that informant actually is a highly confidential source. A record of the identity of such an informant should be recorded in the most convenient manner and kept in the exclusive possession of the Special Agent in Charge. In the event the Bureau has any question concerning such informants, appropriate inquiry will be directed to the SAC. If there is some particular reason for communicating with the Bureau concerning a highly confidential source, it is desired that it be handled in accord with the instructions contained in referenced SAC Letter No. 69.

When a highly confidential source will be used as the basis for information being set forth in numerous reports, the informant should be assigned a permanent symbol number and the Bureau advised of that symbol number by letter under the caption of "June."

The instructions in SAC Letter No. 69 do not require that when an informant is a technical installation that the Bureau be advised of the identity of such informants by use of the letter captioned "June." Information obtained from sources which have been assigned permanent symbol numbers shall be reported and handled as in the past.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7-1-80 BY SP5-RJB/KR 66-1372-
INDEXED

14 1949

490 235
50 SEP 19 1949
228

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB/MJS
ON 10-08-2009

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

CONFIDENTIAL

January 20, 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NICHOLS

RE: "JUNE" MAIL

Reference is made to arrangements which have been set up in the field and here at the Seat of Government to handle technical surveillance mail under the code work "JUNE". I understand the major objective of these special arrangements is to insure the confidential handling of all of this mail and limit the number of persons who will have knowledge of the technical surveillance.

In order to accomplish this in the Field, special sub-files have been set up. At the Seat of Government there has been considerable discussion of the problem with suggestions ranging from the setting up of a special and super-confidential file room in the Security Division to the maintenance of sub-files for each case in which a technical surveillance is involved. We are very strongly opposed to either one of these methods and have submitted the attached counter proposal providing for the processing of JUNE mail into the regular case files. However, the mail will be physically retained in the Security Division where its confidential nature may be appropriately protected.

(U)

We have learned from long experience that a separate confidential file room is inefficient and impractical. You will recall the SIS file room which was set up separately from our master records for reasons similar to the situation which exists today. In an effort to maintain the super-confidential aspect of our foreign operations and protect our agents, a separate records system was devised. This system never worked satisfactorily and finally it was consolidated with our master records after much difficulty and confusion.

Even prior to the setting up of a separate files system for SIS we had experimented with sub-files for various purposes. Again actual experience proved they were impractical, inefficient, and dangerous. Years ago we actually had sub-I files for technical surveillance matters. The main difficulty with this type of file was to determine just what went into them and secondly, to be sure that the supervisory staff and others who reviewed the main file realized that there was a sub-file in existence.

You will also recall that at the time the Kansas City case was last active, we were somewhat embarrassed in our efforts to explain and justify the use of sub-files. At that time the rule was very emphatically invoked that no sub-files (except newspaper clippings, sub-A files) be set up or ever

RECORDED - 111

166-1372-4

54 FEB 10 1950

THIS MEMORANDUM IS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE PURPOSES
 TO BE DESTROYED AFTER ACTION IS TAKEN AND NOT SENT TO FILES

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASS. & EXT. BY: 60324 UC BAW/SAB/MJS
 REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2
 DATE OF REVIEW: 5/1/89
 BY: [signature]
 14/99

MEMORANDUM TO MR. NICHOLS
January 20, 1950

- 2 -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

used again. The Records Section thoroughly endorses such a policy and we are convinced both from the standpoint of experience and good filing practices that it is inefficient to separate subject matter files in the manner suggested.

It is urgently recommended that the Bureau not resort to a special file room or the use of sub-files in the present situation. As I have attempted to point out, not only is this bad practice, but actual experience has shown both procedures to be inefficient under our present system.

We have suggested another method of accomplishing the same general objectives. We do not believe that this is a desirable solution or procedure, however, in order to handle the problem with minimum interference to our system it is the only possible method.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Respectfully,


W. W. Waikart

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: February 3, 1950

FROM : THE EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE

SUBJECT:

June - Seal

At the Executives' Conference, January 30, 1950, Messrs. Tolson, N. H. McCabe, Glavin, Harbo, Nichols, Rosen, Mohr, Carlson, Ladd and Fletcher in attendance, the Conference was advised with reference to the handling of correspondence concerning field technical surveillances that instructions require that they be sent under confidential cover marked "June." Further, that this material is also to be retained in a file separate and apart from the main file room in a confidential office where other confidential correspondence is now handled and filed.

condition of June mail at Seat of Government

With reference to the filing of this material at the Seat of Government, reference was made to the instructions to the field which were in effect that this material was to be placed in a sub-file and handled by a separate group of employees. The Conference was advised that the establishment of sub-files at the Seat of Government had been considered by the Records Section, and the Records Section recommended that instead of a sub-file at the Seat of Government, the correspondence be charged out from the main file of the Records Section, utilizing appropriate charge-out slips in the pertinent files and that the material thereafter be retained in the confidential office. In other words, the June material relating to technical surveillances would be recorded and indexed in the main file, but the actual written material would be charged out of the file reflecting that it was in the possession of the personnel handling the material in the Confidential Room. There, it would be retained in appropriate folders. The Conference was advised that the Security Division handling the Confidential Room was willing to accept the suggested system of the Records Section if that best suited their operations.

The Conference was of the unanimous opinion that the file material should be handled and retained in the Confidential Room in the manner suggested by the Records Section. If you approve, the material will be so recorded, serialized and filed.

Respectfully,
For the Conference

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-5-80 BY SP-5 [signature]

CC - Mr. J. P. Mohr
Mr. H. H. Clegg

RECORDED 101

HBF:tlc

INDEXED

161
MAR 7 1950

66-1372-5

[signature]



United States Department of
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

~~PERSONAL ATTENTION~~
~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO

FILE No. _____

SAC LETTER NO. 12

Series 1950

MEMO FOR MR. HOOVER

February 7, 1950

TOLSON

BOWLES

JONES, M. A.

NAUGHTEN

CLEGG

CALLAHAN

KEAY

NEASE

CONNELLEY

CALLAN

LAUGHLIN

PARSONS

GLAVIN

CARLSON

LEONARD

PENNINGTON

HARBO

CARTWRIGHT

LONG

RENNEBERGER

LADD

CONRAD

McCABE, E. J.

ROGERS

NICHOLS

DOWNING

McCABE, N. H.

SCOTT

ROSEN

EDWARDS, H. L.

McGUIRE

SIZOO

TRACY

EGAN

McINTIRE

TAMM, Q.

BAUMGARDNER

FEENEY

MOBLEY

WAIKART

BOSWELL

FLETCHER

MOHR

WALL

GURNEA

NANNA

WHITSON

AND SUPERVISORS

(A) CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT AND SIMILAR TYPES OF COVERAGE -- It is desired that you submit to the Bureau by February 15, 1950 and by the 15th of each month thereafter the following information:

1. Total number of technical installations _____
2. Total number of microphone installations _____
3. Number of Mail covers regarding
 - a. Internal Security matters _____
 - b. Fugitives _____
 - c. Other criminal matters _____
4. Total number of trash covers _____
5. Number of confidential informants in
 - a. National Defense matters _____
 - b. General Investigative matters _____
 - c. Atomic Energy matters _____

You are instructed to list as informants only those who are truly confidential informants and are cautioned not to include sources of information in your totals. It is expected that, when required, you will be able to justify in each instance that the informants claimed by your office are properly classified as confidential informants. Correspondence in this matter should be handled under the regulations applying to "June" correspondence.

DECLASSIFIED BY SP-5 R/W/K Very truly yours,
ON 8-5-80

John Edgar Hoover

Director

14/ DUPLICATE YELLOW

MAR 17 1950

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 107-1078



United States Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation **PERSONAL ATTENTION**
Washington 25, D. C. **STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL**

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO

FILE NO. _____

January 31, 1950

SAC LETTER NO. 9

Series 1950

SAC	ALBANY	DENVER	MILWAUKEE	PORTLAND
	ALBUQUERQUE	DETROIT	MINNEAPOLIS	RICHMOND
	ANCHORAGE	EL PASO	MOBILE	ST. LOUIS
	ATLANTA	HONOLULU	NEWARK	SALT LAKE CITY
	BALTIMORE	HOUSTON	NEW HAVEN	SAN ANTONIO
	BIRMINGHAM	INDIANAPOLIS	NEW ORLEANS	SAN DIEGO
	BOSTON	KANSAS CITY	NEW YORK	SAN FRANCISCO
	BUFFALO	KNOXVILLE	NORFOLK	SAN JUAN
	BUTTE	LITTLE ROCK	OKLAHOMA CITY	SAVANNAH
	CHARLOTTE	LOS ANGELES	OMAHA	SEATTLE
	CHICAGO	LOUISVILLE	PHILADELPHIA	SPRINGFIELD
	CINCINNATI	MEMPHIS	PHOENIX	WASHINGTON, D. C.
	CLEVELAND	MIAMI	PITTSBURGH	QUANTICO
	DALLAS			

(A) "THIS IS YOUR FBI" -- The American Broadcasting Company is planning a series of four five-minute programs to be heard over their various stations on February 10, 17, 24 and March 2. The purpose of this program is to call to the attention of the listening public contributions being made by "This Is Your FBI."

I am making a transcription for the first program, which will be heard on February 10. On the second program, the local ABC stations will secure a representative from either the local bar association, a judge, a college president, an editor or some other public spirited individual. On the third program, they will have somebody who is active in youth work, such as a representative of the Boys' Clubs, a high school principal, a Boy Scout executive, YMCA secretary or some outstanding civic leader.

The American Broadcasting Company, in issuing instructions to their various station managers, is advising that the representatives selected for the programs for February 17 and 24 should not be decided upon until after the managers of the local stations have checked with the Special Agent in Charge covering the district wherein the station is located. It is conceivably possible, due to pending cases, that it would be inadvisable for some individuals to speak on this program. In other instances, the Bureau might have a good contact or close friend who would like to participate, and the contact will be for this purpose. Obviously, if the individuals suggested by the ABC stations are not of the caliber desired or some other reason exists why they should not speak on an FBI program, you should make a counter proposal.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-5-80 BY SP-5

166-1372-
NOT RECORDED

119

APR 4 1950

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-04-1061

(B) TECHNICAL AND MICROPHONE SURVEILLANCES -- Effective immediately, form FD-11 must be submitted to the Bureau within thirty days after the installation of a technical or microphone surveillance. Extreme care should be taken in the preparation of this form and all information of interest justifying the continuance of the surveillance should be set forth. After the submission of this form the surveillance may be continued unless you are advised to the contrary by the Bureau.

An additional justification form should be submitted within six months after the transmittal of the thirty day justification form. In other words, each surveillance must be justified thirty days after its installation and each six months thereafter. I want to impress upon each Special Agent in Charge the necessity of maintaining close personal supervision of these surveillances and it will be incumbent upon each Special Agent in Charge to immediately discontinue any surveillance which is not furnishing sufficient information to warrant its continuance.

It is imperative that each justification letter reflects specific information concerning the activities, contacts and meetings of the subjects covered. As a further example, the surveillance must also produce the identity of contacts of a subject or members of an organization which contribute to the accomplishment of the objective for which the facility was established.

Your requests for installations of microphone surveillances will be handled as in the past and in regard to technical surveillances, consideration will be given to each request which fulfills the requirements set forth in unnumbered SAC Letter dated December 22, 1949.

(C) TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT - PRESTO 3-D SOUND RECORDERS -- Reference is made to Special Agent in Charge Letters No. 138 dated October 21, 1947, No. 338 dated August 16, 1943, and one dated November 25, 1941. Further reference is made to page AS-8-3 in the Appendix of the Manual of Technical Equipment concerning Presto 3-D sound recorders. The instructions set forth in this letter supersede all previous instructions and should be brought to the attention of every qualified sound agent.

The following items, identified as Group A items, are being removed from the list of auxiliary components and apparatus making up a complete 3-D unit.

Group A Items

- 1 tool kit
- 1 crystal microphone
- 1 instruction book
- 1 outside-in feed pinion for each turntable
- 1 small hexagonal Allen wrench
- 200 playback needles
- 6 dozen cutting needles
- 1 spare 78 RPM pulley for each turntable
- 1 spare 33 1/3 RPM pulley for each turntable
- 1 spare 16 2/3 RPM pulley for each turntable

1-31-50
SAC LETTER NO. 9
Sent by 1050

The following items, identified as Group B items, are those which will still be listed as auxiliary components or accessories making up a complete 3-D unit:

Group B Items

- One amplifier in carrying case
- Two turntables in carrying cases
- One shipping box with sufficient commercial felt wadding for proper packing of the entire unit
- One 15-foot electric power extension cord with 3-way plug
- One line connecting cord having clips at one end and a plug on the other end
- Two pairs crystal headphones equipped with shielded plugs
- Three 3-ampere spare fuses
- Three 6-ampere spare fuses
- One set of 9 spare tubes containing 1-6C8G, 1-5Z3, 2-2A3, 1-6C5, 1-6SF5, 1-6SQ7, 1-6L7, and 1-6H6. (Units #219 and above will not have 1-6C8G and a set will consist of 8 spare tubes.)
- One spare Presto C-1 or Presto 5-C cutting head depending upon type supplied with unit. (No spare head is supplied with units having Van Eps heads.)
- One 78 RPM pulley for each turntable
- One 33 1/3 RPM pulley for each turntable
- One 16 2/3 RPM pulley for each turntable
- One line radio program eliminator
- One microphone radio program eliminator

Each division will hereafter maintain an adequate supply of both Group A and Group B accessories to meet local conditions; however, it will no longer be necessary to keep a complete set of either Group A or Group B accessories for each 3-D unit. Any present accessories of either Group A or Group B items now deemed surplus should be forwarded to the Bureau for stock. However, any 3-D unit shipped to another field office must be complete with all items listed as Group B accessories, including a full set of working pulleys for each turntable to provide 78, 33 1/3 and 16 2/3 RPM operation. All components forwarded with such a recorder must be matched to work with the specific 3-D unit in each instance of equipment.

It will be necessary hereafter when requesting the transfer of a 3-D unit to specifically request tools, microphones and needles, or any other Group A item if such items are desired.

A 3-D unit will be listed on the field technical inventory as including one amplifier in carrying case and two turntables in carrying cases, each with one full set of working pulleys. All additional items listed in either of the two above Group A or Group B lists of accessories and retained in the field should be appropriately placed on the field technical inventory under the proper caption in alphabetical order.

When forwarding 3-D units to the service contractor for repair each office should specifically list all items desired from the contractor and the contractor so advised in writing; otherwise, the contractor will no longer furnish such items.

(D) TELEPHONE CALLS TO BUREAU, GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE AND SECURITY INVESTIGATIVE DIVISIONS -- For your guidance in making necessary telephone calls to the Bureau, there is attached a revised chart showing by classification the work handled by the General Investigative and the Security Investigative Divisions of the Bureau.

This chart supersedes that which was furnished to you by SAC Letter No. 92, Series 1949, dated September 30, 1949. Nothing herein should be construed as altering in any way current instructions regarding telephone facilities in communicating with the Bureau.

(E) RADIO PROGRAM "DRAGNET" -- SAC Letter No. 107 (c), Series 1949, dated November 29, 1949, advised you that captioned program heard over the facilities of the National Broadcasting Company from 10:30 to 11:00 P.M. on Thursday evenings, would conclude with salutes to graduates of the FBI National Academy. After the first few broadcasts of this type representatives of the Los Angeles Police Department protested to the program manager of the Western Network of NBC in Los Angeles that the FBI was in bad repute with local law enforcement agencies throughout the country and the tributes to National Academy graduates would arouse ill feeling. The NBC Western Network program manager accepted their statements and recommended to NBC that the tributes be devoted to any "worthy" officers without regard to their National Academy affiliation. The Newell-Emmett Advertising Agency, which handles the "Dragnet" program for Liggett and Myers Tobacco Company and which originated the National Academy salute idea, naturally resented the attempt at dictation by NBC's West Coast office. The agency was advised by the Bureau that, in view of the controversy, permission to utilize references to National Academy graduates was withdrawn, and, thereupon, the Agency stated it would eliminate the tributes entirely rather than accept the dictation of the West Coast NBC group.

In view of the above circumstances, the instructions set forth in the SAC letter of reference, relative to recommendations of National Academy graduates to receive the "Dragnet" tribute, are rescinded.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Attachment for (D)

1-31-50
SAC LETTER NO. 9
Series 1950

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
 FROM : SAC, San Juan
 SUBJECT: June

DATE: 10/27/50

Dof...

Some question has arisen concerning the administrative handling of "June" material. It does not appear from inquiries the writer has made at the Seat of Government and of Inspectors that there is a uniform or clear understanding of the manner in which material marked "June" is to be filed.

Bureau instructions in SAC Letter #69, 6/29/49, state that "June" material is "to be maintained in a confidential file by the SAC, and this file... shall be retained under lock and key." This referred particularly to certain types of informants.

We opened a so-called "June" file, and in it we have been placing all correspondence marked "June." This has created considerable confusion. Not only is it difficult to maintain in one file correspondence and material pertaining to several informants, but unrelated material is added. For example, "No number SAC Letter" dated 5/3/50, entitled "Surveillances - Technical," is marked "June" and must, presumably, be filed in that file. A similar letter dated 9/26/50, entitled, "Technical and Microphone Surveillances," presents the same problem. We have always maintained among the SAC's confidential files an administrative file entitled "Technical Surveillances." It is logical the two letters referred to go in this latter file.

It has not been made clear whether or not, in setting up the "June" procedure, it was merely intended to establish a code word to characterize material of a "top secret" nature, and that such material might go into various files, so long as they were under lock and key and in the custody of the SAC; or whether it was intended that all "June" material, regardless of its content, go into one confidential file.

The first interpretation seems most logical; the second interpretation creates confusion in filing.

The Bureau is requested to clarify this matter so that we may follow a uniform procedure.

RECORDED: 123

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7-1-80 BY SP-5

NOV 18 1950

59 NOV 25 1950

11-15
 ACS:GEH
 28

166-1372-6
[Handwritten signatures and initials]

SAC, SAN JUAN

November 15,

DIRECTOR, FBI

JUN

~~PERSONAL ATTENTION~~
~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECORDED - 123

13-10-6

Reference is made to your recent memorandum with regard to the administrative handling of material classified under the code w of "June." Under the existing instructions the following is the procedure to be followed by you. Memoranda coming under the latter classification forth in SAC Letter No. 69, dated June 29, 1949, are to be filed in a separate confidential "June" file.

Instructions in the No Number SAC Letter of December 12, 1948, relate to technical surveillances and call for the opening of "sub-one" and "sub-two" files with respect to the individual cases on which there are technical surveillances. Memoranda justifying the continuance of technical surveillances and like correspondence in individual cases would go in the "sub-two" file on an individual case. General instructions with respect to technical surveillances may be maintained by you in an administrative file entitled "Technical Surveillances." This file is to be kept under lock and key in your custody.

DECLASSIFIED BY SP-5 RJL/ma
ON 8-5-80

66-1372 ✓

cc: 66-1372-48

RJL:hc

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP (S) OF
DATE 8-14-80
DiCiano

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

70 DEC 1 1949



United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB/MJS
ON 10-08-2009

NO NUMBER
SAC LETTER

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE No. _____

May 3, 1950

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
JUNE

MEMO FOR MR. HOOVER	BROWN, B. C.	HOLLOMAN	NEASE
TOLSON	CALLAHAN	JONES, M. A.	PARSONS
CLEGG	CALLAN	KEAY	PENNINGTON
CONNELLEY	CARLSON	LAUGHLIN	PONTZ
GLAVIN	CONRAD	LEONARD	RENNEBER
HARBO	DOWNING	LONG	ROGERS
LADD	EDWARDS, H. L.	McGUIRE	SCOTT
NICHOLS	EGAN	McINTIRE, F. H.	SIZOO
ROSEN	FEENEY	McINTIRE, K. R.	TAMM, Q.
TRACY	GEARTY, G.	MOBLEY	WAIKART
BAUMGARDNER	GURNEA	MOHR	
BELMONT	HARGETT	NANNA	
BOWLES	HENNRICH	NAUGHTEN	

RE: SURVEILLANCES - TECHNICAL

Supplementing previous instructions regarding this matter, the procedures set forth hereinafter should be placed in effect immediately.

Correspondence transmitting technical surveillance recordings to Seat of Government and between field offices for translation or any other purpose should be marked JUNE.

Recordings of this nature should be packaged with both an inner and outer wrapper as depicted in the F.B.I. Handbook, Part II, Page 31. To the side of the inner wrapper which encloses the records should be attached a sealed envelope containing a copy of the letter of transmittal. Both the inner wrapper and the envelope should bear the code word JUNE. The outer wrapper carry the address label only. In this connection you should caution the personnel in your office who have occasion to open incoming packages to remove the outer wrapper only, delivering the inner package and envelope unopened to a designated employee.

Technical surveillance logs should show, in those instances where translation has been entered thereon, the identity of the translator.

In the event translation of technical surveillance recordings or other foreign language material is made by one office for another, the office effecting the translation should retain a copy in its files. The copy retained and that furnished the other office must provide the translator's name so that there will be no difficulty in establishing his identity at some future date.

5/4/50
CLASS. & EXT. BY ~~26-278112~~ Very truly yours,
REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW ~~5/4/84~~ John Edgar Hoover

Director

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

~~PERSONAL ATTENTION~~
~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO

FILE No. _____

March 14, 1950

SAC LETTER NO. 19
Series 1950

SAC	ALBANY	DENVER	MILWAUKEE	PORTLAND
	ALBUQUERQUE	DETROIT	MINNEAPOLIS	RICHMOND
	ANCHORAGE	EL PASO	MOBILE	ST. LOUIS
	ATLANTA	HONOLULU	NEWARK	SALT LAKE CITY
	BALTIMORE	HOUSTON	NEW HAVEN	SAN ANTONIO
	BIRMINGHAM	INDIANAPOLIS	NEW ORLEANS	SAN DIEGO
	BOSTON	KANSAS CITY	NEW YORK	SAN FRANCISCO
	BUFFALO	KNOXVILLE	NORFOLK	SAN JUAN
	BUTTE	LITTLE ROCK	OKLAHOMA CITY	SAVANNAH
	CHARLOTTE	LOS ANGELES	OMAHA	SEATTLE
	CHICAGO	LOUISVILLE	PHILADELPHIA	SPRINGFIELD
	CINCINNATI	MEMPHIS	PHOENIX	WASHINGTON, D. C.
	CLEVELAND	MIAMI	PITTSBURGH	QUANTICO
	DALLAS			

(A) JUNE MEMORANDA -- Reference is made to SAC Letter dated December 22, 1949, (no number) "A. Surveillances - Technical" and to the Bureau's "June" program in general.

It is noted that a number of offices have been forwarding "June" memoranda to the Bureau in envelopes labeled "June" but without labeling the memoranda themselves as such.

Henceforth to facilitate administrative handling at the Bureau, all "June" memoranda shall have the word "June" typed upon them above the caption in addition to being forwarded in "June" envelopes.

RECEIVED BY
CH 8-5-80 SP-5 NJB/jun

52 MAR 1 1950



United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

FILE COPY

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE No. _____

April 4, 1950

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
JUNE

SAC	ALBANY	DENVER	MILWAUKEE	PORTLAND
	ALBUQUERQUE	DETROIT	MINNEAPOLIS	RICHMOND
	ANCHORAGE	EL PASO	MOBILE	ST. LOUIS
	ATLANTA	HONOLULU	NEWARK	SALT LAKE CITY
	BALTIMORE	HOUSTON	NEW HAVEN	SAN ANTONIO
	BIRMINGHAM	INDIANAPOLIS	NEW ORLEANS	SAN DIEGO
	BOSTON	KANSAS CITY	NEW YORK	SAN FRANCISCO
	BUFFALO	KNOXVILLE	NORFOLK	SAN JUAN
	BUTTE	LITTLE ROCK	OKLAHOMA CITY	SAVANNAH
	CHARLOTTE	LOS ANGELES	OMAHA	SEATTLE
	CHICAGO	LOUISVILLE	PHILADELPHIA	SPRINGFIELD
	CINCINNATI	MEMPHIS	PHOENIX	WASHINGTON, D. C.
	CLEVELAND	MIAMI	PITTSBURGH	QUANTICO
	DALLAS			


Mem to all field offices supervisors June - Gen

RE: JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUATION
OF TECHNICAL OR MICROPHONE
SURVEILLANCES -
FORM FD-143

There are being forwarded under separate cover to each Field Office copies of a new Form FD-143 dealing with the justification for technical and microphone surveillances. In order that complete information regarding each such surveillance may be readily available to the Bureau more complete data are being required.

It is emphasized that the Bureau must decide from the contents of these letters whether or not authorization should be granted for the continuation of the installations. Therefore, it is mandatory that the Field carefully, thoughtfully, and accurately set out the data required. If, after a thorough analysis, the Field does not believe continuation of an installation is warranted a recommendation to that effect should be made. If, on the other hand, the Field believes that continuance is warranted its reasons for reaching this conclusion should clearly be reported. For example, under Item No. 9 of the new form the most important examples of valuable information obtained through the new installation must be concisely set out with an indication of the specific value of each item. The possibility of obtaining the same information from existing or potential live informants must be constantly borne in mind. At all times the complete security of the installation and plant must receive paramount consideration.

5 OCT 3 1950



RECORDED 124
INDEXED 121

DECLASSIFIED BY SP-5 RWH/ur
ON 8-5-88

NOT RECORDED
OCT 6 1950

1958

66-84-1098

As you have been previously instructed, letters of justification are to be submitted within 30 days after the original installation and within each 6 month period thereafter.

You are instructed to destroy all copies of the old Form FD-143 immediately upon receipt of the new form. In addition, you should remove old Form FD-143 from the FBI Form Book and insert in its place a copy of the new form.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice

Washington, D. C.

(Typed: March 28, 1950)

~~PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~JUNE~~

No Number SAC Letter

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NUMBER _____

LETTER TO ALL SPECIAL AGENTS IN CHARGE:

RE: JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUATION
OF TECHNICAL OR MICROPHONE
SURVEILLANCES -
FORM FD-143

Dear Sir:

DECLASSIFIED BY *SP-5 RJL/ma*
ON *8-5-88*


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As you have been previously instructed, letters of justification are to be submitted within 30 days after the original installation and within each 6 month period thereafter.

You are instructed to destroy all copies of the old Form FD-143 immediately upon receipt of the new form. In addition, you should remove old Form FD-143 from the FBI Form Book and insert in its place a copy of the new form.

Very truly yours,



Director

ENCLOSURE

66-1372

SAC, SEATTLE

January 16, 1951

DIRECTOR, FBI

JUNE - GENERAL

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Reference is made to your memorandum dated January 10, 1951, captioned as above and relating to confidential informant coverage in your Division. *V K 11/16/51*

Your memorandum was received at the Bureau without having been sealed in an envelope bearing the code word "June," and addressed to the Director "Personal and Confidential."

In line with the instructions in SAC Letter No. 69, dated June 29, 1949, you should take the appropriate steps to insure that the contents of memorandums in this case are adequately safeguarded by sealing them in envelopes.

66-1372

RJL:hc *hc*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-1-80 BY SP-5 *RJB/KR*

JAN 16 5 41 PM '51
RECEIVED
U. S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

RECORDED

66-1372-6X

JAN 18 1951

LAMPHERE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-08-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB/MJS

66-1372-7
CHANGED TO
123-6945-2

APR 29 1959

Bw

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENTTO : DIRECTOR, FBI PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL DATE: 8/9/51

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE

SUBJECT: JUNE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~b2
b7D

Info was received by BA Office from an unknown source of complete reliability on Aug. 9, 1951. Inasmuch as the info from this source will appear subsequently in numerous reports emanating from this office, it will hereafter be designated by Balto. symbol [redacted]

RJL:arf

66-903-2 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~EXPEDITED PROCESSING
AUG 11 1951

8-5-80
CLASS. & EXT. BY P-5 RTH/jm
REASON - FCIM 11, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW 8-5-90

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY SLIP (S) DATE 8-14-80

RECORDED - 55

INDEXED - 55 66-1372-8

EX-76

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Loughran

AUG 11 1951

SAC, DALLAS

December 21, 1951

DIRECTOR, FBI

PERSONAL ATTENTION
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

JUNE 66-1372-8X

~~66-1372-12-1~~

RECORDED

Reference is made to your memorandum of December 13, 1951.

The original instructions regarding June correspondence were in SAC Letter 69, dated June 29, 1949. These instructions provided that when information is received from some highly confidential source and such source of information or informant is of such a confidential character that the information should not appear in the file of a case the identification of the source is to be communicated to the Bureau by letter bearing the code word "June." It was provided that copies of such letters were to be maintained in a confidential file by the Special Agent in Charge.

These original instructions were amended by SAC Letter No. 85 of September 7, 1949, which provided that it was not necessary to advise the Bureau of the informant's identity when the informant was actually a highly confidential source. It was stated that a record of the identity of the informant was to be kept in the exclusive possession of the Special Agent in Charge. It was stated that in the event the Bureau desired to develop information regarding the identity of such an informant an appropriate inquiry would be directed to the Special Agent in Charge.

Additional instructions were issued in No. Number SAC Letter of December 22, 1949, which dealt with the handling of technical surveillances. This SAC Letter provided that a Sub 1 file relating to an individual case was to be opened for technical surveillance logs and a Sub 2 file was to be opened for technical surveillance administrative correspondence. It provided that correspondence to the Bureau regarding technical surveillances was to bear the code word "June."

You will note from these instructions that correspondence relative to technical surveillances is filed in a different manner than other "June" correspondence, which is to be kept in a file maintained in your personal possession.

DECLASSIFIED BY 8-6-80 SP-5 R. L. J. P.
ON 8-6-80

RJL:hc

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

MAILED 16
DEC 21 1951
U.S. COMM - FBI

JAN 4 1952
JG 24 1965

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 12-13-51

FROM : SAC, Dallas

"JUNE"

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: JUNE LETTERS

JUNE - GENERAL

Since my arrival in Dallas as SAC recently, particularly during the self-inspection just completed, I have found serials in various files in the office where the serials are marked "JUNE" but are filed pursuant to the subject matter in "confidential" files maintained under the personal supervision of the SAC.

A search of the office administrative files and other confidential files disclosed that apparently the basic instructions on the "June" correspondence have been destroyed, pursuant to administrative authorization for matters over one or three years old.

It is my recollection that items marked "June" must have restrictive filing to one file known as the June File, and that merely because some other file which is the subject matter of the particular communication marked "June" is presently considered confidential and kept in the custody of the SAC does not permit correspondence marked "June" to be placed therein.

It is requested that the Bureau forward to Dallas a copy of the basic instructions covering "June" correspondence, so that I can be certain the procedure here is proper.

JKM:FB

EXPEDITE PROCESSING

DEC 19 1951

DECLASSIFIED BY

ON 8-5-80 SP-5 RSH/mc

66-1372-8X

RECORDED

DEC 19 1951

BY 28 C

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP (S) OF
DATE 8-15-80

JAN 4 1952

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: August 22, 1952

FROM : MR. F. J. BAUMGARDNER **CONFIDENTIAL "JUNE"**SUBJECT: SUGGESTION #373-52
*DOCUMENTATION OF SUMMARY REPORTS
IN SECURITY INVESTIGATIONSTolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Rm. _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____PURPOSE:

To recommend against the adoption of this suggestion.

BACKGROUND:

Attached hereto is a copy of a letter dated August 1, 1952, from the Special Agent in Charge at Pittsburgh enclosing a suggestion by Special Agent J. Edward Madvay.

In his suggestion Special Agent Madvay recommends that the Bureau prepare a list of all past and present technical and microphone surveillances and "anonymous" sources which have been utilized throughout the Bureau's Field Divisions. This list consisting of the symbol numbers of each such informant in all offices would be sent to those Divisions responsible for the preparation of the majority of the summary reports in security cases. The list would then be utilized by the Agents in those offices to determine whether it would be necessary to request documentation of information to be included in summary reports which was obtained from sources in offices other than the office preparing the summary report. Special Agent Madvay makes this suggestion based on the premise that by having such a list available in each office considerable Agent time and correspondence would be saved by eliminating the requests for documentation of information received from these sources.

In this connection the Bureau's instructions are that it is not necessary to completely document information received from these "June" type sources.

It should be noted that to compile such a list of symbol numbers of such sources to be distributed throughout the Field and to thus be identified to numerous Agents as actually being technical, microphone or "anonymous" sources would in effect partially defeat the purpose of the "June" ruling. That is, these Agents would have knowledge that

Attachment
LGD:mjtCLASS. & EXT. BY
REASON FCIM II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEWRECORDED-117
EX-115
66-1372-9**CONFIDENTIAL**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

information obtained in an investigation was from this type of source.

It should also be observed that such a list would consist of approximately 2,000 technical and microphone surveillance symbol numbers and it would be necessary to review about 8,000 informant cards at the Bureau to determine which informants were actually "anonymous" sources. (S)

Special Agent Madvay, in addition to the above, suggests that if the above is adopted that the Bureau consider the preparation of a list of the more active live informants to show their present symbol numbers and all previous symbol numbers assigned to them for the purpose of eliminating the necessity of submitting amended pages to summary reports when it is found that the old symbol number as included in the report has been changed.

This phase of the suggestion does not appear to be feasible or practical because of the relatively few times that this would occur. Such infrequency would not justify preparation of such a list.

Special Agent Madvay's suggestion has been acknowledged.

ACTION:

If you agree with the above, this memorandum together with the attached copy of the suggestion should be submitted to the Training and Inspection Division for their observations and action.

2 agree
2-10-52
8/22/52

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Director, FBI

SAC, Pittsburgh

8-17-52
August 1, 1952

JUNE

DOCUMENTATION OF INVESTIGATIVE
SUMMARY REPORTS IN SECURITY TYPE
INVESTIGATIONS

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

The following observations and suggestions concerning the captioned matter have been submitted to me by SA J. EDWARD MADVAY. The Bureau may desire to consider these observations under the Suggestion Program.

REGISTERED MAIL

FH:tbw

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-5-80 BY SP-5 RJB/ML

66-1572-9

SAC, Pittsburgh

August 1, 1952

SA J. EDWARD MADVAY

CONFIDENTIAL

DOCUMENTATION OF INVESTIGATIVE
SUMMARY REPORTS IN SECURITY TYPE
INVESTIGATIONS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-5-80 BY SP-5 RTH/mc

The following observations and suggestions concerning captioned matter are submitted for consideration under the Suggestion Program.

OBSERVATIONS

At the present time the various field divisions of the Bureau are in the process of preparing lengthy investigative summary reports on thousands of individuals who are maintained on the Security Index and who have been active in or associated with the Communist Party or related groups since January, 1949. The principal instructions relating to the preparation of these reports were furnished to the field by No Number SAC Letter I dated 3-14-52. By No Number SAC Letter I dated 3-14-52 the Bureau instructed the field to document all information included in these reports by setting forth on the administrative pages under the appropriate informant's symbol, the file and serial numbers where the original informant's report can be located in a given field division.

In this same connection the field was advised by No Number SAC Letter I dated 3-14-52, page 11, that information included in these investigative summary reports which came from a microphone or technical surveillance should be handled as follows: The information received from such a source should be reported under an appropriate temporary symbol. On the administrative pages of the report the microphone or technical symbol number followed by an asterisk should be shown. The date of the activity being reported and the date the information was received should also be given. No further documentation is necessary.

In the documentation of reports containing information furnished by an informant operating in the division writing the report there appears to be no specific problem involved. However, when information is reported which came from an informant in another division; it is necessary to request that division to furnish the necessary documentation before the report can be considered complete. In the case of live informants this is necessary. In the case of informants coming under the category set forth in No Number SAC Letter I dated 3-14-52, page 11, the same procedure has been followed as in live informants. With this in mind the following suggestion is submitted. It is believed that this suggestion could reduce considerably the time, expense and effort of Agent personnel assigned to security investigations, of stenographers and of clerical personnel.

JEM:tbw

CLASS. & EXT. BY

REASON

DATE OF REVIEW

8-5-80
SP-5 RTH/mc
66-1372-9
8-5-80

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUGGESTION #1

It is suggested that a list containing the past and present symbols of past and present informants coming under the category of No Number SAC Letter I dated 3-14-52, page 11, plus "anonymous" sources, be compiled by the Bureau and thereafter be furnished to those divisions responsible for the preparation and submission of the majority of the investigative summary reports in security type cases.

By having such a list available in the various divisions the Special Agents when preparing summary reports could, after determining from the case file the informant symbol belonging to another field division, check the symbol numbers of the informants reporting information to be included in his report and readily determine if it would be necessary to direct a letter and/or a copy of the report to a particular division to determine if the informant was a live one or otherwise.

This, in many cases, would alleviate the necessity of designating extra copies of reports to the various field divisions with the request that the particular informant's information be documented; would decrease considerably the number of letters sent by the various divisions to each other requesting documentation information; would decrease considerably Agent personnel time spent in dictating these letters; stenographic time transcribing the letters; clerical time required to handle these letters and reports; and would decrease basic material and mailing costs.

By taking an estimated 30 divisions working on the preparation of investigative summary reports, multiplied by an estimated average of 30 or more Agents per division working on the preparation of these reports, it can readily be seen that considerable time, expense and effort could be saved. Also, this suggestion, if adopted, could possibly assist in reducing the delinquency rate in the field of security investigations.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUGGESTION #2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Should the Bureau consider the first suggestion favorably the following suggestion is also submitted for consideration.

It has been found that when an investigative summary report has been prepared, letters requesting documentation and/or a copy of the report may, of necessity, be sent to five or more different field offices. Upon receipt of the requested information it is frequently found that the Agent who prepared the report assigned two or three temporary symbols to the same informant. This has happened because the permanent symbol assigned to a given informant may have been changed three or four times. Consequently, the Agent had no information relative to these symbol changes and therefore gave the same informant numerous temporary symbols in his report. Upon learning this the Agent must either direct a letter to the Bureau and all divisions receiving copies of this report calling attention to this fact or submit a corrected report. This has resulted in the expenditure of additional time and expense in the submission of these letters and may eventually lead to the expenditure of additional time and expense in preparation of an entirely new report.

It is suggested that the Bureau might also consider the preparation of a list of the more active live informants which list will show the live informants' present symbol number and all previous symbol numbers assigned.

By utilizing this list the Agents, when preparing these reports, could request documentation of another division, then upon receipt of the requested information would only have to submit amended administrative pages of the report to the Bureau instead of a completely new report.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 7, 1952

2B
SAC, Miami

AMSD
PERSONAL ATTENTION
JUNE

Director, FBI

UNKNOWN SUBJECTS
DYNAMITING OF JEWISH TEMPLES,
SCHOOLS AND CENTERS AND RELATED CASES
CIVIL RIGHTS

JUNE - Central A1

It is desired that information received from technical surveillances in operation in connection with the investigation of these cases be omitted from investigative reports prepared by the Miami Division. This information may be referred to in teletypes and letters under appropriate symbol but should be omitted from investigative reports as previously indicated. However, the results of investigation in connection with any leads developed from the utilization of these sources should be included in reports.

You should personally follow this matter to determine that the Bureau's instructions are closely observed.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7-1-80 BY SP-5 RCH/ML

DST:bsw

66-1372-
NOT RECORDED
71 JAN 10 1952

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, F.B.I.

DATE: December 8, 1953

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: JUNE MEMORANDA

JUNE

(U) Reference is made to SAC Letter No. 85, Series 1949. This instructs that the identity of highly confidential sources should be recorded in the most convenient manner and kept in the exclusive possession of the SAC. Where a highly confidential source will be used as the basis for information being set forth in numerous reports, it is provided that the informant may be assigned a permanent symbol number and the Bureau advised of that symbol number by letter under the caption June.

The following suggested procedure is set forth for the consideration of the Bureau in connection with anonymous sources. If the Bureau finds merit in the suggested procedure, consideration might be given to calling it to the attention of other field offices.

(U) Where an anonymous source is developed and the information provided by him has been disseminated by means of a dissemination memo to pertinent case files, it is suggested that a June memo be prepared identifying the anonymous source and referencing the dissemination memo. If the information is later incorporated into a report, it is suggested that no additional June memo be prepared to identify the anonymous source but instead that a memo be prepared for the subject's case file stating that the anonymous source mentioned in the report is the anonymous source mentioned in the dissemination memo. For example, the memo might state "T-1, the anonymous source described in SA John B. Brown's report dated 12-3-53 is the anonymous source mentioned in the memo dated 10-9-53 in instant case file, serial 52".

This procedure would eliminate the multiplication of basically identical memos in the June files. It would also reduce to a minimum the number of occasions on which agents would find it necessary to have the June files searched for documentation purposes.

It is further suggested that a uniform signal be adopted to indicate the June character of any symbol number representing an anonymous source.

GGM:MTM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-1-80 BY SP-5 RJT/MLR

ASS. & EXT. BY
JASON - FCIN 11
DATE OF REVIEW

RECORDED-27

66-1372-9X

DEC 19 1953

EX-115
CONFIDENTIAL

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP (S) OF
DATE

EXP. PROC.
DEC 10 1953

LT. TO DIRECTOR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

12/8/53

It is specifically suggested that the letter "J" be appended to all such symbol numbers, so that all agents and offices receiving information derived from a June source will know its nature at once.

It is believed that this would save time, and research and reduce the need for inter-office correspondence, particularly in connection with the preparation of summary reports.

-2-

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. BELMONT

DATE: July 17, 1953

FROM : W. A. BRANTIGAN *HAB*SUBJECT: JUNE MAILGeneral~~SECRET~~

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Nichols _____
 Belmont _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Harbo _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Garry _____
 Mohr _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Sizoo _____
 Miss Gandy _____

Paragraph B, SAC Letter #69, 6-29-49, specifies that certain mail bearing code word "June" will be filed in separate confidential files at the Bureau under lock and key. (66-1372-1) A memorandum from the Director dated 12-28-49 specifies that "June" mail shall be retained and filed separate and apart from the main file room in a confidential office. (66-1372-2)

(U) As a result of setting up of the above procedures, this mail is being retained in 5 cabinets in Room 1734 under supervision of R. J. Lamphere, Supervisor in Charge, Soume Unit. The same room is also utilized for retention of all [REDACTED] material (9 cabinets). Space is at a premium in this room which is now occupied by 2 Supervisors, 2 clerks, 1 Secretary and 1 clerk-typist. We are faced with an expansion problem created by the continued addition of Bureau Source material and "June" material. (S)

(U) To resolve this problem, it is proposed that the 5 file cabinets containing "June" mail be relocated in Room 1732, immediately adjacent to the room in which the files are now kept. The cabinets will be locked at all times that they are not being worked on by the clerk-typist assigned to their maintenance. Ready access is had through a door between rooms. Supervisor Lamphere will retain supervision and custody of the "June" file cabinets and access to the contents will only be possible when accompanied by approved personnel from the Soume Unit. (S)

This will greatly alleviate the space problem and it is believed full security is assured. 66-1372-10

ACTION:

RECORDED-39

JUL 21 1953

If you approve, the "June" mail cabinets will be placed in Room 1732 subject to the above regulations.

SBD:GAS
 66-1372

56 JUL 21 1953

5/4/79
 CLASS. & EXT. BY 2842 PVO/PPM
 REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2 2
 DATE OF REVIEW 5/4/89

paramarkis otherwise

~~SECRET~~

SAC, New York

December 30,

RECORDED - 54

Director, FBI (66-1372) 34-9

JUNE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EX-110

Reurlet of 12-8-53.

The purpose of the June file with respect to anonymous sources is to provide a system whereby the administrative correspondence relative to such sources is kept out of main files. The suggestion in your memorandum would result in a number of memoranda going into the main files relating to such sources and would tend to defeat the purpose of the June file. The Bureau, therefore, does not desire such a system initiated.

With respect to your second suggestion that when a permanent symbol is used with respect to an anonymous source that the letter "J" be appended to the symbol number so that agents and offices receiving information would know its name and source, the Bureau feels that this also would tend to negate the purpose of the June file and, therefore, this suggestion is not being adopted.

RJL:blb

CLASS & EXT BY
REASON - FCIM 11
DATE OF REVIEW

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

MAILED ROOM
DEC 31 1953
COMM-FBI

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Gearty _____
Mohr _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____

Date: March 3, 1954

To: Director, FBI

From: Legat, Mexico

Subject: JUNE

This office maintains a file on June correspondence and keeps the same in my custody in accordance with Bureau regulations. However, the Bureau instructions with reference to handling this material have been destroyed through inadvertence when the SAC Letter containing the same became three years old.

It is requested that you furnish this office with a copy of the latest instructions on the handling of June material. They will be placed in the June file and not destroyed after the expiration of three years' time.

JNS:lg

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-5-80 BY SP-5 RBJ/AN

66-1372-10X

66-1372-10X
MAR 16 1954

RECORDED

EST/SEC

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: May 28, 1954

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: JUNE

General

Tolson _____
 Boardman _____
 Nichols _____
 Belmont _____
 Glavin _____
 Harbo _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Tracy _____
 Mohr _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Miss Gandy _____

The purpose of this memorandum is to recount the general procedures and policies which are followed in handling June mail in order that we will have in one memorandum this material.

Paragraph B, SAC Letter No. 69, dated June 29, 1949, specified that certain mail bearing the code word "June" was to be filed in separate confidential files at the Bureau and by the SAC's in the field. This SAC Letter was designed to cover "black bag jobs" and extremely sensitive confidential informants, "such as Governors, secretaries to high officials," etc.

No Number SAC Letter dated December 22, 1949, incorporated technical surveillances under this program and provided that the field should place in sub files data regarding technical surveillances. The sub-1 file was for the maintenance of technical surveillance logs, and the sub-2 file was for administrative correspondence regarding technical surveillances, including justification forms. A memorandum from the Director dated December 28, 1949, specified that June mail should be retained and filed separate and apart from the main file room in a confidential office. (66-1372-2) In a memorandum dated January 20, 1950, from Mr. Waikart to Mr. Nichols it was provided that June mail would be indexed and recorded in the Record Section and a special serial charge out would be used to charge the mail out to Supervisor R. J. Lamphere. This applied to correspondence regarding technical surveillances. An attachment to this memorandum provided for mail routing to be done in messenger envelopes and provided that all outgoing correspondence should be routed to the confidential file room maintained under Supervisor Lamphere. (66-1372-3)

This matter was also considered by the Executive Conference on January 30, 1950, and the use of the charge out system from the main file was approved at the Bureau's Headquarters rather than utilizing the sub files as set forth in No Number SAC Letter dated December 22, 1949. (66-1372-5)

In order to insure that these June folders do not become lost a charge out system is utilized for this mail and an inventory index system is maintained in Supervisor Lamphere's office. This inventory is taken once a month.

RECORDED - 9

EX. - 107

66-1372
 59 JUN 11 1954
 RJJ:efc

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 8-5-80 BY SP-5 RLL/hd

No Number SAC Letter of December 22, 1949, provided that the instructions did not encompass microphone surveillances. However, at an Executive Conference meeting on June 9, 1950, our policy of utilizing microphone surveillances which involved trespass in their installation or maintenance was considered and the recommendation was made that our existing policy be followed. Mr. Tolson disagreed on the grounds that it involved an illegal technique and the Director noted his agreement with Mr. Tolson. (66-2554-7853) Thereafter, on July 19, 1950, Mr. Ladd and Mr. Belmont telephonically issued instructions to all SAC's regarding the utilization of microphones involving trespass and the SAC's were informed that microphone surveillances which had involved trespass were to be considered as June mail. The SAC's were informed that there would be no written instructions on this matter.

ACTION:

None. This memorandum has been prepared in order to set forth in one place the pertinent instructions relating to the maintenance of June mail.

AT

66-1372-10X

~~66-1372-221~~

RECORDED - 4

EX - 10

SECRET AIR COURIER

Date: March 23, 1954
To: Legal Attache
Mexico City, Mexico
From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Subject: JUNE

In accordance with the request in your memorandum of March 3, 1954, the following Photostats of SAC Letters dealing with June matters are being furnished to you:

1. SAC Letter #69, Series 1949, June 29, 1949.
2. SAC Letter #85, Series 1949, September 7, 1949.
3. No Number SAC Letter, December 22, 1949.
4. SAC Letter #12, Series 1950, February 7, 1950.
5. No Number SAC Letter, May 3, 1950.
6. SAC Letter #19, Series 1950, March 14, 1950.

Enclosure


ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 8-5-80 BY SP-5 RSB/140

RJL:awn

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Gearty _____
Mohr _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Miss Gandy _____

cc - Foreign Service Desk



New York (62-10026A)

August 11, 1954

Director, FBI (66-1372)

PERSONAL and CONFIDENTIAL

RECORDED-20

JUNE

66-1372-12

JUNE

EX-103

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reurlet 8/3/54, pointing out certain problems which have arisen in your office in connection with filing "June" memoranda when information secured from an anonymous source is reported.

You cite as an example of your problem a hypothetical case wherein an anonymous source is developed at Amtorg Trading Corporation. You say that a June memorandum is written thereafter, setting forth the pertinent information relating to this anonymous source. As a result of the development of this anonymous source at Amtorg, you may ascertain 50 to 100 names of contacts of Amtorg. You state that every time a report is written on one of these contacts, wherein information from the anonymous source is utilized, a memorandum must be written for the June file identifying the anonymous source. Therefore, 50 to 100 additional memoranda are added to the June file and each of these memoranda has essentially the same information.

Your attention is directed to SAC Letter 85, dated 9/7/49, paragraph B, which reads as follows: "When a highly confidential source will be used as the basis for information being set forth in numerous reports, the informant should be assigned a permanent symbol number and the Bureau advised of that symbol number by letter under the caption of 'June.'"

This is apparently the solution to your problem and you should follow Bureau instructions in this regard.

ERT:em
CC 66-1372-sub.34 (NY)

5/4/79
CLASS. & EXT. BY 2842 PVP/KR
REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2

DATE OF REVIEW 5/4/85

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____

RECEIVED
FBI
MAILED 6

AUG 11 1954
COMM - FBI

para marked otherwise
405
FBI
NO

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
FROM : SAC, New York (62-10026A)
SUBJECT : JUNE General

DATE: 8/3/54

JUNE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

As the Bureau is probably aware, a problem has gradually arisen in the New York Office which may be common also to offices such as Washington Field Office, Philadelphia, Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco and possibly others. This has to do with the system of filing "June memos" when information secured from an anonymous source is reported.

Because of its nature and the Bureau's desire to keep "June" confidential, considerable latitude has been given field offices in setting up the June system. SAC Letter No. 89, Series 1949, directed the recording of identity of highly confidential sources "in the most convenient manner". The Bureau directed that where June matters were concerned all instructions should be transmitted orally. Admittedly because the purpose, operation and function of the June file is not clearly known by many Agents who have nothing to do with it, the system may be prone to possible errors and omissions and lack of standardization.

(U) One of the main difficulties is the question of volume. For each anonymous source developed there is an original identifying memo and succeeding memos each time an item from the source is used in a report. This latter is the cause of the great volume in the June file at the New York Office. As pointed out to the Bureau in NYlet 12/8/53, many of these memos are basically identical differing only in the statement as to where the material is being used. To cite an example, an anonymous source is developed at Amtorg Trading Corporation. A report is written using all, any or a summary of the material secured. This necessitates a June memo. Then fifty or a hundred names of contacts of Amtorg, learned through the anonymous source, are either disseminated in the office to existing case files or to new case files which are opened on them. In each of these case files, when a report is written that uses the anonymous material a June memo must be written. Each of the June memos has essentially the same information in it, namely, the date of the job, identity of the Agents, location of the material. Therefore, fifty to a hundred memos have been now added to the June file. In New York this June memo file for anonymous sources is now twenty-two sections in length and growing rapidly.

RM

RPW:HC

RECORDED-20

EX-103

AUG 4 1954

CLASS. & EXT. BY 2845 PVP/STN
REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2

Letter to Director
NY 62-10026A

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

It is pointed out that there seems to be no actual necessity so to repeat the identification of the Agents participating in the development of the anonymous source. The only new or different item in each of the succeeding June memos is the identity of the file where the item is now being reported. It is the opinion of this office that subsequent to the first June memo identifying the source no further memos should be needed.

What seems to be an obvious weakness in the present arrangement lies in the ever increasing numbers of Agents and stenographers who have had nothing to do with the development of the original source but who are learning all details about it due to the additional and subsequent June memos. An example of this - Agent checks indices on a subject and finds an identical reference which he will use in a report in an applicant or AEC or loyalty or other type case. The information is in another report and is credited to a T informant. The informant page identifies the T informant as anonymous. Since the Agent must go to the original source he now goes to the June file. He looks up by dates (since there is no indexing in the June file) and locates a memo that tells him the date and place and the identity of the Agents who performed an extremely delicate and highly confidential job. He needs this information for his dictation of a June memo which will state the same information but will add the identity of the report in which he is using the original information.

It is believed desirable that the Agent and stenographer not know about that operation as, because of its type and its confidential nature, the fewer persons who know, the better. Also nothing actually will have been added to his report. There has been no increase in accuracy or credibility because he put the information in another June memo. In any case the informant page is deleted in dissemination. This process can be repeated many times and in New York it has, leading to the present tremendous June file.

The NYO has been giving thought to this problem and wishes to point out its opinion that there seems to be need for simplification and standardization in the handling of June matters. This be true in other offices so the suggestion is made that the au might consider soliciting the opinion and analysis of other offices which might be concerned. Against the possibility that the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Letter to Director
NY 62-10026A

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Bureau might wish to use this NYO letter to help present the problem, nine copies are furnished the Bureau which if it desires in turn can furnish them to the other offices with whatever comments and requests and opinions the Bureau cares to add.

To provide some indication as to the direction in which New York's consideration has gone, there is set out a suggestion that might furnish some basis for discussion and development.

1. Immediately upon completion of the development of a highly confidential source, a June memorandum would be written completely identifying the source and the Agents participating. Under this suggestion this is the only June memorandum that would ever have to be written and filed pertaining to this source.

2. When a report is written which sets out all or any of the information from the above highly confidential source, it will credit the information to a T informant who will be identified on the informant page as: T- Anonymous Source and date. The date to be used will be the date of the original June memo. If several such sources are developed on the same day, of course a separate June memorandum will have to be written for each one and an identifying letter added to the date, such as: T- Anonymous Source 5/25/54A.

3. Subsequently, when an Agent checks indices and finds information that originated from an anonymous source, or writes a report using material disseminated from the highly confidential source, he will only have to note the fact that it was an anonymous source and the identifying date. It will not be necessary for him to go to the June file to look up the original memorandum or the identity of the Agents. The word "Anonymous" will be a flag to him that he need not go to the original source.

4. In cases where material secured from a highly confidential source is transmitted to another Field Division, where in turn it may be used repeatedly in other case files, it would not be necessary for the original office actually to transmit any identification of the source. In the second or successive office the informant would be identified in its June file merely as: New York Anonymous Source and New York's date of the development of that source.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Letter to Director
NY 62-10026A

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5. There could be an alternative arrangement if the Bureau should feel that a record should be kept of the reports where such material is subsequently used.

The Agent will send a longhand memorandum to the custodian of the June file directing that a notation be placed on the original June memorandum which he will identify as: Anonymous Source and the date. The type of notation would be as follows:

Date (of report or letter he is writing which
uses the anonymous source material)
File number (of the case he is handling)
Agent's name (who writes report or letter)

Entire notation would appear on one line, such as:

6/12/54 - 105-3711 - SA John Doe

Each succeeding time material is thus used a similar notation is made. Succeeding sheets can be added to the memorandum if necessary. However, there will never need to be an additional June memo as such for that particular highly confidential source.

The following advantages appear to be obvious in connection with such a proposal:

1. At New York the June file is 22 sections in length and continues to grow with each use of confidential material. By using only one original memo, the use of paper and filing time will be drastically cut.

2. Stenographic time in receiving dictation of and in the preparation of June memos will be saved. It has been noted that many of these memos are identical except for the one statement as to where the information is being used on each succeeding occasion.

3. It will thus be unnecessary for any person other than the officials of a Field Office and the Agents who developed the highly confidential source ever to know the actual identity of those Agents as no one will have to have reference to the June file other than the custodian of the file.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Letter to Director
NY 62-10026A

4. New York letter previously mentioned of 12/8/53 set up a proposal which was answered by Bureau letter 12/30/54. In this the Bureau objected to the previous proposal, which proposal created additional administrative memoranda relating to the source which then went into main files and defeated the purpose of the June file. The proposal now suggested meets the Bureau objection to the previous proposal.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Director, FBI.

SAC, New York. (66-6182B)

Class. 6-3-
Reason FCIM II, 1-2.4.2
Date of Review 2/11/95 2/11/82 1/20/55

HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL AND
ANONYMOUS SOURCES

INTERNAL SECURITY - C.

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY SLIP
DATE 6-3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In connection with the development of highly confidential and anonymous sources, there has been utilized successfully by the New York Office a new and practical investigative technique, which may prove of value to other offices in the development of these sources in their territory.

The technique involves the use of "Booties", which is a type of shoe cover commonly used by window dressers in their trade. These "Booties" are used by window dressers in order to allow them to walk around a display window without leaving shoe or dirt marks on the floors, rugs or other material used in the display. The "Booties" are slipped on over their shoes and obviates the necessity of removing their shoes.

It should be noted that the "Booties" are comparatively small in bulk and can easily be folded to handkerchief size and carried in the pocket of the user. The very practical and advantageous use of the "Booties" in connection with the development of highly confidential and anonymous sources is realized on snowy and rainy days when shoes become wet or muddy. On such days, these "Booties" can be easily and quickly slipped over the wet shoes just prior to entering the particular apartment, office, etc. and will allow movement within the premises without leaving "tell tale" stains or smears. Upon exit they can be removed just as easily and placed in the user's pocket thus affording a higher degree of security and a greater degree of movement while in the premises.

In connection with the development of the highly confidential and anonymous source [redacted] on 1/14/55, these "Booties" were used advantageously and utmost security was obtained despite the fact that the streets of New York on that morning were covered with snow. These of the "Booties" eliminated the possibility of any of the agents entering the premises leaving any wet or smear marks on the floors or rugs.

Enclosure (1)
JOC:DJC

REINDEXED - 3

66-1372-12X1
66-1372-34
NOT RECORDED
176 FEB 13 1955

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASS. & EXT. BY 2842 PDD/PL
REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW 5/4/79
Para marked c

777 JAN 19 1966

~~INDEXED-68~~ SAC, New York (62-10026A)

September 7, 1954

RECORDED-68

66-1372-12X
Director, FBI

JUNE

JUNE

Reurlet August 26, 1954, advising that
symbol numbers for highly confidential sources
for your office would be as follows: [REDACTED]


b2

There is no provision for a double asterisk
and these sources should be assigned symbol numbers
as follows: [REDACTED]

GFM:sd

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-5-80 BY SP-5 [Signature]

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____



57 SEP 16 1954 717
JAN 19 1966

Office Memo, *transm* UNITED STATES GOVERNMENTTO : A. H. Belmont *APB*DATE: April 8, 1955 *APB*FROM : W. A. Branigan *WAB*JUNESUBJECT: JUNE PROCEDURES *V*

Tolson	_____
Boardman	_____
Nichols	_____
Belmont	_____
Harbo	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Sizoo	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

June General

As you are aware, since 1949 we have operated a confidential file room in the Domestic Intelligence Division, part of which relates to the handling of June mail. In setting up the procedures followed, we have at all times been guided by the Records Section which made recommendations in the initial phases of the program for the system to be utilized. It is believed it would be well at this time for the Records Section to have one of their supervisors survey the procedures presently being followed to insure that we are handling all matters in accordance with presently existing Records Section regulations.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that Records Section have one of their supervisors go over with Supervisor Lamphere the procedures presently being utilized with respect to June mail.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-5-80 BY SP-5

RJL:em
66-1372

(4) *em*

CC: Mr. Belmont
Mr. Branigan
Mr. Lamphere

RECORDED-45

INDEXED-45

EX-124

APR 22 1955

59 APR 26 1955

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. BELMONT *W.A.B.*

FROM : W. A. BRANIGAN

SUBJECT: *CONF.*
"JUNE" MAIL

DATE: November 10, 1955

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

~~JUNE~~
~~SECRET~~

(U)

Sovme Unit of Espionage Section presently serves as custodian of "June" mail. Continuing receipt of such mail has created storage and space problem which can be anticipated to become more critical as volume increases. "June" mail is material involving most secretive sources such as Governors, secretaries to high officials who may be discussing such officials or their attitude, or material relating to highly confidential or unusual investigative techniques including technical surveillances. SAC Letter 69, 6/29/49, specified such material should be filed in separate confidential files at Bureau and in field. Memo from Director to Bureau officials 12/28/49 specified such material should be retained and filed separate and apart from main file room in a confidential office. Our recollection is that it was decided to have Espionage Section act as custodian of "June" mail because Sovme Unit already had facilities for maintaining highly confidential material.

b2

(U)

June mail
Actual processing and filing of this mail in Bureau provides restricted handling and separate filing. Participation of Espionage Section involves (1) routing and (2) custodian and is outlined as follows. Mail is received in Routing Unit (Records Section), sent to Expedite Processing (Records Section) and is then sent to Sovme Unit (Espionage Section) for routing to proper Bureau official or supervisor. After action on mail is completed and mail is initialled, it is returned to Sovme Unit. Mail is then sent to Records Section to be removed from expedite processing, indexed, recorded, and special charge-outs made up to be placed in regular files. Mail is then returned to Sovme Unit for placing in "June" folders. Espionage Section charges these folders out to Agent Supervisors needing them and inventories these folders monthly as required.

(U)

Space is a factor for these files, coupled with files on Bureau Source material, have expanded beyond facilities of Sovme Unit. "June" file cabinets (6) must now be retained in adjacent room under lock and key. There is no loss of security. We are in position now where we must order another cabinet and we are running out of space. Records and Communications Division has confidential file room which could afford security of custody and likewise has Special Mail Desk which could handle routing aspects.

SBD:hmm

(5)

cc: Belmont
Nichols
Branigan
Tully

5-9 DEC 29 1955

RECORDED - 33

INDEXED-33

EX-118

10 DEC 19 1955

ESP ~~SECRET~~

5/4/79
CLASS. & EXT. BY 2842 PJP/KDR
REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW 5/4/89
para marked & allow review

59 DEC 30 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BELMONT

~~SECRET~~

RECOMMENDATION:

Recommend Records Section of Records and Communications Division take over custody of "June" mail by retaining it in their confidential file room and that Records Section institute revised routing procedures, possibly through the Special Mail Desk, to eliminate Espionage Section from the routing aspect.

~~copy~~ *210*
OK *PTB* *SD*
for

~~SECRET~~

Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES

GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. NICHOLS *File*

DATE: 11-23-55

FROM : F. W. WALKART

JUNE

SUBJECT: "JUNE" MAIL

Tolson	_____
Boardman	_____
Nichols	_____
Belmont	_____
Harbo	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Sizoo	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

Reference is made to Mr. Branigan's memorandum to Mr. Belmont dated 11-10-55 recommending that the Records Section take custody of "June" mail in our Confidential Room and thereafter handle routing and service questions that arise.

During the recent Inspection of the Domestic Intelligence Division, a similar proposal was discussed by you with Assistant Director Tamm, who was conducting the Inspection. The conclusion was reached that no change should be made and that the files should be retained in the Domestic Intelligence Division.

The following points should be considered in connection with this problem.

(1) Space is equally a problem in the Records Section since the Confidential Room is completely filled and it would be necessary to move a partition and generally rearrange the space in the 7500 corridor in order to accommodate this material in the Confidential File Room. However, since the total of a 6-year accumulation of "June" material occupies only 6 file cabinets, it is not believed that space should be a controlling factor.

(2) The Records Section is not as well qualified as the Domestic Intelligence Division to exercise control over "June" material and to determine to whom this material should be made available.

(3) Most requests for "June" material are from personnel in the Domestic Intelligence Division. Consequently, moving the files from the first floor to the seventh would result in an increase in transportation with the attendant additional cost and security hazards.

(4) Assuming that the same conditions still exist that created the system, it would be illogical to move the operation back to the Records Section now.

RECORDED - 33

66-1372-16

INDEXED 1331 INFORMATION CONTAINED

ALL INFORMATION IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 8-5-80 BY SP-5 RSK/ML

59 DEC 16 1955

59 DEC 29 1955

Memorandum to Mr. Nichols
Re: "June" Mail

11-23-55

If it is now determined that conditions have so changed as to make it unnecessary to keep "June" material out of the Records Section, the whole program should be re-evaluated, particularly in the light of the Bureau's efforts to economize its operations. Present method of handling "June" mail is time consuming and expensive. If it is returned to the Records Section, it is our opinion that we should revert to the established procedures of processing and filing this mail in the regular file rather than charging the material out and maintaining it separately as is the present procedure.

The accumulation, storage, and servicing of material in a "confidential room" in our view is extremely undesirable and wasteful. We are always reluctant to increase the capacity of this unit because of its obvious waste and duplication of effort. We contend quite properly that all our records are "confidential" and from an efficiency standpoint should be maintained intact and serviced accordingly.

RECOMMENDATION:

That if "June" mail still requires special handling and maintenance, it be retained in the Domestic Intelligence Division. On the other hand, if we can re-absorb this material into our regular files as we did the old SIS file, the mail should be returned to the Records Section.

I don't agree so
long as reasons
exist which caused
us to set up June
mail.

12-12-55

The Executives' Conference, consisting of Messrs. Tolson, Nichols, Holloman, Mason, Rosen, Boardman, Nease, Conrad (for Parsons), Tamm, Mohr and Belmont, unanimously recommended that the June Mail continue to be handled as it is at the present time in view of the continued need that this mail be handled separate and apart from the regular Files procedure.

A. H. Belmont

4-528

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-08-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB/MJS

66-1372-17
CHANGED TO
66-1372-34-135

AUG 16 1956

J. M.



@

JUNE
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 56-C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CONFIDENTIAL

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

February 3, 1956

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

(U) RE: TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCES (C)

A reliable confidential informant has advised that the Communist Party on the west coast has prepared a detailed memorandum concerning the techniques of concealing microphones, telephone tapping, recording devices, concealed radio transmitters and infrared for use in photography and on surveillances. The information reflects that it was probably prepared by technically trained people experienced in technical problems encountered in this field. However, some statements clearly indicate that their knowledge does not extend into all aspects or phases of these techniques as presently employed by the Bureau. It is deemed desirable to advise you at this time of the salient points set forth in this Communist Party document.

With regard to microphones, they state that there is no reliable guarantee against microphone coverage. They advise searching in such places as light fixtures, picture moldings, pictures, chairs, tables, ventilator openings, draperies, valances, wall outlets, wall spaces, et cetera. They warn against public address speakers being used as microphones.

They described small radio transmitters which can be concealed in wall spaces or on the person with various methods of immobilizing same. Reference is made to power line carrier equipment as a means of listening in on conversations.

The Communist Party memorandum refers to methods of tapping telephones including specially prepared telephone instruments which permit them to also act as microphones, along with technical methods which require five wires connected to the instruments, or other methods which do not require any additional wires to the instrument.

The memorandum also alludes to concealment of equipment such as recorders on the person or in an automobile. With particular regard to automobiles and the concealment of radio equipment, they point out that hidden places can be examined for the presence of such equipment. Specific mention is made of placing units under the car in locations such as fender wells, et cetera. Of particular significance is the statement that radio antennas must be exposed free of the metal body of the automobile in order to work. This is, of course, a commonly accepted statement;

SENT TO ALL SAC's, Bur. Offs,
& Sup. 2-13-56 5/4/79

MAR 6 1963

CLASS. & EXT. BY 2242 PVD JCF
REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW 5/4/89

NOT RECORDED

35 MAR 5 1963

CONFIDENTIAL

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-04-2375

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

however, Bureau installations do not necessarily follow this practice. They also state that concealed radio equipment under certain circumstances can be utilized to help trace automobiles.

(U) The memorandum details countermeasures or procedures to be used in carrying on conversations such as talking in a low tone of voice while playing the radio at a loud level. Also an evaluation of detailed experiments including the use of sign language and note writing between individuals was explained.

In conclusion the above-mentioned memorandum theorized on the use of radioactive matter and infrared designed to trace automobiles as well as pointing out certain aspects of infrared night photography.

The Bureau is setting out the above information particularly for the guidance of sound-trained Agents and security personnel. You should personally bring the contents to their attention.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

2/3/56
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER NO. 56-C - 2 -
JUNE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4-528

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-08-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB/MJS

66-1372-18, 19

CHANGED TO

66-1372-34-148X, 149X

JAN 21 1958
jm



In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

PERSONAL ATTENTION
SAC LETTER NO. 57-52

September 16, 1957 WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

ALL INFORMATION
CONTAINED HEREIN IS
UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 8-14-80

(A) PROTECTION OF DEPARTMENTAL RECORDS -- The Attorney General has issued an order instructing that henceforth no memorandum, letter, document or other record originating within the Department shall be classified, designated, described or otherwise marked with any word or phrase restricting access thereto except in accordance with the provisions of Executive Order 10501 or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. The Attorney General stated that Departmental Order 3464, Supplement Number 4 (Revised), January 13, 1953, adequately protects the integrity of the Department's records. This order is set out in the Manual of Rules and Regulations, Part II, Section 8, Page 17a.

Henceforth no Bureau memorandum, letter, document or other record shall be marked with any restrictive words or phrases such as "Personal and Confidential," "Strictly Confidential," "For Official Use Only" or other similar designations.

The Department has advised that there is no objection to using on envelopes the words "Personal and Confidential" or other similar words or phrases even though they may not be used on the document itself. There is also no objection to using in the documents themselves such words as "personal and confidential." If for any reason it becomes necessary to restrict the circularization or dissemination of a document either to a Bureau employee, to another governmental official or agency or to an outside correspondent, it will be permissible to use a sentence in the communication itself stating that the information is being furnished for the personal and confidential information of the recipient. This procedure should be used discreetly and only where the circumstances justify.

The use of the word "Obscene" on documents and envelopes and the code word "JUNE" should be continued since these words are regarded as descriptive of the material rather than a classification.

The legend to outside agencies appearing on the bottom of FBI report forms will be continued as will the notation appearing on FBI identification records.

The Attorney General's order permits the continued use of the words "Personal" and "Personal Attention" on documents. In many instances the Bureau will use these words on correspondence, particularly to Bureau employees, where heretofore the words "Personal and Confidential" were used.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 8-5-80 BY SP-5 RJA/KR

126 57 23 457

CLASS. & EXT. BY SP-5 RJA/KR

REASON - F.T.R. 1.2, 1.4, 2.2

DATE OF REVIEW 8-11-90

67 SEP 24 1957

CONFIDENTIAL

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-1372-1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The foregoing instructions do not change existing instructions concerning words, designations and phraseology now used on envelopes on intra-Bureau mail for the purpose of controlling the routing, opening or handling of such mail.

It is imperative that all Bureau employees strictly abide by the spirit and intent of the Attorney General's memorandum concerning the protection of Departmental records.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

9/16/57
SAC LETTER NO. 57-52

- 2 -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. NEASE *Ne*

DATE: 9-4-58

FROM : W. G. EAMES *E*SUBJECT: SUGGESTION #241-59
RECORDS BRANCH STREAMLINING COMMITTEE

Tolson	_____
Boardman	_____
Belmont	_____
Mohr	_____
Nease	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Trotter	_____
Clayton	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

SUGGESTION: [] a GS-4 employee assigned to the Recording Unit of the Records Branch, has suggested through the Streamlining Committee that ~~"June"~~ mail be flagged or stamped with a large red stamp indicating that the mail is "June" mail.

PRESENT PROCEDURE: At the present time "June" mail has the word "June" typed in black on the mail.

ADVANTAGES: [] stated that the current practice of having the word "June" typed in black on the mail is not very noticeable. She believes that the adoption of her suggestion would enable employees to spot "June" mail more quickly and it would also eliminate some errors of sending some "June" mail to regular files. It would also assist the typists in that they are required to type the word "June" on the abstract.

CONCLUSIONS: The Records Branch believes the afore-mentioned suggestion has some merit and would greatly assist the work of the Records Branch. It is believed that the views of the Domestic Intelligence Division should be obtained.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. For referral to the Training and Inspection Division for proper acknowledgment.

2. For referral to the Domestic Intelligence Division for consideration.

TBC:dvh

(5)

1 - Personnel file of []

REC-3

66-1372-20

EX-136

13 SEP 24 1958

61 OCT 9 1958

6 OCT 7 1958

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-5-80 BY SP-5

memo to Mr. Baumgardner & Mr. Belmont 9/12/58 - B.R. []

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: September 12, 1958

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION #241-59
RECORDS BRANCH STREAMLINING COMMITTEE
SUBMITTED BY [REDACTED]

Tolson	_____
Boardman	_____
Belmont	_____
Mohr	_____
Nease	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Trotter	_____
W.C. Sullivan	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

It has been suggested that "June" mail be stamped or flagged with a large red stamp indicating the mail is "June" mail.

Existing procedure provides that "June" mail has the word "June" typed in black on the front page of all "June" correspondence and that all routing be specifically handled by placing correspondence in a separate envelope designating the exact routing of same.

The desk preparing outgoing correspondence in the "June" category places the correspondence in U. S. Government messenger envelopes (Standard Form No. 65) and designates thereon the routing desired. The mail room upon receipt of "June" correspondence places the outgoing in a "June" envelope for transmission to the field and the yellow is returned in "June" envelope to the "June" Room for filing.

It is believed the existing procedure for the handling of "June" mail is adequate and the further "flag" is not necessary. It is not believed that any time would be saved by use of the proposed stamp as the typist can type the word "June" on the correspondence while it is in her typewriter in less time than it would take to stamp the mail.

RECOMMENDATION:

The Domestic Intelligence Division does not favorably recommend the adoption of instant suggestion and recommends that this matter be returned to the Training and Inspection Division for consideration and further handling.

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
- 1 - Mr. Rose
- 1 - ~~Training and Inspection Division~~

BFR:ssh

(5)

ADDENDUM: 9/16/58 - NAW:ceh
Training and Inspection Division agrees with the observations of Domestic Intelligence Division. The present procedure of marking this type of mail is considered entirely satisfactory. No further action recommended as employee has been thanked for her suggestion.

REC-3


EX-136

61 OCT 9 1958

6 OCT 7 1958

13 SEP 24 1958

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-5-80 BY SP-5 [REDACTED]



JUNE
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 57-C
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

February 27, 1957 WASHINGTON 25, D.C. 54-2213

RE: ~~TECHNICAL AND MICROPHONE SURVEILLANCES - FORMS~~

Effective immediately when submitting Form FD-142 re-
questing authority to install and Form FD-143 as justification for
continuation of technical and microphone surveillances furnish only
an original and no copies.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover


Director

RECORDED - 49
INDEXED - 49

2 FEB 28 1957

2567

EX-125



EX-125
ENCLOSURE

6 MAR 26 1957

1957, & Ext. by
1-2, 4, 2
Date of Review

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-5-80 BY SP-5 RJA/ma

66-1372-

NOT RECORDED

119 MAR 7 1961

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-04-2567

7858 SR / OLC / CC

4-23-82



JUNE
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

NO NUMBER
SAC LETTER Q
Series 1952

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

April 24, 1952

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB/MJS
ON 10-08-2009

SAC

ALBANY	DENVER	MILWAUKEE	PORTLAND
ALBUQUERQUE	DETROIT	MINNEAPOLIS	RICHMOND
ANCHORAGE	EL PASO	MOBILE	ST. LOUIS
ATLANTA	HONOLULU	NEWARK	SALT LAKE CITY
BALTIMORE	HOUSTON	NEW HAVEN	SAN ANTONIO
BIRMINGHAM	INDIANAPOLIS	NEW ORLEANS	SAN DIEGO
BOSTON	KANSAS CITY	NEW YORK	SAN FRANCISCO
BUFFALO	KNOXVILLE	NORFOLK	SAN JUAN
BUTTE	LITTLE ROCK	OKLAHOMA CITY	SAVANNAH
CHARLOTTE	LOS ANGELES	OMAHA	SEATTLE
CHICAGO	LOUISVILLE	PHILADELPHIA	SPRINGFIELD
CINCINNATI	MEMPHIS	PHOENIX	WASHINGTON, D. C.
CLEVELAND	MIAMI	PITTSBURGH	QUANTICO
DALLAS			

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Class. & Ext. By 7858 JLC/RA
Reason-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2
Date of Review 4-15-99

RE: ~~TECHNICAL AND MICROPHONE SURVEILLANCES~~

The Attorney General has advised that whenever the Department is giving serious consideration to the institution of criminal prosecution in any particular case, the Bureau, upon request, should advise the Department in detail concerning any telephone, microphone or other technical surveillances employed by the Bureau or other Federal agencies (when known) as well as any other investigative techniques or procedures which would compromise or otherwise endanger a successful criminal prosecution. On the other hand, whenever the Bureau is aware or has reason to believe that the Department is seriously considering prosecution, the Bureau should promptly advise the Department of the existence of any of the above factors without waiting for a specific request from the Department.

CASES INVOLVING USE OF CONFIDENTIAL TECHNIQUES

In view of the above, no case in which confidential techniques were employed as an investigative step should be presented to the United States Attorney for a decision relative to prosecution without prior authorization from the Bureau. Therefore, whenever such cases are developed to a point where they are ready for presentation to the United States Attorney for a decision relative to

ENCLOSURE

MAR 6 1963

RECORDED - 82-7-6-1566
APR 24 1952
INDEXED - 82-7-6-1566
MAY 24 1952
66-1372
NOT RECORDED
35 MAR 6 1963
CLASS. & EXT. BY 2842 PVP/OK
REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW 5/17/89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

prosecution, you should notify the Bureau and await authority to present such cases to the United States Attorney. On the other hand, should the United States Attorney indicate a desire to prosecute a case previously presented to him which involves the use of confidential techniques, you should immediately advise the Bureau by teletype and await authority to advise confidentially the United States Attorney of the existence of these techniques.

When Bureau authority is received, you should orally furnish the United States Attorney in the district of prosecution information relating to technical or microphone surveillances through which defendants or their attorneys have been covered. Unless individual circumstances dictate otherwise, this information should not include mechanical details of their operation. There must, however, be no misunderstanding on the part of the United States Attorney as to the existence or extent of such installations for it is imperative that this Bureau make every effort to avoid possible charges of indulging in evasive tactics or half-truths.

DISCONTINUANCE OF TECHNICAL INSTALLATIONS UPON ARREST OF SUBJECT

In the event federal prosecution is authorized in any Bureau case in which a technical or microphone surveillance is in operation, and one or more subjects are arrested, any such surveillances directly covering arrested subjects or on individuals with whom they are so closely associated that the coverage is in effect directly upon the subjects should be discontinued immediately. The Bureau should be advised promptly of this discontinuance. The office of prosecution should take the necessary steps to insure that any auxiliary offices involved will take similar steps.

ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENAS DUCES TECUM

Other factors to be considered are the filing of defense motions calling for the production of records pertaining to alleged technical and microphone surveillances involving previously intercepted communications of defendants or their attorneys and the service of subpoenas duces tecum on representatives of the Bureau or the Department. Upon receipt of information that such action has been taken the Bureau should be advised immediately by telephone or teletype.

4/24/52
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER Q
Series 1952

- 2 -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(U)

As soon as the subpoena duces tecum is issued or a defense motion entertained which calls for the production of Bureau records pertaining to alleged technical or microphone surveillances, you should immediately take the necessary steps to preserve all original discs, tapes, records, etc., obtained from technical or microphone surveillances of the defendants as well as those obtained through continuing operations of other related installations [such as Communist headquarters] which could occasionally cover the defendant's conversations. There should be absolutely no further destruction of those discs, tapes, records, etc., until the Bureau authorizes you to do so. The Department has advised that the denial of a pretrial motion and the quashing of a subpoena requiring the production of certain discs, tapes, records, etc., based on evidence allegedly illegally obtained through wire tapping and other technical surveillances, would not represent a final and conclusive disposition of the matter and would not preclude the defendants from attempting to pursue a similar line of inquiry at any stage of the trial. In view of this, it is the opinion of the Department that it is both desirable and necessary that these records be preserved and retained not only during the pendency of the motions and subpoenas in question but also during the entire progress of the trial to which applicable. The Department will re-examine this entire matter at the conclusion of the trial in order to determine the desirability and propriety of reverting to the established procedure for the disposal of this material. The office of prosecution in each instance should take the necessary steps to advise the auxiliary offices of the above procedure. ~~CONF~~

The above instructions apply not only to defendants but also to defense attorneys selected to represent a subject. Under no circumstances does the Bureau desire technical coverage on a defense attorney after the institution of prosecutive action and his selection or appointment to represent the defendant becomes known. Instructions in this regard were set forth in No Number SAC letter J, dated October 19, 1951.

The procedures outlined above must be thoroughly understood and followed.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1/24/52

NUMBER SAC LETTER Q
series 1952

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RE: SECURITY CASES - PREPARATION OF REPORTS

(U) In view of the above instructions it will no longer be necessary, when submitting reports in connection with the program of preparing summary reports in Security Index cases, to attach cover letters pointing out that the report contains information obtained by means of a technical or microphone surveillance as instructed by No Number SAC Letter G, dated March 4, 1952. The procedure outlined in No Number SAC Letter I, dated March 14, 1952, regarding the placing of an asterisk behind the symbol numbers for these technical and microphone surveillances on the administrative pages remains in effect. (S) (X) (C)

(U) There are a few live confidential informants who are so highly placed in subversive movements and whose position as informants is so sensitive that they should be treated as confidentially within an office as technical and microphone surveillances. Such live informants are to be handled in the same manner as technical and microphone surveillances insofar as requirements for documentation of information received from them in security reports are concerned. That is, an asterisk should be placed behind their symbol numbers in the administrative portion of security reports. The identity of the Bureau employee receiving the informant's report and location of the original in the office files will not be shown in the security reports. This will eliminate the necessity of Agents locating the original reports of such informants in office files. (S) (X) (C)

(U) Such procedure must be restricted to only those live informants who are on a high level in subversive organizations and who, for reasons of security, should be protected as fully as other sources who are handled under the "June" procedure. (S) (X) (C)

(U) Before decision is made by you to so report information received from live informants you must carefully evaluate each live informant to be certain he comes within this stipulation. It is expected that this provision will be applicable only in rare instances. It is desired that complete documentation of the original reports of ordinary live confidential informants be made in reports of security investigations at this time in line with instructions in No Number SAC Letter I, dated March 14, 1952. (S) (X) (C)

4/24/52

NO NUMBER SAC LETTER Q
Series 1952

- 4 -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(U)

Designation of a live confidential informant as coming within the above instructions should be handled by you personally. It is suggested that you determine the permanent symbol number of all technical surveillances, microphone surveillances, and high level live informants in your office which should be handled in accordance with these instructions, and prepare a list of the symbol numbers of such sources for your Agents who are handling security investigations. The Agents should be instructed that these sources need only be documented in security reports by placing an asterisk behind their symbol numbers together with the date of activity and date the information was received. By this procedure the possibility of Agents becoming directly cognizant of the identities of such sources through referral to the informants' files will be eliminated. ~~(S)~~ ~~(X)~~ ~~(C)~~

The above instructions shall apply to both investigative and summary reports in all security cases.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4/24/52
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER Q
Series 1952

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
ATT: FBI LABORATORY - ATT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE: 11/28/58

b6
b7C

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK

JUNE

(U) SUBJECT: [REDACTED] NEW YORK OFFICE

b2
b7E

(U) The conversion of [REDACTED] NYO, to the
pyramid type of monitoring system has been completed,
except for minor modification in the physical arrangement of the
monitoring banks. (X)



ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-5-80 BY SP-5 RCH/MLK

PROG
DEC 1 1958

3 - Bureau
(1 - FBI LAB-ATT: [REDACTED])
1 - New York

JJH:hd
(4)

REC-6 66-1372-21X

3 DEC 1 1958

b6
b7C

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

61 DEC 1958
JAN 19 1966

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-08-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB/MJS

66-1372-22

CHANGED TO

66-1372-34-171

²²⁸⁰
JAN 15 1959

P.S.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : W. A. Branigan

DATE: April 15, 1959

FROM : A. P. Litrento

~~SECRET~~

Tolson	_____
Boardman	_____
Belmont	_____
Mohr	_____
Nease	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Trotter	_____
W.C. Sullivan	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

SUBJECT: JUNE MAIL

b2

(U) In connection with maintenance of June and [redacted] files in the Soume Unit, it has been the practice over the years of taking a monthly inventory for the purpose of determining if all files are accounted for. This monthly inventory uses up about 6 to 8 hours clerical time each month. It has not been possible to determine the basis for setting up the inventory on a monthly basis although it is probably due to the sensitive nature of these files. (S)

Inquiry of the Records Section reveals that it is the general practice for an inventory to be made of Bureau files including those kept in the Confidential Room, twice a year, that is April 1 and October 1.

(U) It is the opinion of the clerical personnel handling the inventory in the Soume Unit that it is not necessary to have the inventory made on a monthly basis and it would serve the same purpose to have the inventory made on a 3 months' basis. It was pointed out that clerical time saved could then be utilized in the performance of other duties assigned these employees in the Soume Unit. (S)

(U) Unless advised to the contrary, the practice will be instituted of conducting the inventory on the files in the Soume Unit every 3 months namely, May 1, August 1, November 1 and February 1. (S)

ACTION:

For your information.

APL:jdb
(3)1 - Branigan
1 - Litrento

5/4/79
CLASS. & EXT. BY 2843 PDD/PN
REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW 5/4/89
para marked c otherwise a

APR 22 1959

~~SECRET~~

55 APR 24 1959

10-6-65

RECORDS MANAGEMENT - JUNE MAIL

INSPECTOR E. C. WILLIAMS: Space within the Espionage Section, Room 2704 specifically, has been set aside to house certain files classified Confidential using as a flag for special treatment the Bureau's code word "JUNE." There are approximately 57 file drawers of material falling into this category.

After a spot examination of some of the material contained in these files it was determined a considerable volume had no lasting value, could be treated as administrative type correspondence, and should be purged. The mail in question appeared to fit into the category of correspondence spelled out in the specifications approved by a memorandum from the Department of Justice to the Bureau dated 12-15-50 (66-3206-443). This authority, granted upon request from the Bureau, approves the disposal of certain administrative type mail. The instructions in part read as follows: "Administrative correspondence with the field offices relating to, but not restricted to, subjects such as case status and follow-up letters, etc."

As a further means of conserving space, it is felt certain of the older files included in Room 2704 could be considered for microfilming. Completely inactive mail, at least ten years old, and referred to infrequently should be the criterion or guide followed before starting this program. It is felt with careful preparation and planning a continuing and effective system for reclaiming space in this fashion could be adopted. Therefore, the following recommendations are submitted for consideration and action:

RECOMMENDATION:

(1) In line with the above it is recommended the Domestic Intelligence Division survey the files containing June mail and submit a plan for purging of material housed therein.

(2) Also, as an additional means of reclaiming space, it is recommended the benefits of microfilming material ten years old be considered.

Comments of Assistant Director Belmont requested.

D. I. D. Inspection
11-9-60
OGM:jao
5J-1

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-6-80 BY SP-5 RLB/tac

66-1372
NOT RECORDED
170 OCT. 7 1965

63 NOV 22 1965

RECORDS MANAGEMENT - JUNE MAIL

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR A. H. BELMONT: "June" mail procedure was instituted in 1949 for the specific purpose of handling mail relating to technical and microphone surveillances and other sensitive sources to limit knowledge of and access to such material. As a general rule, a "June" file contains correspondence dealing with surveys made for technical and microphone installations, proposed use, authorized use (including in most instances Attorney General authority for the installation), justification (forms FD-142 and FD-143), removal and in many instances technical problems connected with the installation. In addition, some of these files contain correspondence transmitting tapes of recordings to the Bureau and between field offices for translation purposes. One "June" file (66-2542) which occupies three file drawers contains mostly correspondence relating to statistical information as to the number of installations, mail covers, informants, etc., in all field offices. This material is furnished by the field to the Bureau periodically so that the Bureau may be aware of developments in the various field offices on a continuing basis.

With respect to technical and microphone surveillances, it is believed that we should have available the administrative history of each installation. Form FD-143, which is sent to the Bureau periodically, contains data submitted by the Field Office in justification for the continuation of the installation. Admittedly, this data should be incorporated elsewhere in the Bureau's files in investigative reports and it is, therefore, believed that purging the "June" files of all these forms which are two years old would not detract from the administrative history of the installation.

Likewise, correspondence transmitting tapes for translation would be purged.

There are approximately five thousand "June" files maintained in the Espionage Section. It is recommended that these "June" files be purged in line with the above by Records Division personnel. If you approve, the Espionage Section personnel will be instructed that hereafter in filing any justification forms (FD-143), they should insure that the form previously submitted two years prior has been destroyed and deserialized. This will be done on a continuing basis. Copies of correspondence transmitting tapes for translation will, in the future, not be accepted for filing and Espionage Section personnel will be so instructed, as will personnel of the Translation Section in the Laboratory.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
NOVEMBER 18, 1960
WAB:hmm

The Inspector has also recommended the benefits of microfilming criminal material ten years old. A spot check survey shows that there are not more than 1/2 dozen criminal files more than ten years old. Under the circumstances, it is not believed that enough space can be saved to justify the expense of microfilming; however, a tickler has been made so that on the Tenth of February each year we will consider the need for microfilming and will discuss this with appropriate Records Division personnel.

ans

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. TOLSON

FROM : J. H. GALE

SUBJECT: SECURITY OF CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

DATE: October 20, 1964

CLASS. & EXT. BY 288/289

REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2

DATE OF REVIEW 10/30/89

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
DeLoach _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED ON 6/25/79
BY 6076 WAH/DB

June

During the course of the inspection of the Special Investigative Division, inquiry was made into security afforded criminal intelligence information in view of the fact that certain sensitive investigative counterparts to these matters in the Domestic Intelligence Division are maintained by the Files and Communications Division in a special file room. Criminal intelligence information is not. The inquiry developed three questions to be resolved: (1) should criminal intelligence information be filed in the special file room; (2) where should abstracts of this information be filed; and (3) do the abstracts of "June" material contain too much revealing information and should this be corrected? This material is highly confidential data such as that relating to microphone surveillances, technical installations, etc., which is flagged by the word "June" to insure it received restricted handling and selective routing. It is filed in the special file room.

The Inspection Division feels there should be a uniformity established in filing procedures; i.e., if certain selected files on sensitive investigations of Domestic Intelligence Division receive special filing, then counterpart files in Special Investigative Division should receive the same handling. Secondly, this Division feels abstracts, provided they contain sensitive information, should be filed using selectivity of filing (special filing) commensurate with the material to which they relate or they should not contain sensitive information. This is not being done at the present time, for example, with criminal intelligence abstracts or with "June" abstracts which are filed with all other abstracts and which contain sensitive information about highly confidential sources. It was felt by the Inspection Division that alternative ways to bring about a desirable solution to the latter inconsistency with security, exclusive of special filing of these abstracts, would be to (1) eliminate abstracts in "June" material or (2) instruct that "June" abstracts should contain only the identity of the submitting office or Division, date, name of subject, etc., and the word "June." (In view of practical objection raised by Mr. Tavel to (1) and (2), Inspection Division is proposing a third alternative, namely, to continue "June" abstracts but caution personnel to avoid alluding to highly confidential techniques and to paraphrase any information therein so as not to reveal presence or nature of such techniques.

These observations were presented in an inspection write-up and comments of Assistant Directors Evans, Sullivan and Tavel were requested. Mr. Evans interposed no objection to special filing procedures for his sensitive files, and

ENCLOSURE

1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Casper
1 - Mr. Tavel

Enclosures 5
ESM:bhg, wmf (6) 1064

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEC 7 1964

MAIL ROOM

66-17404-43

ORIGINAL FILED IN

Memo for Mr. Tolson
Re: Security of Criminal Intelligence Information

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

recommended the adoption of the procedure to eliminate all information exclusive of file number, etc., and the word "June" on pertinent abstracts. Mr. Sullivan reiterated that sensitive investigative files of his Division are filed in the special file room and cannot be released without the consent of a specified representative of that Division. Further, that as a result of the last inspection, at the Inspector's suggestion, a number of abstracts relating to these cases containing detailed summaries of sensitive information, arrangements were made with the Records Branch to flag these certain abstracts so that they could be handled with the same precautions as the files. Also as a result of the inspection the field was instructed by an SAC Letter dated 9/1/64 to avoid inclusion of unnecessary highly sensitive information on abstracts in security investigations. Mr. Tavel agreed that criminal intelligence information could be filed in the special file room and that the field should be advised to avoid inclusion of unnecessary highly sensitive criminal intelligence information on accompanying abstracts. In regard to "June" abstracts, Mr. Tavel pointed out a number of practical uses in the Records Branch wherein employees of that Branch rely on even limited narrative data in abstracts to assist in the efficient operation of their records management function, and suggested this be taken into consideration in proposing corrective measures. Inspection Division is phrasing its third recommendation accordingly.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the Special Investigative Division make arrangements with the Files and Communications Division for the institution of special filing procedures for such files as "La Cosa Nostra," [redacted] Top Echelon Criminal Informant files and other selected files. A system to limit charge-out of abstracts of information in these files should also be instituted. (u) b2

GK -
JH
JH
ST

2. That the field be instructed to avoid inclusion of unnecessary highly sensitive information on abstracts in criminal intelligence investigations of a sensitive nature (Letter to all SAC's attached).

GK -
JH
JH
ST

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memo for Mr. Tolson
Re: Security of Criminal Intelligence Information

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3. That the field and the Seat of Government be instructed to carefully avoid alluding to any highly confidential techniques in the preparation of "June" abstracts and, further, that any information contained in these abstracts should be paraphrased in such a way so as not to reveal the presence or nature of the technique utilized. No number letter to all SAC's attached. Seat of Government Division Heads will each get a copy of this letter.

OK ✓ JH JH ST
WTS
Q
JH
LH R
JH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

A. H. Belmont

1-Helmont
1-Branigan
1-Donahoe
1-Torrillo

March 6, 1959

W. A. Branigan

~~SECRET~~

CORRESPONDENCE - TRANSMITTAL NOTATIONS

SAC Letter 59-10 dated 2/24/59 re captioned matter provides that term "Personal and Confidential" (use of which on Bureau communications was abolished by SAC Letter 57-52) is likewise no longer to be used on envelopes, and that the terms "Personal" or "Personal Attention" be used instead. Envelopes bearing these designations received at Bureau from field are routed to Director's office for opening. In the field, only the SAC may open envelopes marked "Personal" while anyone acting for him may open those marked "Personal Attention," although the SAC must initial such mail prior to filing. Field was cautioned against unnecessary use of these terms on envelopes to Bureau to avoid unnecessary handling in Director's office.

With a view to ascertaining if any problem as to the volume of mail which might be received in the Director's office or to be personally reviewed by SACs might exist as regards certain types of communications handled by the Espionage Section, an appraisal of the matter has been made, results of which follow:

"June" Mail: Check with Records Section reflects this type of mail is not received or sent in envelopes designated "Personal" or "Personal Attention" and therefore creates no problem.

(U) "Source" and "Hunter" b2
mail: Communications in these types of cases do in some instances utilize designation "Personal Attention" because of the extremely sensitive nature of the sources and material involved and the necessity for such material receiving restricted handling. However, only a few such communications are sent to the field each month and even fewer are received at the Bureau. Accordingly, it does not appear any problem exists either at the Bureau or in the field as regards the volume of these communications and no action is necessary.

ACTION:

For your information.

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Nease _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Trotter _____
W.C. Sullivan _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

66-1372 (June)

66-58068 (Hunter)

66-58068 (Source)

66-7225 (June)

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

4372
NOT RECORDED
159

5/4/79
CLASS. & EXT. BY 2842 P.H.D.P.
REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW 3/5 5/4/89
para marked otherwise

~~SECRET~~

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-7225-142

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

b2

TO : Mr. Belmont *ABW* 1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Branigan
FROM : Mr. Branigan *CB* 1 - Mr. Lenihan
1 - Mr. Litrento

DATE: April 13, 1959

SECRET

SUBJECT: JUNE MAIL

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Nease _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Trotter _____
W.C. Sullivan _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

(U) The Soume Unit of the Espionage Section is the custodian for "June" mail and [redacted] material. The "June" mail and [redacted] material are stored in 24 cabinets in Room 2704. Twelve of these cabinets contain "June" mail. Under the general regulations of Executive Order 10501, ~~Top Secret~~ material must be stored under the most secure facilities possible. The Order states that this normally means a safe or safe-type steel cabinet which is fireproof. In view of this, all of our [redacted] material (which is classified ~~Top Secret~~) is stored in safe-type fireproof cabinets. These are all four-drawer cabinets. We have also been storing "June" mail in similar-type cabinets although in recently expanding these files, we used two five-drawer nonfireproof cabinets for this material. To the best of our recollection, this was done because no four-drawer, safe-type, fireproof cabinets were available to us at that time, or it might have been that space limitations in the past called for the use of the regular cabinets. (S)

In examining the space situation in Room 2704, it appears that this space will eventually become inadequate due to the normal expansion of these files in the future. In order to utilize this space to its fullest extent, it is believed desirable that the four-drawer, safe-type, fireproof cabinets containing the "June" mail be replaced by the five-drawer nonfireproof cabinets. This can be done by exchanging the four-drawer, safe-type, fireproof cabinets for five-drawer nonfireproof cabinets which are presently being used by supervisors and clerical employees throughout the Espionage Section. We will, of course, have special locks placed on the cabinets used for the "June" mail in order to afford maximum security to these files.

There is no real need for these safe-type cabinets in the Espionage Section, it being noted that it is a general practice that classified material is stored throughout the Bureau in other than safe-type fireproof cabinets. The supervisors in the Espionage Section will use the safe-type cabinets exchanged only as an economy measure. These safe-type cabinets are available for exchange within the Bureau wherever there is a need for them.

APL:eda
(5)

REC-10

66-1032-24

EX-10 MAY 1 1959

5/4/79
CLASS. & EXT. BY 2842 P. 00102
REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW 5/4/89
Para marked C otherwise

55 MAY 5 1959

SECRET

Mr. Branigan to Mr. Belmont
June Mail

~~SECRET~~

RECOMMENDATION:

If you approve, we will proceed along the lines set forth above.

Amr WAB
Branigan

Q

SP

~~EX~~

Ma
4/15

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-08-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB/MJS

66-1372-25

CHANGED TO

66-1372-34-176X

AUG 3 1959

MS

C

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : A. H. Belmont

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: JUNE MAIL PROCEDURES

DATE: September 21, 1960

~~SECRET~~

Tolson _____

Mohr _____

Parsons _____

Belmont _____

Callahan _____

DeLoach _____

Malone _____

McGuire _____

Rosen _____

Tamm _____

Trotter _____

W.C. Sullivan _____

Tele. Room _____

Ingram _____

Gandy _____

(U) Since 1949 the Domestic Intelligence Division has operated a confidential file room, part of which relates to the handling of June mail. This file room is located in the Sovme Unit, Room 2704. In setting up the procedures followed we were guided by the Records Section which made recommendations in the initial phases of the program for the system to be used.

In April, 1955, we requested the Records Section to have one of its supervisors survey the procedures that were being followed to insure that we were handling all matters in accordance with existing Records Section regulations. Records Section Supervisor Eames made the survey at that time.

In view of the lapse of time, it is believed another survey should be made of our procedures by a supervisor from the Files and Communications Division to insure that our procedures are in accordance with present existing regulations of that Division.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the Files and Communications Division have one of its supervisors survey the procedures presently being utilized in the handling of June mail.

APL:str
(5)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. McGuire
- 1 - Mr. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. Litrento

REC-77

66-1372-26

15 OCT 26 1960

5/4/79

CLASS. & EXT. BY 2842 PVO/98

REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2

DATE OF REVIEW 9/21/80

para marked otherwise

61 NOV 4 1960

6 OCT 27 1960

~~SECRET~~

4-52

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-08-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB/MJS

66-1372-27

CHANGED TO

66-1372-34-195X

MAR 7 1961

MX / GLB

C,

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Belmont
1 - Branigan
1 - Downing

TO : MR. BELMONT

DATE: December 7, 1960

FROM : W. A. BRANIGAN

SUBJECT: "JUNE" CORRESPONDENCE

During the Inspection of the Domestic Intelligence Division in 1960, the Inspector recommended and the Division agreed to purging our "June" files of certain correspondence that was not essential. Among the items of correspondence intended to be purged were letters to and from the Bureau transmitting tapes for translation.

This was discussed with Mr. Churchill Downing, Chief of the Cryptanalysis-Translation Section on December 7 who was advised that letters from the field and to the field transmitting tapes for translation need not be classified "June" since the letter contained no information which the "June" procedures were intended to protect.

Personnel in the Espionage and Cryptanalysis-Translation Sections have been alerted to this and will take steps to properly guide the field offices.

ACTION:

This is for record purposes.

WAB:hmm
(4)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-1-80 BY SP-5 RCB/142

REC-92

EX-105

66-1372 - 28

JAN 5 1961

Tolson _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Belmont _____
Callahan _____
DeLoach _____
Malone _____
McGuire _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Trotter _____
W.C. Sullivan _____
Tele. Room _____
Ingram _____
Gandy _____

31 JAN 6 1961

4-528

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-08-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB/MJS

66-1372-29,30
CHANGED TO
66-1372-34-202X,204X

^{E146}
FEB 13 1962

va. — msh



JUNE
PERSON
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 61-
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ST
In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

November 29, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

RE: TECHNICAL AND MICROPHONE SURVEILLANCES -
CHANNELIZING MEMORANDA

No Number SAC Letter dated December 22, 1949, established the "June" procedure for handling information obtained through these techniques. The Special Agent to whom the case is assigned, after reviewing the log, dictates necessary excerpts from the log in paraphrased form for inclusion in future reports. For purposes of uniformity, this dictation should take the form of channelizing memoranda which should be disseminated to the appropriate files. In accordance with SAC Letter No. 61-8 dated February 21, 1961, these memoranda may be destroyed following submission of reports containing the information in both individual and organization security cases.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 8-5-80 BY SP-5 RJA/mc

166-1372-

NOT RECORDED

102 DEC 7 1961

5mc-
DEC 27 1961





DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB/MJS
ON 10-08-2009

JUNE
PERSONAL
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 61-F

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~SECRET~~

November 7, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

b2
b7E

(U) RE: ~~RADIO FREQUENCY MICROPHONE-
TELEPHONE DEVICE (RFMT)~~

(U) No Number SAC Letter V, Series 1952, dated July 14, 1952, advised that the FBI Laboratory developed an instrument which imposes a radio frequency on a telephone line and converts the telephone instrument into a microphone without entering the premises where the telephone is located. You were instructed to admonish your Security Supervisors and Sound-Trained Agents that this technique has been classified "~~Top Secret~~" and that it should not be discussed with other than Agent personnel in these two categories. (S)

(U) The device has recently been reclassified as "~~Secret~~." It will, therefore, not be necessary to continue the former practice of keeping this device in the personal custody of an Agent at all times when it is not stored in an approved field office space. Henceforth, when the device is not operated under the personal custody or supervision of an Agent, it may be [redacted]

(U) This technique will operate successfully only under certain conditions. It will be necessary that a detailed survey of the telephone company subscriber equipment and telephone cable facilities serving the subscriber be made in each instance prior to installation of the equipment. This survey should be forwarded to the Bureau, attention FBI Laboratory, for review. If an installation appears feasible, a specially trained technician from the Laboratory or from key points in the field will be sent to make the installation. (S)

SENT TO ALL SACs & 415 ar OFFS.
11/7/61

EC-51

MAR 5 1963

NOV 9 1961

MAILED 2

NOV 7 1961

CLASS. & EXT. BY 2842 PWD/10/1/963

REASON-FCIM 11-2.4.2

DATE OF REVIEW 2/7/81

para make c otherwise

NOV 8 1961

66-1372

NOT RECORDED

35 MAR 5 1963

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-04-3958
UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-04-3958

~~SECRET~~

(U) Use of this equipment will be approved only on a most selective basis. It will be necessary, therefore, for all requests to use the device to be supported by adequate information reflecting the essential need to obtain this coverage and the reasons why such coverage is not feasible by other means. All communications concerning this equipment should be captioned "RFMT" and transmitted as "JUNE" material. ~~(S)~~

b2

(U) The use of RFMT in the unattended manner described above will permit

(U) I will hold each SAC personally responsible for the security of RFMT equipment assigned his office and for adequately covering each microphone and telephone surveillance operating within the field office territory. ~~(S)~~

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 61-F
11/7/61

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~

#609-63

Date
February 13, 1963
Division of Assignment
Files and Communications

To:
Director, FBI

From: (Suggester's name)
[Redacted]

SUGGESTION

It is suggested that zipped names appearing on mail being removed from file as JUNE mail be reproduced on the serial charge-out placed in file. (See sample attached)

FORM FD 4-312

0

JUNE mail
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-5-80 BY SP-5 RSW/mr

Current practice or rule (Include manual citation as well as facts)

At the present time the name of the subject of the file does not appear on the charge-out.

Advantages of suggestion and annual savings (include basis for estimate)

The file would be complete from a "name" standpoint and would provide necessary information for employees preparing correlation search slips and summaries and those consolidating, correcting, or changing mail. Since employees preparing correlation search slips and summaries do not see JUNE mail, they would be alerted to the fact that subject used that particular variation of name and would take steps to insure that all references to subject under that name would be included in the summary. Employees consolidating, correcting, or changing mail would be able to determine quickly where main cards were made.

REC-54 66-1372-31

Disadvantages of suggestion

Would require more time and thought in preparing charge-out placed in file.

8 FEB 20 1963

Two

(The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States. I understand that I will be considered for any justified award only if my suggestion is adopted within two years after submission.)

☐ Mr. ☒ Mrs. ☐ Miss

Signature and Title of Suggester

Recommendations and comments of Division Head

Favorable, as modified. (See Comments on page 2)

NFS:jam
(6)

Enclosure

(Do not write in this space - for Bureau use only)

ENCLOSURE

Let of Ack
M.D. Fab, 2/19/63.
Memo Cooper to M.A.W.
GER: gah, 2/28/63.

SA

1-Auth. Sta
2-Auth. Sta

Memorandum [redacted] to Director, FBI
Re: SUGGESTION

2-13-63

COMMENTS:

When JUNE mail is maintained in the Confidential File Room but processed using the regular serial sequence in file, a charge-out is placed in file to indicate the location of the missing serial. Employee's suggestion points out that the name of the subject appearing on correspondence placed in the Confidential File Room is not reproduced on the charge-out. Correlation analysts do not review confidential mail since such correspondence cannot be summarized and placed in the correlation summary because of its confidential nature. The Records Branch is opposed to [redacted] suggested procedure on the grounds that relatively few such charge-outs would be reviewed by correlation analysts and considerable effort would have to be expended to include the name of the subject on the charge-out. However, in order to make available complete information concerning the subject of the summary, it is recommended that the current procedure be modified and analysts be instructed to review JUNE material for the purpose of obtaining identifying data concerning their subject. Adoption of employee's suggestion with this modification is recommended.

5
2/15

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-08-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB/MJS

b6
b7C

Date of Mail _____

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Branch.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

Subject _____ JUNE MAIL

*Subject of mail is always
written on "June" form -*

Removed By _____

File Number _____

ENCLOSURE

66-1372-31

Encl. suggestion of Permanent Serial Charge Out to Director; 8-15-63

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

b6
b7c

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Casper _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Gale _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holmes _____
 Gandy _____

TO : Mr. Mohr

DATE: 2/28/63

FROM : J. J. Casper

SUBJECT: JUNE MAIL

SUGGESTION #699-63 SUBMITTED BY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 8-5-80 BY SP-5
 FILES AND COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

SUGGESTION: That "zipped names" (name variations marked for indexing) appearing on mail being removed from file as JUNE mail be reproduced on the serial charge-out (Form 4-312) placed in file.

PRESENT PROCEDURE: At the present time the particular name of the subject of the mail does not appear on the charge-out.

ADVANTAGES: File would be complete from "name" standpoint and needed information would be available for employees preparing correlation search slips and summaries, or consolidating, correcting, etc. mail. These employees do not see JUNE mail but would be alerted that subject used the particular variation of the name and would take steps to insure all references under that name were included in the summary.

DISADVANTAGES: Proposed procedure would require more time in preparing the charge out.

OBSERVATIONS: Files and Communications Division opposed the procedure as proposed by suggester on the grounds that relatively few charge-outs would be reviewed by correlation analysts and considerable effort would be expended to include the name of the subject on the charge-out. They recommended, however, that current procedures be modified to permit correlation analysts to review JUNE material to obtain as much identifying data as possible on their subject.

Domestic Intelligence Division opposed both the original suggestion and the modification proposed by Files and Communications Division. They commented that the recording of "zipped names" on the serial charge-outs for JUNE mail would expend time and effort not justified by the results. They stated that there are relatively few instances where "zipped names" appear in JUNE mail.

REC-16

MAR 1 1963

OVER

EX-102

JER:pab
(2)

65 MAR 11 1963

JUN 11 1963

2-6-63

Memo J. J. Casper to Mr. Mohr
Re: Suggestion #699-63

Regarding the review of JUNE files by analysts, as proposed by Files and Communications Division, they noted that these files were created to safeguard sensitive information and restrict access to it by unauthorized personnel. To permit analysts to review them would decrease the value of JUNE files and the safeguards against unnecessary disclosure of information. They stated that JUNE files may be charged out only to Agent Supervisors and, if in preparing correlation search slips or summaries, there are references to JUNE files, these should be called to the attention of the appropriate Agent Supervisor. He could then call the file in question for the proper decision as to the pertinence of the information.

The Training Division agrees with the views of Domestic Intelligence Division. To preserve the purpose for which JUNE files were established, present restrictions should continue.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the suggestion not be adopted. On approval, no further action is necessary. Receipt of the suggestion was acknowledged by prior letter.

J. J. Casper

VIEWS OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION RE: SUGGESTION #699-63

ADDENDUM DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION 2/21/63 JON:rmc

Jon

It is believed that the recording of zipped names on serial charge-outs involving JUNE mail would expend time and effort not justified by the results. There are relatively few instances where zipped names appear in JUNE mail, although a more accurate picture could be determined through a survey during the preparation of correlation search slips and summaries.

Regarding review of JUNE files by analysts; JUNE files were established for the purpose of safeguarding certain sensitive information and restricting knowledgeability of such information. By making JUNE files available to additional personnel, the information becomes less restricted and the value of JUNE files is decreased.

JUNE files may be charged out only to Agent Supervisors. If, in preparing correlation search slips or summaries, there are references to JUNE files, such references should be called to the attention of the appropriate Agent Supervisor. He then can call for the JUNE file and make a determination if identical and pertinent, and if it is permissible to use the information. The responsibility for use of the information in JUNE files rests with the Agent Supervisor where it rightfully belongs.

It is recommended that this suggestion not be adopted.

WCG

*Memo Copy sent to Mr. W,
J&R: jmk, 2/28/63.*

*Auth. Slip
J&R
2/28/63*

February 19, 1963

PERSONAL

FEB 19 3 47 PM '63
REC'D-READING ROOM
FBI

66-1372-31
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Dear [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-5-80 BY SP-5
RSH/mc

I have received your suggestion that names
appearing on certain mail being removed from file be placed
on the serial charge out. This idea is being considered and you
will be advised if it is adopted.

The interest you displayed in bringing this matter
to my attention is appreciated.

Sincerely yours, *[Signature]*

J. Edgar Hoover

MAILED 30

FEB 19 1963

COMM-FBI

1 - Mr. Tavel

1/- Personnel file of [redacted]

ML:pab pab

(5) (Suggestion #699-63 dated 2/13/63)

NOTE:

Since suggestion concerns "JUNE" mail it is being referred to
the Domestic Intelligence Division for views and recommenda-
tions.

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

FEB 19 4 23 PM '63

FBI
REC'D WASH DC

RECEIVED

65 MAR 1 1963

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

4-528

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-08-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB/MJS

66-1372-33
CHANGED TO
66-1372-34-223

FILE
JUN 28 1963

VA-DCB

4-528

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-08-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB/MJS

66-1372-34
CHANGED TO
66-2542-3-34-5344

FEB 10 1966

pc/c.s.H.

0



In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

PERSONAL
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

October 26, 1964

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

RE: PREPARATION OF ABSTRACTS IN CONNECTION WITH
CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS AND
"JUNE" MATERIAL

Detailed summaries of highly sensitive information set forth in communications in criminal intelligence investigations are not desirable on abstracts submitted with these communications. Accordingly, all Agents handling criminal intelligence investigations should be cautioned to avoid inclusion of unnecessary sensitive information on abstracts in such matters.

In cases where it is necessary to mark a communication or memorandum "June," the body of the accompanying abstract should contain no reference to any highly confidential techniques, and, further, the information contained in these abstracts should be carefully paraphrased so as not to reveal the presence or nature of the technique utilized. These regulations apply to both the field and the Seat of Government.

Very truly yours, 166-1372-
NOT RECORDED

170 NOV 2 1964

John Edgar Hoover

Director

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

64 NOV 2 1964 DATE 8-5-80 BY SP-5 RJA/nrb



ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

JUNE

Date

January 24, 1964

To:

Director, FBI

From: (Suggester's name)

Division of Assignment

Domestic Intelligence

SUGGESTION

Changes in Form FD-142. See attached memorandum [redacted] to
F. J. Baumgardner 1/24/64.

Current practice or rule (Include manual citation as well as facts)

See attached memorandum.

Advantages of suggestion and annual savings (Include basis for estimate)

More clarity in first 3 items of FD-142. No savings effected.
See attached memorandum.

Disadvantages of suggestion

None apparent.

(The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States. I understand that I will be considered within two years after submission.)

☒ Mr. ☐ Mrs. ☐ Miss

Special Agent

Recommendations and comments of Division Head

I recommend that this suggestion be adopted.

Signature and Title *ASS. to Director*

(Do not write in this space - for Bureau use only)

1 JAN 29 1964

65 MAR 24 1964

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 8-5-80 BY SP-5 RJA/m

Technical Surveillance

NOT RECORDED

167 MAR 19 1964

ORIGINAL FILED IN

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

DATE: January 24, 1964

FROM :

J U N E

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION RE CHANGES FD-142
(RECOMMENDATION FOR INSTALLATION OF
TECHNICAL OR MICROPHONE SURVEILLANCE)
#526-24

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-5-80 BY SP-5 ROL/ML

This memorandum is to recommend certain changes in Form FD-142 so that there will be more clarity in Items 1, 2 and 3 of this form.

There is attached page 1 of Form FD-142 which concerns recommendation for installation of technical or microphone surveillance. There are attached 10 copies of proposed changes for page 1 of this form, which are as follows:

Item 1 currently requests: "Name and address of subject." Since on occasion the individual on whom the installation is to be placed is different to that of the title as shown on this form, it is suggested that this item be changed to request information as follows: "Name of person or organization on whom surveillance is to be placed."

Item 2 requests information: "Location of technical operation." Since this item could and has been interpreted as meaning the location of the installation as well as the location of the monitoring point, it is suggested that this item be changed to request information as follows: "A. Address where installation is to be made (set forth exact room number or area to be covered); B. Location where monitoring plant is to be maintained."

Item 3 requests: "Other technical surveillances on same subject." Since this could be interpreted to mean previous and other current technical surveillances on the same subject and since such information is desirable, it is suggested that this item be changed to request: "Previous and other current installations on the same subject."

OBSERVATIONS:

No known savings would be effected. It is felt that these changes will add more clarity to the first 3 items of FD-142. It has been determined from the Administrative Division that there are 435

Enc.

LTG:kmj

XEROX
JAN 30 1964

ENCLOSURE
NOT RECORDED
167 MAR 19 1964

ENCLOSURE
1 JAN 29 1964

ORIGINAL FILED IN
UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

66-2578-0918

Memorandum to Mr. Baumgardner
RE: SUGGESTION RE CHANGES FD-142

of these forms on hand at Seat of Government, which represents an approximate 3 months' supply.

These forms are used in connection with various cases in Divisions 5, 6 and 9.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that this suggestion be adopted. If adopted, it is recommended that new forms be prepared and the field notified to request sufficient supply for use.

Handwritten:
JTB
CWB

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-08-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB/MJS

JUNE

TO : (Bufile) DATE:

FROM :

SUBJECT: RECOMMENDATION FOR INSTALLATION OF TECHNICAL OR MICROPHONE SURVEILLANCE

RE: Title

Character of Case
Field Office
Symbol Number
Type of Surveillance (Technical or
Microphone)

1. Name and address of person or organization on whom surveillance is to be placed:
2. A. Address where installation is to be made (set forth exact room number or area to be covered):
B. Location where is to be maintained:
3. Previous and other current installations on the same subject:

b2

PROPOSED REVISED PORTION
OF FD-142

ENCLOSURE

66-1372-

66-8160-2508

ENCLOSURE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : (Bufile) DATE: JUNE

FROM :

SUBJECT: RECOMMENDATION FOR INSTALLATION OF TECHNICAL OR MICROPHONE SURVEILLANCE

RE: Title

Character of Case
Field Office
Symbol Number
Type of Surveillance (Technical or Microphone)

1. Name and address of subject:

4

2. Location of technical operation:

4

3. Other technical surveillances on same subject:

10

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-5-80 BY SP-5
1256/MC

4. Cost and manpower involved:

CURRENT FD-142

5. Adequacy of security:

ENCLOSURE

66-1372-
66-8160-2538

ENCLOSURE

XEROX
JAN 30 1964

Registered Mail

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-08-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB/MJS

66-1372-35
CHANGED TO
66-2542-3-34-5357

^{F142}
SEP 8 1966

Va - Baw

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-08-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB/MJS

66 -1372- 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43

CHANGED TO

66 -3482- 6999x, 6999x2, 6999x1, 6985x, 6999x3,
6999x4, 6999x5, 6999x6.

JAN 21 1969

snt / Baw

4-528

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-08-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB/MJS

66-1372-44
CHANGED TO
100-3-4-3X

105
OCT 25 1968

ps / Bar

66-1372-45
CHANGED TO
140-36086-9570X

35
OCT 25 1968

po / Baw

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-08-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB/MJS

66-1372-46, 47, 48
CHANGED TO
66-3482-7069, 7070, 7071

JAN 21 1969

mt / Ban

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

JUNE

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: January 17, 1969

FROM : W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION THAT WORD "JUNE" BE REPLACED AS CODE
WORD USED IN CONNECTION WITH HIGHLY SENSITIVE TECHNIQUES.
#465-69

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-6-80 BY SP-5

Purpose is to suggest study be made to determine if code word "JUNE," utilized in intra-Bureau correspondence relating to highly sensitive techniques such as technical surveillances, should be changed or if necessity exists for continued use of code word in such correspondence, since magazine article has compromised use of "JUNE."

In addition to its vicious and unprincipled attack on the Director, the article entitled "The Last Days of J. Edgar Hoover" by Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson in the January, 1969, issue of "True" magazine also compromised the security of our code word "JUNE." This article, on page 32, alleges we had technical coverage involving Fred Black and refers to a Bureau report which was "so hush-hush that they even used a code word for 'secret' and stamped the report 'June.'"

The use of code word was originally developed as a means of preserving the security of our technical operations. Developments in recent years, such as publication of our technical surveillances through judicial proceedings, may indicate a change in our security precautions is warranted.

RECOMMENDATION:

That study be made in this Division, Files and Communications Division and other interested divisions to explore situation to determine whether we should change code word; whether necessity still exists to preserve the system or whether any other action should be taken at this time.

ACTION:

Refer to Suggestion Desk.

JEG:lam (16)

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Casper
1 - Mr. Felt
1 - Mr. Bishop
1 - Mr. Callahan

1 - Mr. Gale
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Tavel
1 - Mr. Trotter
1 - Mr. Conrad
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Farr
1 - Mr. Little

674501
CORRECTION
501 1-27-69

mying Casper to Mohr
1/31/69, ML: 501

REC-28

66-1372-49
JAN 23 1969

Suggestion 465-69


The suggestion is that a study be made to determine whether the word "June" should be replaced as a code word used in connection with highly sensitive techniques, it being noted that the word was originally used for the purpose of preserving security to our technical operations. The purpose in using the June designation is thought to have been compromised as a result of recent articles in national magazine publications.

VIEWS OF THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

1. It is noted that all sources utilized in the criminal and criminal intelligence type investigations and where the code word "June" is utilized were sources illegal in nature and, of course, to protect those sources all information is included in the June file together with the field requests and the Seat of Government responses with respect to authority for installation. This material not only identifies specifically the location of such installations, but, in many instances, reveals directly individuals on whom the coverage was maintained as well as the identity and conversations of other persons from all walks of life who had occasion to enter the area of our coverage.

In view of the foregoing, it is believed important that full security be maintained with respect to these files which are even now in some instances subject to inquiry by the Department because of disclosure considerations in matters presently pending before the courts. It would be impractical to attempt to change the June designation on communications which must of necessity be made available in some of the Department's disclosure actions and for this reason it does not appear that any value would be obtained by discontinuing the use of the June designation with respect to the illegal microphones previously utilized.

2. It is noted that with the passage of the Omnibus Crime Bill during the Summer of 1968, any future electronic surveillance activities will acquire legal status as a result of a so-called warrant of a court empowering the use of the electronic surveillance technique in particular times and places. It does not appear, therefore, that the June designation will be inappropriate in any future criminal electronic surveillance installations since installations of this type will be seeking evidence for prosecution and will be legal in nature. The statute itself provides for disclosure of the results of such coverage to the individual on whom the surveillance had been maintained so it does not appear that the degree of security will be required in future criminal installations as has been required in the past.



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

JUNE

DATE: January 30, 1969

b6
b7C

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

TO : Mr. Mohr *[initials]*

FROM : J. J. Casper *[initials]*

SUBJECT: TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCES
SUGGESTION 465-69 SUBMITTED BY
SA [redacted]
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

JUNE

SYNOPSIS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 8-6-80 BY SP-5 RJD/142

It was suggested that a study be made to determine if the code word, "JUNE," which has been used in intra-Bureau correspondence regarding highly sensitive techniques should be changed and whether the present system for handling and filing this type of mail is necessary since the January, 1969, edition of the "True" magazine contained an article by Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson wherein it alleges Bureau had technical coverage involving Fred Black and refers to a report which was "so hush-hush that they even used a code word for 'secret' and stamped the report 'June.'"

Identification and Administrative Divisions advised this procedure did not involve their operations. Files and Communications Division firmly believed the entire system should be abandoned. Domestic Intelligence Division wishes to retain system of handling these files and same code word. General Investigative Division felt the material should be kept in one location for use on a need-to-know basis but discontinue use of "JUNE" and possibly consider a new procedure for identifying symbol informants (asterisk by informant symbol number). Laboratory and Crime Records Division felt material should be retained in present fashion but that code word should be changed. Special Investigative Division pointed out it was impractical to change code word on communications produced in court and pointed out that information obtained by such means in the future will be for prosecution purposes. Full security should still be afforded these files.

Training and Inspection Divisions agree with the Domestic Intelligence Division that no change should be made at the present time in the manner in which this material is handled or in the use of the code word "JUNE." If the public does become aware of fact that we have a special system for handling of certain confidential material, they will be reassured and feel that the FBI is giving this type of information proper and correct supervision and control.

ML:saj
(2)

98 APR 7 1969

66-1372-50

(CONTINUED-OVER)

FEB 20 1969

[Handwritten signature and initials]

b6
b7C

Memo Casper to Mohr
Re: TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCES
SUGGESTION 465-69 SUBMITTED BY
SA [REDACTED]
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

RECOMMENDATION: That the suggestion not be adopted. On approval, no further action is necessary with regard to the suggester. He was thanked by prior letter.

Ryan
mac
7 *Chg.* *ST*
TEB
mc
JWH/CD
cas

Memo Casper to Mohr
Re: TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCES
SUGGESTION 465-69 SUBMITTED BY
SA [REDACTED]
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

DETAILS

SUGGESTION: That a study be made by all interested divisions to determine if the code word, "JUNE," used in intra-Bureau correspondence relating to highly sensitive techniques such as technical surveillances, should be changed or if necessity exists for continued use of code word in such correspondence, since magazine article has compromised use of "JUNE." The January, 1969, issue of "True" magazine published an article by Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson entitled "The Last Days of J. Edgar Hoover." This article, on page 32, alleges Bureau had technical coverage involving Fred Black and refers to a report which was "so hush-hush that they even used a code word for 'secret' and stamped the report 'June.'"

The use of this code word was originally developed as a means of preserving the security of our technical operations. Developments in recent years, such as publication of our technical surveillances through judicial proceedings, may indicate a change in our security precautions is warranted.

OBSERVATIONS: The Identification and Administrative Divisions advised this matter did not affect their operations.

Files and Communications Division firmly believed this to be an appropriate time to abandon the entire system pointing out it was initially set up to restrict the handling of mail relating to technical surveillances and the conditions requiring this no longer exists. Laws are in effect that authorize the use of technical surveillances and, in every instance, they are approved by the Attorney General. At the present time, this division has accumulated in the Special File Room 96 file drawers of "June" material. Both the mail and files require special processing, handling and maintenance all of which are according to this division unnecessary, expensive, time-consuming and inefficient. If the system were abandoned, this material could be handled more efficiently in a uniform manner consistent with the processing and maintenance of other important record material. Additional valuable space could be reclaimed for use and the substantive case file would be made complete with all pertinent data contained therein, including "JUNE" material. Similar savings would occur throughout the field and the present method of labeling and affording special handling to "JUNE" material could be abandoned in other divisions at the Seat of Government.

Domestic Intelligence Division pointed out this material pertains to technical surveillances, microphone surveillances where trespass is involved, "black

Memo Casper to Mohr
Re: TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCES
SUGGESTION 465-69 SUBMITTED BY
SA [REDACTED]
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

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b7C

bag jobs," as well as most secretive sources such as governors, secretaries to high officials, etc. The purpose of the code word was for the safeguarding of this sensitive information and restricting the knowledge of such information to those employees of the Bureau with a need to know. Public knowledge of the code word "JUNE" does not disclose the identity or contents of matters so flagged by the Bureau. Therefore, the security of such material is not compromised by the public knowing this word has been used in the past to indicate a document containing information concerning technical coverage. Changing the code word would require notification to all offices and could result in some confusion. This division recommended idea not be adopted since "JUNE" is an administrative device and disclosure to the public does not in any way jeopardize the security of the information so designated. This division also desired that the files be maintained as in the past since this limits access to such mail both at the Seat of Government and in the field.

General Investigative Division stated that with respect to criminal cases, any future use of an electronic surveillance will be authorized by the Department and will be in accordance with the provisions of the Omnibus Crime Bill. Information obtained from any such authorized source can be used as evidence so it appears the need for the present system no longer exists. If any electronic surveillances are established which are not in accordance with the provisions of the Omnibus Crime Bill, but rather are authorized on the basis of Presidential authority, it may be necessary to set up separate rules regarding the two types of authorization. An asterisk has been used following an informant symbol number to designate electronic surveillances. It is possible that as a result of court hearings and disclosures which have been made that not only "JUNE" has been compromised but possibly use of asterisk has become known. This division felt it might be desirable to consider a new procedure for identifying various symbol informants when they relate to electronic surveillances for the benefit of Agent reading reports. This division advised it would appear to be desirable to continue to keep a record of the exact number of electronic surveillances used by the Bureau in one location whether they be under Presidential authorization or under the Omnibus Crime Bill.

The Laboratory felt the code word should be changed in view of the Drew Pearson disclosure but that in order to afford adequate security for all microphone and technical surveillances prior to, during and after their installation, a special code word should be used to assure special handling of sensitive correspondence and the present handling should be continued to afford protection of the identity of telephone

Memo Casper to Mohr
Re: TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCES
SUGGESTION 465-69 SUBMITTED BY
SA [REDACTED]
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

b6
b7c

company officials who furnish invaluable technical assistance to the Bureau on these matters.

Crime Records Division recommended adoption of the idea since it felt the word "JUNE" had been compromised by the article and outdated by judicial proceedings.

Special Investigative Division advised all sources used in criminal and criminal intelligence-type investigations where the code word "JUNE" is utilized were sources illegal in nature and, of course, to protect these sources all information is included in the "JUNE" file together with the field requests and the Seat of Government's responses with respect to authority for installation. This material not only identifies specifically the location of such installations, but in many instances, reveals directly individuals on whom the coverage was maintained as well as the identity and conversations of other persons from all walks of life who had occasion to enter the area of our coverage. It is important that full security be maintained with respect to these files which are even now in some instances subject to inquiry by the Department because of disclosure considerations in matters presently pending before the courts. It would be impractical to attempt to change the "JUNE" designation on communications which must of necessity be made available in some of the Department's disclosure actions; therefore, it would be of no value to discontinue this procedure with respect to previous correspondence. Any future electronic surveillance activities will acquire legal status as a result of a so-called warrant of a court empowering the use of the electronic surveillance technique in particular times and places. This division felt the "JUNE" designation would be inappropriate in any future criminal electronic surveillance installations since they will be seeking evidence for prosecution and will be legal in nature. The statute itself provides for disclosure of the results of such coverage to the individual on whom the surveillance had been maintained so this division felt the same degree of security will be required in future criminal installations as has been required in the past.

Training and Inspection Divisions are in complete agreement that the present system should be retained at this time. It is felt that the public, if they become aware of the fact that we have a special system for handling of certain confidential material, they will be reassured and feel that the FBI is giving this type of information proper and correct supervision and control. The public has long been aware of the fact that "Secret" and "Top Secret" have been words used to denote

Memo Casper to Mohr

Re: TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCES
SUGGESTION 465-69 SUBMITTED BY
SA
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

b6
b7C

sensitive information but knowledge of this has not compromised the security of the data involved. Neither should the fact that we use "June" as an administrative device to protect certain information have any affect on the security of the information itself.

7

January 22, 1969

PERSONAL

REC-28

66-1372-49
~~66-8160-3047~~

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Dear [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-6-80 BY SP-3 RJA/mn

Your suggestion has been received that consideration be given to a particular procedure which is in use at the present time to determine if any action is necessary regarding it. Your proposal is being evaluated and you will be advised if a favorable decision is made in this regard.

I appreciate the interest which led you to give me the benefit of your observations on this matter.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

MAILED 9

JAN 22 1969

COMM-FBI

1 - Mr. Sullivan

1 - Personnel file of SA [redacted]

ML:saj

(5)

(Suggestion 465-69 dated 1/17/69)

NOTE:

Based on memorandum W. R. Wannall to Mr. Sullivan, JEG:lam
1/17/69, re: Suggestion That Word "JUNE" Be Replaced As
Code Word Used In Connection With Highly Sensitive Techniques.

Referred to all divisions at the Seat of Government for views
and recommendations.

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

99 MAR 25 1969

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ON 10-09-2009

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE:

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Casper
1 - Mr. Gale
1 - Mr. Rosen
May 19, 19701 - Mr. Tavel
1 - Mr. Soyars
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. C.D.

Brennan

1 - Mr. Rozamus

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Walters _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

FROM : C. D. Brennan

SUBJECT: CODE WORD "JUNE"

Recommendation is being made that a proposed letter, which is attached, be sent to all Special Agents in Charge. It reiterates pertinent instructions concerning the use of the code word "June" relative to electronic surveillances (elsurs) matters.

No Number SAC Letter of 12/22/49 instructed that correspondence dealing with highly confidential information concerning telephone surveillances should have the code word "June" with telephone logs being placed in a "Sub-1" file having the same file number as the case file and the administrative correspondence being filed in "Sub-2" file. Both of the sub files would be kept in a confidential room. The Executives Conference by memorandum of 4/21/50 suggested that the "June" procedure apply to microphone surveillances.

Memorandum from Mr. A. H. Belmont to Mr. L. V. Boardman, 5/26/54, captioned "Microphone Surveillances," pointed out that information obtained through nontrespass (legal) microphones need not be included in the "June" procedure since the results were definitely admissible evidence. It recommended and was approved that Special Agents in Charge be verbally instructed when they report to the Bureau for conferences.

Memorandum from Mr. J. J. Casper to Mr. Mohr of 1/30/69, captioned "Technical Surveillances, Suggestion 465-69, Submitted by SA [redacted] Domestic Intelligence Division," evaluated the use of the code word "June." Domestic Intelligence Division suggested that the procedure be retained. The Special Investigative Division pointed out that with respect to criminal cases the "June" procedure would no longer be needed in view of the fact elsurs are authorized by court order under the Omnibus Crime Bill.

OBSERVATIONS:

On occasions questions arise as to whether a communication concerning an elsur should be designated "June." In view of the above background, only correspondence which identifies an individual,

66-1372

EX-115

REC-1

66-1372-51

Enclosure - detached

JUN 2 1970

(11)

17 MAY 25 1970 CONTINUED - OVER

CONFIDENTIAL

b6
b7c

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum C. D. Brennan to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: CODE WORD "JUNE"
66-1372

(U) organization or diplomatic establishment as having been or under consideration to be the subject matter of an elsur in the internal security or racial field should be included in the "June" procedure. (C)

RECOMMENDATION:

That the proposed letter to all Special Agents in Charge be approved and sent.

GR
JEF
P
JEF
WCL
WBS
GK.
A
✓

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Memorandum

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Intell. WVH
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Insp. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

TO : Mr. T. W. Leavitt

DATE: 3/16/78

FROM : Mr. R. J. Gray, Jr.

- 2 - Mr. H. N. Bassett
(1 - Mr. M. S. Ramey)
- 1 - Mr. T. W. Leavitt
- 1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton
- 1 - Mr. R. J. Gray, Jr.
- 1 - Mr. R. Hildreth, Jr.

SUBJECT: HANDLING OF SENSITIVE MATERIAL
UNDER CODE WORD "JUNE"

(U) PURPOSE: To advise of the status of a study concerning the need to continue handling certain sensitive mail under "June" procedures and if not, to determine disposition of such material presently maintained in the Special File Room. *(U)*

(U) DETAILS: Reference is made to M. S. Ramey memorandum to Mr. Bassett, dated 1/24/78, captioned as above, a copy of which is attached. *(U)*

(U) The Records Management Division (RMD) has requested the Intelligence Division (INTD) to reconsider whether the "June" procedures for handling sensitive material are still warranted. For information, current "June" policy as set forth in SAC Letter 70-29, dated 5/26/70, states that "only correspondence which identifies an individual, organization, or diplomatic establishment as having been or is under consideration to be the subject matter of an electronic surveillance in the internal security or racial field should be included in the "June" procedure." The INTD is currently taking steps to update the above definition inasmuch as the use of the "June" designation has been broadened to also include certain serials which contain information regarding other types of sensitive information. Further, the terminology "internal security or racial field" requires updating to reflect correct phraseology, that being "foreign counterintelligence or domestic security field." *(U)*

Enclosure

REC-70

SEP 19 1978

ENCLOSURE

ST 110 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by 1929
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

RH:pj

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

CONTINUED - OVER

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FBI/DOJ

66-1372

CLASS. & EXT. BY 2842 P/STK/PM
REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW 3/16/98
per marked attached

6/11
97
19 SEP 25 1978

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum to Mr. T. W. Leavitt
Re: Handling of Sensitive Material
Under Code Word "June"

(U) Liaison with the Section Chief of CI-1 and the Assistant Section Chief of CI-2 would seem to indicate a continuing need for the "June" procedure in order to afford proper security to this sensitive material. Contact has also been made with Mr. Ramey in the RMD and he has been advised of the initial findings in this study. ~~(S)~~

(U) Further observations and a final recommendation regarding captioned matter will be forwarded at an early date. ~~(U)~~

(U) ACTION: None. For information. ~~(U)~~

PLM

APPROVED:

Director _____
Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____

Adm. Serv. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Intell. *WMA* _____
Laboratory _____

Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Insp. _____
Rec. Mgnt. *PLM* _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Bassett *EM* JUNE

DATE: 1/24/78

FROM : M. S. Ramey *MSR*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: HANDLING OF SENSITIVE MATERIAL
UNDER CODE WORD "JUNE"

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Fin. & Pers. _____
Ident. _____
Intell. ☒ _____
Laboratory _____
Legit Coun. _____
Plan. & Insp. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

PURPOSE:

To obtain opinion of the Intelligence Division if there is a current need to continue handling certain sensitive mail under "JUNE" procedures and, if not, to determine disposition of such material presently maintained in the Special File Room.

DETAILS:

(U) SAC Letter 69, series 1949, dated 6/29/49, initiated procedures for handling certain material from "...the most secretive sources...or when referring to highly confidential or unusual investigative techniques." The procedures effected greater security for this sensitive data and the code word "JUNE" was utilized to flag such material for special handling. SAC Letter 70-29 dated 7/26/70 stated that "...only correspondence which identifies an individual, organization, or diplomatic establishment as having been or is under consideration to be the subject matter of an electronic surveillance in the internal security or racial field should be included in the "JUNE" procedure." This is the last policy instruction concerning use of "JUNE" procedures. ~~(C)~~

In today's environment, with compartmented intelligence classifications and the overall attention given to handling sensitive data as well as FOIPA considerations, it is believed timely to reconsider whether the "JUNE" procedures for handling sensitive material in one restricted area of our operations is warranted.

About 29 file cabinets of "JUNE" material accumulated over the years is presently stored in the Special File Room, a great part of it being the individual serials from substantive files maintained in the general files.

1 - Mr. Leavitt
66-1372
MSR:mjl (5)

66-1372 - 52 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONTINUED - OVER

ENCLOSURE

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

If the Intelligence Division does not feel "JUNE" procedures are currently warranted, the RMD should also be advised whether the "JUNE" material currently maintained in the Special File Room should be consolidated into the general files. This effort would necessarily have to be in conjunction with the Document Classification and Review Section since some of the material may well justify Top Secret classification thus warranting retention in separate facilities. Also, on an individual basis, some of the material may justify retention in the Special File Room independent of the "JUNE" procedures.

1. That the Intelligence Division advise the RMD if "JUNE" procedures for handling certain sensitive material are currently necessary and, if so, justification for same.

11. ESVD;

2. color
 3. 5. 11. 12.
 4. 6. 10. 13.
 5. 9. 14.

11-2-67

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Gebhardt

DATE: 12/5/74

FROM : R. F. Bates

SUBJECT:

WOUNDED KNEE LEADERSHIP TRIALS,
ST. PAUL, MINNESOTA

- 1 - Mr. Gebhardt
- 1 - Mr. Bates
- 1 - Mr. Gordon
- 1 - Mr. Mintz
- 1 - Mr. Jacobson
- 1 - Mr. Marshall
- 1 - Mr. McDermott
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Cassidy

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Ext. Affairs _____
Files & Com. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Legal Coun. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

b6
b7c

This pertains to attempts by Defense Attorney William Kunstler in captioned case to ascertain a description of the "June" files of the FBI when SAC Joseph H. Trimbach testified during the trial on 3/21/74 and 4/5/74. An attempt was also made to ascertain the identity of a "Q" file.

On 11/27/74, SAC Trimbach advised he did not know where Kunstler first heard of the word "June" in connection with FBI files. Jack Anderson's column, "The Washington Merry-Go-Round," in "The Washington Post" editions dated 8/24/69 and 12/5/70 contained information pertaining to FBI "June" files (attached are copies of Anderson's columns dated 8/24/69 captioned "J. Edgar Bugs Up" and 12/5/70 captioned "Digging Expose Is Causing Jitters"). In connection with the case involving former teamster president James Hoffa, an evidentiary hearing was held in Chattanooga Federal Court during August, 1969, at the direction of the U. S. Supreme Court based on the Solicitor General's disclosure that Hoffa was overheard on an electronic eavesdropping device. During this hearing, former Section Chief Charles Bels, Accounting and Fraud Section, General Investigative Division, testified in response to a defense subpoena. In answer to a direct question by the defense, Mr. Bels testified concerning a "June" file maintained by the Bureau containing results of FBI checks with various field offices for record of overhearing or Hoffa.

SAC Trimbach stated there was a question directed to him concerning a "Q" file to which he responded that he did not know of such a file. It would appear Kunstler's line of questioning may refer indirectly to what is known by the FBI as an Atomic Energy "Q" Clearance.

Enclosure

JRC: 11
(66)

51 DEC 10 1974

NOT RECORDED

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-6-80 BY SP-5 [signature]

157-31312-402
ORIGINAL FILED IN

Memo Bates to Gebhardt
RE:

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b7C

SAC Trimbach states while in captioned case the question of a "June" file was not pertinent, the SAC feels we can reasonably anticipate Kunstler will attempt to uncover the meaning of a "June" file in any future cases wherein the FBI is involved. The SAC felt it was appropriate to specifically bring to the attention of the Bureau those portions of the transcript which pertain to the questioning of the SAC as it relates to "June" files and a "Q" file (see letter from SAC, Minneapolis, 11/27/74, captioned case, with enclosures of pertinent pages of the trial transcript, attached).

ACTION:

For information and record purposes. This memorandum should be indexed in the general indices under "June."

WHS/RL

N/L JCG

RTG
WHS

WHS

JH

QJ

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION

AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:

FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE

EXEMPTION CODE 25X(c)

DATE 10-15-2009

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT

WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 5/30/78

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.: _____
Adm. Servs. W
Crim. Inv. W
Ident. W
Intell. W
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Insp. W
Rec. Mgmt. W
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : The Director

FROM : Lee Colwell

SUBJECT: SECURITY OF SENSITIVE MATERIAL AT FBIHQ - "JUNE"

PURPOSE:

To set forth findings as determined through a review of Bureau abstracts concerning sensitive material and submit recommendations regarding this matter.

DETAILS:

During a recent project which required the review of numerous abstracts maintained by the Service Unit, Records Services Section and the Numbering Unit, Records Systems Section, Records Management Division, it was determined that while "June" mail is maintained in the Special File Room, Records Management Division, the abstracts are maintained in the Numbering and Service Units. During this review it was noted that many of these abstracts, some of which are marked "June", contained succinct, detailed information of an extremely sensitive nature, much of which would appear to warrant their being classified. It was further determined that at the present time the only abstracts that are maintained in the Special File Room are those that pertain to undercover operations. Attached are eight examples of abstracts from the National Security Electronic Surveillance File; Technical Surveillance-General File and New York [redacted] File as maintained by the Numbering and Service Units. (S)

ENCLOSURE

66-1372 (JUNE General File)
Enc.

- 1 - Mr. Adams-Enc.
- 1 - Mr. McDermott-Enc.
- 1 - Mr. Bassett-Enc.
- 1 - Mr. Cregar-Enc.
- 1 - Mr. Moore-Enc.
- 1 - Mr. Colwell-Enc.
- 1 - [redacted]-Enc.
- 1 - [redacted]-Enc.

RLH/mt (9)

REC-79

Discussed with
6/78 and matter
is to be addressed by
informant/asset task force
22-067-4 1978

CLASS. & EXT. BY 2843 PLO/PA
REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2 2
DATE OF REVIEW 5/30/98
para marked C otherwise u

CONTINUED - OVER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FBI/DOJ

6 NOV 20 1978

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum Lee Colwell to The Director
RE: SECURITY OF SENSITIVE MATERIAL AT FBIHQ - "JUNE"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The files for the above are usually maintained in the Special File Room or in a secure area of the Intelligence Division; however, these security precautions are somewhat negated by the abstracts which are maintained in the Numbering and Service Units. A wide range of employees have access to this material which increases the potential of having such sensitive information unnecessarily disseminated.

The Intelligence and Criminal Investigative Divisions may have other sensitive files which require special handling and which at the present time have detailed abstracts on file in the Numbering and Service Units of the Records Management Division.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

It is recommended that representatives of the Intelligence, Criminal Investigative and Records Management Divisions, including the Bureau's Document Classification Officer, review this matter and submit appropriate recommendations.

APPROVED: <i>[Signature]</i>	Adm. Serv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Director <i>[Signature]</i>	Crim. Inv. <i>m/let</i>	Plan. & Insp. <i>[Signature]</i>
Assoc. Dir. <i>[Signature]</i>	Ident. _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____	Intell. _____	Tech. Servs. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____	Laboratory _____	Training _____
		Public Affs. Off. _____

It is noted that the Records Management Division is presently heading a task force which includes representatives from the Intelligence and Criminal Investigative Divisions for the purpose of looking into the current security procedures for FBI informant files. It is believed that rather than create another task force that this group would be appropriate for handling this matter and submitting the appropriate recommendations.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1, 6)
DATE 10-15-2009

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

62-115687-188

56

8/27/75

SAC, PG

JUNE

NATIONAL SECURITY
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
FILE

WITH ~~REX~~ REGARD TO MISUR INSTALLED BY PG AT

(S)

b1

[REDACTED] AUTHORIZED BY ATTORNEY
GENERAL 1/14/75, BE ADVISED INSTALLATION
INVOLVED ENTRY BY FBI PERSONNEL ONTO PREMISES
OF SUBJ AFTER OCCUPANCE BY SUBJ. (S)

~~SECRET~~

5/4/79
CLASS. & EXT. BY 2842 PVB/DA
REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2, 1
DATE OF REVIEW 8/27/95
both also marked S

~~SECRET~~

62-115687-183

56

8/26/75

SAC, NY

JUNE

NATIONAL SECURITY ELECTRONICS
SURVEILLANCE FILE

(U)

INSTALLATION OF MISUR IN [REDACTED]
EFFECTED BY FBI PERSONNEL SUBSEQUENT TO SUBJ'S
OCCUPANCY. INSTALLATION OF MISUR IN [REDACTED]
R OF [REDACTED] BY FBI
PERSONNEL EFFECTED PRIOR TO HIS OCCUPANCY. (S)

b6
b7C
b2

~~SECRET~~
ENCLOSURE

66-1372-52X

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(U)

62-115687-209

8

MJJ:jmn 12-2-75

F. J. Cassidy to
Mr. W. R. Wannall

JUNE

~~ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE~~
SURVEILLANCES

The purpose of the enclosed memo is to highlight concern over the failure of the AG to grant authority for certain electronic surveillances. "GIVE TO ME 12-22-75 for meeting to remind AG of need to know NSA Knowledge on capabilities of nations. "Ok Roy Wannal should handle. K" (S)

5/74/79
CLASS. & EXT. BY 2842 P.D.D.
REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW 1/23/96
marked

(U)

62-115687-219

encl. 1
8

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
JWD:jmn 1/23/76

FOR AG

JUNE

~~NATIONAL SECURITY~~
~~SPECIAL COVERAGE~~

Reurmemo 12/24/75, captd "Radio Intercepts, & ur statement that reqs for auth to conduct these intercepts shld be handled in same way reqs for wiretaps w/out judicial warrant r handled. On 1/14/76, reps of this Bu discussed these radio intercepts in detail w/u & members of ur staff. By 3 separate communs dated 1/20/76, I reqd ur approval of radio intercepts currently conducted by the FBI. Bu is preserving tapes for 10-year period. Enclosed LHM. (S)

~~SECRET~~

2

~~SECRET~~

(U)

~~66-8160-3799~~
66-8160-3797

45

~~SECRET~~

HWP:ded 12/18/75

Assistant Attorney General SURREPTITIOUS ENTRIES
Civil Rights Division JUNE Technical

Surveillance-General

Reurmemo of 8/19/75 req cer info concern surrep
entries conducted by FBI since 1/1/66 & to our
mem of 10/23/75 list entries conducted against
domestic targets. We have discov an entry in add
to those reported concern Martin Luther King, Jr.
Files of NYO show 29 entries into bus office of
Stanley David Levison. Our rec show another
entry into office of Levison. We are tak no act
to obt further info at this time. Details of
entries avail to u in connect w/ King matter. (S)

66-8160-34-366

113

WKH:dc* 4/20/77

(S) TO ADIC NEW YORK

TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE - NY
RELOCATION OF NEW YORK
OFFICE - [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IS VERY CONCERNED THAT THE PROPOSED RELOCATION
WILL RESULT IN SEVERE TECHNICAL PROBLEMS. NY HAS
INDICATED THAT THE FBI OPERATIONS WOULD ALSO BE
ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THE RELOCATION. NEW YORK
SHOULD ADDRESS THEMSELVES TO THE POINTS SET FORTH
IN TELETYPE. (S)

~~SECRET~~

4/4/79 BY 2842 PVO/KR
CLASS. & EXT. BY 2842
REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW 7/20/99
both also marked

3
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

66-8160-3790

4

HWP:113 12-1-75

HWP:113 12/1/75

(U)

Assistant Attorney General JUNE Surreptitious
Civil Rights Division Entries

~~TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE-GENERAL~~

Re 8/19/let of AAG, Civ Rights Div, DOJ, for
info re surrep entries. Since preparation of
10/23/75 memo from Director to AAG re domestic
tgts of entry a 10/63 entry into offices of
Fair Play for Cuba Committee, NYC, has been
located. AAG being advised. (e)(u)

66-8160-3833

enc 4
38

HWP:ds/en 3-22-76

(U)

AAG

JUNE

~~HWP:ds/en 3-22-76~~
SURREPTITIOUS ENTRIES

Civil Rights Division

~~TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE-GENERAL~~

Rememo 12/1/75 & Reurmemo 1/20/76 asking for info
re what material obtained in 10/63 entry into
Fair Play for Cuba Comm offices, NYC, & whether
info dissem to Warren Comm. Memo responds to
this request. (e)(u)

~~SECRET~~

4

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 3

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. O. Cregar

FROM : Mr. R. J. Gray, Jr.

SUBJECT: ~~HANDLING OF SENSITIVE MATERIAL~~
~~UNDER CODE WORD "JUNE"~~

Mr. H. N. Bassett
1 - Mr. M. S. Ramey
1 - Mr. D. Ryan

DATE: 6/27/78

1 - Mr. D. W. Moore, Jr.
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. E. C. Peterson
1 - Mr. C. G. Sullivan
1 - Mr. R. J. Gray, Jr.
1 - Mr. R. Hildreth, Jr.

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Fin. & Pers. _____
Ident. _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Insp. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

(U) PURPOSE: To recommend new procedures for the handling and storage of material currently designated as "JUNE".

(U) SYNOPSIS: Records Management Division (RMD) has requested the Intelligence Division (INTD) to review procedures for handling sensitive material designated "JUNE". Current policy states "only correspondence which identifies an individual, organization, or diplomatic establishment as having been or is under consideration to be the subject matter of an electronic surveillance in the internal security or racial field should be included in the "JUNE" procedure." Since this initial policy statement, the term "JUNE" has been broadened to include other sensitive material such as recruitments. The current "JUNE" definition is outdated in terminology and in practice. Further, markings such as "JUNE" are prohibited in the new Executive Order (EO) scheduled to replace EO 11652 and to become effective in October, 1978. Details of this memorandum recommend continued special storage for certain sensitive material dealing with electronic surveillance, as well as communications regarding recruitments, penetrations, and double agents. Henceforth the term "JUNE" is discontinued and material warranting special storage will be designated as such via an informal memorandum to the RMD, Attention Special File Room (SFR).

Enclosure

RH:maw
(9) maw

V-39

ENCLOSURE
CONTINUED - OVER

DE-28

REC-70

66-1272-53

SEP 19 1978

ENCLOSURE

ST 110
CONFIDENTIAL

Classified by 1929
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite



79 OCT 03 1978

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FBI/DOJ

Memorandum to Mr. W. O. Cregar
Re: Handling of Sensitive Material
Under Code Word "JUNE"

(U) CURRENT POLICY: Current "JUNE" policy, as set forth in SAC Letter 70-29, dated 5/26/70, states that "only correspondence which identifies an individual, organization, or diplomatic establishment as having been or is under consideration to be the subject matter of an electronic surveillance in the internal security or racial field should be included in the "JUNE" procedure. Current practice has also broadened the "JUNE" designation to include other types of sensitive material at the discretion of the supervisory Agent regardless of the material's relevance to electronic surveillance. This would include matters pertaining to possible recruitments, double agent cases, and undercover operations. ~~(U)~~ ~~(C)~~

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(U) 1. That the term "JUNE" be discontinued. ~~(U)~~

APPROVED: *WOB*
Director *WOB*
Assoc. Dir. *WOB*
Dep. AD Adm. *WOB*
Dep. AD Inv. *WOB*
Adm. Serv. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Intell. *Lib 4/7*
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Insp. _____
Rec. Mgnt. *WOB*
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____

WOB *MSR* *Pm*

(U) 2. That material, formerly designated "JUNE", continue to receive special handling and storage in the SFR, and be redefined as: FBI national security elsur material which identifies the target, reveals extraordinary technical devices being used, or where the subject is particularly sensitive; FBI communications identifying subjects of recruitment cases in which recruitment appears probable; other sensitive communications dealing with penetration or double agent matters. ~~(U)~~ ~~(C)~~

WOB
DK/KY

Recommendations contd. page 3

APPROVED: *WOB*
Director *WOB*
Assoc. Dir. *WOB*
Dep. AD Adm. *WOB*
Dep. AD Inv. *WOB*
Adm. Serv. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Intell. *Lib 4/7*
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Insp. _____
Rec. Mgnt. *WOB*
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____

MSR *Pm*

Memorandum to Mr. W. O. Cregar
Re: Handling of Sensitive Material
Under Code Word "JUNE"

(Recommendations - contd.)

- (U) 3. That upon adoption of Recommendations 1 and 2, the Intelligence Division (INTD) advise all security officers in the field offices as well as Bureau supervisors of the changes contained herein so as to effect uniform policy for the handling and storage of this sensitive information. (U)

APPROVED: *WCB*
Director *WCB*
Assoc. Dir. *WCB*
Dep. AD Adm. *WCB*
Dep. AD Inv. *WCB*

Adm. Serv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Crim. Inv. _____	Plan. & Insp. _____
Ident. _____	Rec. Mgnt. <i>WCB</i>
Intell. <i>WCB</i>	Tech. Servs. _____
Laboratory _____	Training _____
	Public Affs. Off. _____

- (U) DETAILS: Reference is made to M. S. Ramey memorandum to Mr. Bassett, dated 1/24/78, and captioned as above. (A copy is attached). (U)

- (U) The RMD has requested the INTD to reconsider whether the "JUNE" procedures for handling sensitive material are still warranted. For information, current "JUNE" policy as set forth in SAC Letter 70-29, dated 5/26/70, states that "only correspondence which identifies an individual, organization, or diplomatic establishment as having been or is under consideration to be the subject matter of an electronic surveillance in the internal security or racial field should be included in the "JUNE" procedure." A review of current practice regarding "JUNE" reflects that the definition and/or use of the "JUNE" designation has been broadened so as to include numerous types of sensitive material, regardless of their relevance to electronic surveillance. This would include matters pertaining to possible recruitments, double agent cases, penetrations, and undercover operations. To date, approximately 29 file cabinets of "JUNE" material have accumulated and are presently stored in the SFR. (C)

The May, 1970 definition of "JUNE" material would appear to be outdated both in its terminology as well as its current use. The terms "internal security" as well as "racial" are no longer applicable. Further, page nine of the final draft of the new Executive Order scheduled to replace Executive Order 11652 and to become effective in October,

(OVER)

Memorandum to Mr. W. O. Cregar
Re: Handling of Sensitive Material
Under Code Word "JUNE"

(U) 1978, prohibits the use of terms or markings such as "JUNE" in order to identify information requiring protection. ~~(U)~~

Despite the restrictions set forth above regarding special markings, the INTD feels that it is imperative that certain intelligence information be afforded special storage outside that provided by the general files. Said special storage should also be afforded this sensitive material in the field divisions. The following material should continue to receive special storage, preferably in the same space designated for SCI or "Top Secret" national security material:

- (U) a) FBI national security elsur material which identifies the target, reveals extraordinary technical devices being used, or where the subject is particularly sensitive.
- b) FBI communications identifying subjects of recruitment cases in which recruitment appears probable or other sensitive communications dealing with penetration or double agent matters. ~~(C)~~

(U) Keeping in mind the large number of employees both at FBIHQ and in the field offices having access to general file areas, special storage would serve to enforce the need-to-know principle among our own employees far more efficiently than that of more close supervision in these general file areas. ~~(U)~~

So as not to conflict with the special marking prohibitions outlined in the final draft of the new order on classification, the "JUNE" designation should be discontinued and henceforth all mail falling within the boundaries of the sensitive material defined above should be handled in the following manner. Any file meeting those requirements for SFR storage should be routed to the SFR attached to the tickler copy of an informal memorandum (Section Chief to Assistant Director). This memorandum will identify the supervisory Agent authorizing SFR storage as well as a statement setting forth the reason for said storage.

(OVER)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum to Mr. W. O. Cregar
Re: Handling of Sensitive Material
Under Code Word "JUNE"

(U) In most cases the reason will be stated in such terms as "This file warrants special handling and storage due to the sensitivity of the information contained herein." It is imperative that the information meet the requirements of the new definitions set forth above. In the case of individual serials, when SFR storage is deemed necessary, the administrative procedures set forth above are also applicable, noting only that there will be some changes in terminology i.e., serial in place of file. (U)

(U) After the initial memorandum has been submitted, any subsequent serials or file sections for the same file number may be designated for SFR storage by routing slip. The above procedure is administrative in nature and therefore does not constitute a violation of the new Executive Order. It should be noted that this administrative action need not apply to material marked SCI or "Top Secret" inasmuch as this material is already afforded special handling and storage. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
JULY 1973 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Bassett *Bassett* JUNE

FROM : M. S. Ramey *M. S. Ramey*

SUBJECT: HANDLING OF SENSITIVE MATERIAL
UNDER CODE WORD "JUNE"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE: 1/24/78

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Fin. & Pers. _____
Ident. _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Insp. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

PURPOSE:

To obtain opinion of the Intelligence Division if there is a current need to continue handling certain sensitive mail under "JUNE" procedures and, if not, to determine disposition of such material presently maintained in the Special File Room.

DETAILS:

(U) SAC Letter 69, series 1949, dated 6/29/49, initiated procedures for handling certain material from "...the most secretive sources...or when referring to highly confidential or unusual investigative techniques." The procedures effected greater security for this sensitive data and the code word "JUNE" was utilized to flag such material for special handling. SAC Letter 70-29 dated 7/26/70 stated that "...only correspondence which identifies an individual, organization, or diplomatic establishment as having been or is under consideration to be the subject matter of an electronic surveillance in the internal security or racial field should be included in the "JUNE" procedure." This is the last policy instruction concerning use of "JUNE" procedures.

In today's environment, with compartmented intelligence classifications and the overall attention given to handling sensitive data as well as FOIPA considerations, it is believed timely to reconsider whether the "JUNE" procedures for handling sensitive material in one restricted area of our operations is warranted.

About 29 file cabinets of "JUNE" material accumulated over the years is presently stored in the Special File Room, a great part of it being the individual serials from substantive files maintained in the general files.

ENCLOSURE

1 - Mr. Leavitt
66-1372
MSR:mjl (5)

CONTINUED - OVER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan



5010-110

FOI/CS

Memorandum M. S. Ramey to Mr. Bassett
Re: Handling of Sensitive Material
Under Code Word "JUNE"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The Intelligence Division as the user division is requested to advise the Records Management Division (RMD) if "JUNE" procedures are still warranted and, if so, to set forth justification for same.

If the Intelligence Division does not feel "JUNE" procedures are currently warranted, the RMD should also be advised whether the "JUNE" material currently maintained in the Special File Room should be consolidated into the general files. This effort would necessarily have to be in conjunction with the Document Classification and Review Section since some of the material may well justify Top Secret classification thus warranting retention in separate facilities. Also, on an individual basis, some of the material may justify retention in the Special File Room independent of the "JUNE" procedures.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the Intelligence Division advise the RMD if "JUNE" procedures for handling certain sensitive material are currently necessary and, if so, justification for same.

APPROVED:	Admin. Serv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Director _____	Ext. Aff. _____	Public Aff. _____
Asst. Dir. _____	Gen. Inv. _____	Rec. Mgmt. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____	Ident. _____	Spec. Inv. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____	Intell. _____	Training _____

twj *Buss*

2. If "JUNE" procedures are no longer necessary, provide the RMD with guidelines as to disposition from the Special File Room of the material currently retained there under provisions of the "JUNE" handling of this sensitive material over the years.

APPROVED:	Admin. Serv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Director _____	Ext. Aff. _____	Public Aff. _____
Asst. Dir. _____	Gen. Inv. _____	Rec. Mgmt. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____	Ident. _____	Spec. Inv. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____	Intell. _____	Training _____

twj *Buss*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

b6
b7C

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 11/27/74

FROM : SAC, MINNEAPOLIS (70-6832-Sub P)

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

WOUNDED KNEE LEADERSHIP TRIALS
ST. PAUL, MINNESOTA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-6-80 BY SP-5 [REDACTED]

During the trial [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] at St. Paul, Minnesota, there were repeated efforts by Defense Attorney WILLIAM KUNSTLER to ascertain a description of the "June" files of the FBI while I was on the stand. (I do not know where KUNSTLER first heard of the word "June" in connection with FBI files.)

Enclosed herewith are pages 8745 through 8751 and 10742 through 10753 of the transcript of this trial. The earlier portion pertains to testimony 3/21/74 and the latter testimony occurred on 4/5/74. KUNSTLER, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] are Defence Attorneys, and [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] are members of the prosecution.

As indicated in the transcript, this matter was orally discussed at FBI Headquarters by me, and a response was furnished to the court "in camera" in line with those instructions.

It is further noted that on page 8751 there is a question directed to me concerning a "Q" file. I responded that I did not know of such a file.

While in this case the question of a "June" file was not pertinent, it is felt that we can reasonably anticipate KUNSTLER will attempt to uncover the meaning of a "June" file in any future case wherein the FBI is involved.

During my visits with Bureau officials wherein this matter was discussed, there was some mention of a possibility of discontinuing "June" files.

2 - Bureau (Enc.)
1 - Minneapolis
JRT:jch
(3)

NOT RECORDED

46 DEC 18 1974

4 DEC 23 1974

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

ORIGINAL FILED IN 70-6832-403

MP 70-6832-Sub P

Although Headquarters has the complete transcript of this trial, I felt it was appropriate to specifically bring to the attention of the Bureau that portion of the transcript which pertains to the questioning of me as it relates to "June" files and a "Q" file.

ST
esa
(U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(E) CODE WORD "JUNE" -- On occasions questions arise as to whether a communication concerning an electronic surveillance should contain the code word "June." For your guidance, only correspondence which identifies an individual, organization, or diplomatic establishment as having been or is under consideration to be the subject matter of an electronic surveillance in the internal security or racial field should be included in the "June" procedure. (C)

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures for (A) and (D)

66-1372-
NOT RECORDED
176 MAY 28 1970

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-04-3741

8-6-80
CLASS. & EXT. BY SP-5 [Signature]
REASON - FCIM 11, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW 5-28-80

5/26/70
SAC LETTER 70-29

- 3 -

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP
DATE 8-15-80
[Signature]

70 JUN 17 1970

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Insp. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

TO : Director

DATE: 8/17/78

FROM : Legal Counsel *jm*

SUBJECT: HANDLING OF SENSITIVE MATERIAL
UNDER CODE WORD "JUNE"

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-16-80 BY SP-5 NLS/AC

PURPOSE:

To respond to the Director's routing slip to Mr. Mintz requesting recommendations concerning the Gray to Cregar Memorandum dated 6/27/78, captioned as above.

DETAILS:

A review of the 6/27/78, Gray Memorandum, the proposed Executive Order (EO 12065) pertaining to classified records, and the status of the law relating to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and Privacy Act (PA) revealed no inconsistencies between the recommendations contained in the Gray Memorandum and the law and proposed Executive Order.

Continued specialized storage procedures for certain FBI records do not violate the mandates of the Executive Order or, as long as the records remain retrievable through a published system of records, the FOIA or PA.

In view of the fact that the recommendations contained in the Gray Memorandum are consistent with the law and regulation, Legal Counsel Division raises no objection to their implementation.

RECOMMENDATION:

None, for information.

ENCLOSURE

- 1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Mathews

CMIII: *gm* (3)

APPROVED: *W*

Director _____
Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____

Adm. Serv. _____
Crim. Inv. _____

Ident. _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____

Legal Coun. *jm*

Plan. & Insp. _____
Rec Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____

1 SEP 19 1978

REC-70

SL 110



6 SEP 29 1978 Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FBI/DOJ

DO-7

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
TO
OFFICIAL INDICATED BELOW

MR. ADAMS _____ ()
MR. MCDERMOTT _____ ()
MR. BASSETT _____ ()
MR. COCHRAN _____ ()
MR. COLWELL _____ ()
MR. CREGAR _____ ()



MR. MINTZ _____ () ✓
MR. MOORE _____ ()
MR. BOYNTON _____ ()
MR. BRUEMMER _____ ()

_____ ()
TELE. ROOM _____ ()
_____ ()
_____ ()
_____ ()

SEE ME _____ ()
NOTE AND RETURN _____ ()
PREPARE REPLY _____ ()
SEND MEMO TO ATTORNEY GENERAL _____ ()
FOR YOUR RECOMMENDATION _____ () ✓
WHAT ARE THE FACTS? _____ ()
HOLD _____ ()

REMARKS: _____

78F 21 7C W/ 1218

ON 10-09-2009

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1-Mr. J. B. Adams
1-Mr. R. J. Bruemmer
1-

DATE: 9/18/78

3-Mr. H. N. Bassett
1-Mr. M. S. Ramey
1-
1-Mr. D. W. Moore, Jr.
1-Mr. W. O. Cregar

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Insp. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

b6
b7C

TO : Mr. W. O. Cregar

FROM :

SUBJECT: HANDLING OF SENSITIVE MATERIAL
UNDER CODE WORD "JUNE"

PURPOSE: To set forth new procedures for the handling and storage of material currently designated as "JUNE."

CURRENT BUREAU POLICY: Current "JUNE" policy, as set forth in SAC Letter 70-29, dated 5/26/70, states that "only correspondence which identifies an individual, organization, or diplomatic establishment as having been or is under consideration to be the subject matter of an electronic surveillance in the internal security or racial field should be included in the 'JUNE' procedure." Current practice has also broadened the "JUNE" designation to include other types of sensitive material at the discretion of the supervisory Agent regardless of the material's relevance to electronic surveillance. X X X

SYNOPSIS: Current policy regarding captioned subject states "only correspondence which identifies an individual organization, or diplomatic establishment as having been or is under consideration to be the subject matter of an electronic surveillance in the internal security or racial field should be included in the 'JUNE' procedure." The current procedure is outdated in terminology and conflicts with Executive Order 12065 on classification, in that special markings to identify material for protection i.e., "JUNE" are prohibited as of December 1, 1978. The Intelligence Division (INTD) recommended that certain sensitive material continue to receive special storage and the Director, FBI has authorized same. The definitions of the material to include the administrative procedures to be implemented in obtaining said storage, are contained in the details of this memorandum. Field offices and Legats are being advised via attached SAC Memorandum.

Enclosure

RH:maw
(12) *maw*

JAN 24 1979

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

CONTINUED - OVER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CONTINUED

FBI/DOJ

b6
b7C

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
and

Memorandum to Mr. W. O. Cregar
 Re: Handling of Sensitive Material
 Under Code Word "JUNE"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That Assistant Directors in each Headquarters Division insure that all Bureau supervisors assigned to their division are advised of the new procedures contained herein.

APPROVED: *WOW*
 Director _____
 Assoc. Dir. _____
 Dep. AD Adm. _____
 Dep. AD Inv. _____

Adm. Serv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Crim. Inv. _____	Plan. & Insp. _____
Ident. _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
Intell. <i>WOW</i>	Tech. Servs. _____
Laboratory _____	Training _____
	Public Affs. Off. _____

*see Atul 10/16
 memo 10/16
 J*

2. That attached SAC Memorandum, setting forth new handling and storage procedures for sensitive material, be forwarded to all Field Offices and Legats.

APPROVED: _____
 Director _____
 Assoc. Dir. _____
 Dep. AD Adm. _____
 Dep. AD Inv. _____

Adm. Serv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Crim. Inv. _____	Plan. & Insp. _____
Ident. _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
Intell. <i>WOW</i>	Tech. Servs. _____
Laboratory _____	Training _____
	Public Affs. Off. _____

*see memo
 per Steve memo
 10/6
 WOK
 J*

(U) DETAILS: Reference is made to my memorandum dated 6/27/78 and captioned as above. For information current "JUNE" policy as set forth in SAC Letter 70-29, dated 5/26/70, states that "only correspondence which identifies an individual, organization, or diplomatic establishment as having been or is under consideration to be the subject matter of an electronic surveillance in the internal security or racial field should be included in the 'JUNE' procedure." A review of the current practice reflects that the definition of "JUNE" is both outdated in its terminology, and is also in conflict with Executive Order 12065, which replaces Executive Order 11652 and becomes effective December 1, 1978. This new Executive Order prohibits the use of terms or markings such as "JUNE" in order to identify information requiring protection. So as not to conflict with the special marking prohibitions outlined in the new Executive Order on classification, the "JUNE" designation is being discontinued. (C)

CONTINUED - OVER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum to Mr. W. O. Cregar
Re: Handling of Sensitive Material
Under Code Word "JUNE"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETAILS (Cont.)

Despite the restrictions set forth above regarding special markings, the Intelligence Division considers it imperative that certain intelligence information be afforded special storage outside that provided by the general files. On August 30, 1978, the Director, FBI, approved new procedures regarding the designation of certain sensitive material for special storage. The following material should receive special storage in the same space designated for Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) or "Top Secret" national security material:

(U) a. FBI national security electronic surveillance (ELSUR) material, which identifies the target, reveals extraordinary technical devices being used, or where the subject is particularly sensitive.

b. FBI communications identifying subjects of recruitment cases in which recruitment appears probable or other sensitive communications dealing with penetration or double agent matters. (S)

(U) All mail, falling within the boundaries of the sensitive material defined above, should be handled in the following manner. Any file meeting the above requirements for Special File Room (SFR) storage should be routed to the SFR attached to the Records Management Division tickler copy of a formal memorandum (Section Chief to Assistant Director). This memorandum will identify the supervisory Agent authorizing SFR storage as well as a statement setting forth the reason for said storage. In most cases the reason will be stated in such terms as "This file warrants special handling and storage due to the sensitivity of the information contained herein." The information must meet the requirements of the new definitions set forth above. In the case of individual serials, when SFR storage is deemed necessary, the administrative procedures set forth above are also applicable, noting only that there will be some changes in terminology i.e., serial in place of file. (S)

CONTINUED - OVER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum to Mr. W. O. Cregar
Re: Handling of Sensitive Material
Under Code Word "JUNE"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETAILS (Cont.)

After the initial memorandum has been submitted any subsequent serials or file sections for the same file number may be designated for SFR storage by routing slip. These procedures are administrative in nature and do not constitute a violation of the new Executive Order. It should be noted that these procedures need not apply to material marked SCI or "Top Secret" inasmuch as this material is already afforded special storage.

Field Offices and Legats are being advised via the attached SAC Memorandum.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : W. O. Cregar *WOC*

FROM : *TR*
RK

SUBJECT: HANDLING OF SENSITIVE MATERIAL
UNDER CODE WORD "JUNE"

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1-Mr. J. B. Adams
1-Mr. R. J. Bruemmer
1- *[Redacted]*

DATE: 10/18/78

3-Mr. H. N. Bassett
1-Mr. M. S. Ramey
1- *[Redacted]*
1-Mr. D. W. Moore, Jr.
1-Mr. W. O. Cregar
1- *[Redacted]*
1- *[Redacted]*
1- *[Redacted]*
1- *[Redacted]*
1- *[Redacted]*

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.: *[initials]*
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Intell. *[initials]*
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Insp. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

b6
b7C

PURPOSE: To set forth new procedures for the handling and storage of material currently designated as "JUNE."

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That Assistant Directors in each Headquarters Division insure that all Bureau supervisors assigned to their division are advised of the new procedures contained herein.

APPROVED: *[initials]*
Director _____
Assoc. Dir. *[initials]*
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Adm. Serv. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Intell. *[initials]*
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Insp. _____
Rec. Mgnt. *[initials]*
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____

2. That attached SAC Memorandum, setting forth new handling and storage procedures for sensitive material, be forwarded to all Field Offices and Legats.

APPROVED: *[initials]*
Director _____
Assoc. Dir. *[initials]*
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Adm. Serv. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Intell. *[initials]*
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Insp. _____
Rec. Mgnt. *[initials]*
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____

REC-126

66-127-56

DETAILS: Reference is made to my memorandum dated 9/18/78 and captioned as above, which set forth new procedures for the handling and storage of material currently designated as "JUNE." Upon reviewing the SAC Memorandum which was attached to referenced memorandum, the Director instructed that the SAC Memorandum be rewritten to specifically include language indicating that both in Field Offices and at FBIHQ, care should be taken to insure that any files or serials designated for special storage are properly charged out from _____

2 NOV 17 1978

RH:maw
(14)

Enclosure

66 DEC 4 1978

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-6-80 BY SP-5 *[initials]*

FBI/DOJ

Memorandum to W. O. Cregar
Re: Handling of Sensitive Material
Under Code Word "June"

DETAILS (Continued)

the office's general files in accordance with current charge-out procedure.

Pursuant to the Director's instruction, attention is directed to the last sentence of the attached SAC Memorandum which incorporates a statement concerning the charge-out procedures.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

No Duplication Fees are charged for Deleted Page Information Sheet(s).

Total Deleted Page(s) ~ 27

Page 13 ~ b2, b6, b7C, b7E

SEALED - COURT ORDER

Page 14 ~ b2, b6, b7C, b7E

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